

EASTERN ASIAN REFUGEE IN THE PHILIPPINE
REFUGEE PROCEEDING CENTER

by

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ACRONYMS

AID	- Aid to Families with Dependent Children
ADRA	- Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AVN	- Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AT	- Assistant Teacher
AWOL	- Away Without Leave
CBFP	- Center for Assistance to Displaced Persons
CHSODS	- Community Administration, Social Services Development and Education Group
CHO	- Community Based Structures
CDC	- Centers for Disease Control
CPRI	- Community Family Services International
CRMS	- Community Mental Health Services
CO	- Cultural Orientation
COAO	- Community Organization and Administration Officer
CPs	- Displaced Persons
ENG	- Engineering and Maintenance Group
ESL	- English as a Second Language
FAC	- First Aid/First Aid Camp
FCAG	- Food Service and Community Administration Group
HSC	- Health Services Group
ICIM	- International Commission for European Migration
IOIC	- International Catholic Migration Commission
INC	- Interreligious Council
INS	- Immigration and Naturalization Service
IOE	- International Organization for Migration
ITE	- Indigenous Technical Knowledge
JOCV	- Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
JVA	- Jewish Voluntary Agency
MCS	- Modern Christian Service
NARA	- Norwegian Government Refugee Agency
NLF	- National Liberation Front
NPA	- New People's Army
ODP	- Orderly Departure Program
OTEP	- Overseas Refugee Training Program
PASS	- Preparation for American Secondary School
PRM	- Philippine Baptist Refugee Mission
PC	- Philippine Consulate
PRAC	- Palawan First Aid Camp
PRSC	- Philippine National Red Cross
PRSP	- Preparing Refugees for Elementary School Program
PRSDS	- Processing and Community Organization and Social Services
PRPC	- Philippine Refugee Processing Center

PRPC - Philippine Refugee Thrust Center
 REFCOORD - Refugee Coordinator
 RVN - Republic of Vietnam (Government in South Vietnam)
 SA - Salvation Army
 SRC - Social Rehabilitation Center
 UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
 UNRDO - United Nations Research Institute for Social
 Development
 USOR - United States Operation Station in Vietnam
 VOLAG - Voluntary Agency
 VNAF - Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
 MO - Work Orientation
 WPC - World Relief Corporation
 YASP - Young Adult Service Program
 YACU - Young Adult Service Unit

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**SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES IN THE PHILIPPINE
REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTERS**

by

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Chairman: Art Korman
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The issues of dependency and the "dependency syndrome" among refugees are as poorly defined as they are resilient. Refugee camps can be places where people learn that they are not in control of many aspects of their daily lives, where they come to believe that they are powerless and helpless. Camps can be dependency-arousing places where passivity is the expected response, where initiative and assertiveness are not

encouraged and rewarded but discouraged and punished. Or refugee camps can be places where people are presented with a range of decisions they can and must make, where people have some control, where initiative and assertiveness may be tolerated, encouraged, or even rewarded. It is important to distinguish the two types of perceptions of refugee camps and to determine what factors contribute to the difference.

In this dissertation I address this distinction and some possible causal factors for one case, the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) in Batuan, Marikina in the Philippines, where I carried out research for two years from 1988 to 1990. I also address the degree of dependency or autonomy experienced by the refugees in the PRPC, arguing for a greater degree of autonomy and I present some factors that possibly explain the degree of autonomy I found among the refugees in the PRPC.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Refugees

For anthropologists, refugees present many questions. What kinds of societies produce refugees? What kinds of people choose to become refugees, and why? What are the responses to refugee flows? Do different societies respond differently to refugees? Does the same society respond differently to different kinds of refugees? If there is a differential response to refugees, why? What is the response of the refugees themselves to the way they are treated, to those who seek to aid them, to the institutions that arise as a response to their presence?

I attempt in this dissertation to answer a few of the questions above for one population and one institution. The population is Southeast Asians, specifically Vietnamese. The institution is the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) in Sctesus, Philippines. The questions I seek to address are as follows:

1. What is the PRPC? What does it do, how does it work, and why?
2. What is the response of the Vietnamese Refugee population to the PRPC? What do they do, how do they do what they do, and why?

3. What do answers to the above two questions contribute to our understanding of people experiencing dramatic changes in how they live their lives?

The three questions above form the basis to the general topic of the patterns of behaviors and responses to refugee camps. The first question above addresses what a refugee camp is, the institutional environment to which refugees respond. The second question addresses the responses of the refugees, the behaviors that constitute their response to the refugee camp environment. This question also addresses what a successful refugee transition is, as well as what behaviors lead to problems and an unsuccessful transition. Resettlement was the goal of the refugee population in the RRC. A successful transition through the RRC was based on behaviors that facilitated the refugees' progress in the resettlement process.

The third question addresses the theoretical issues. The issues central to anthropology as a whole. My people do what they do is the central question of all the social sciences. Socio-cultural anthropologists approach this question by attempting to identify the commonalities and differences in what groups of people do and seeking to explain them in terms of the basic processes that determine human behavior.

Dislocated people, people who have experienced a rapid change in both their physical and social environments, can be considered a unique group or population. Identifying the

commonalities and differences in what they do can yield important information to the growing data base on the basic processes that determine human behavior. That is the essential purpose in pursuing studies of displaced people and their potential contribution to what is known as social change theory.

The Dissertation

Writing this dissertation has been, is, and continues to be an exploration of myself and my motivations for conducting the research that this dissertation is about and presenting the research the way I do. I have discovered that there are certain questions that pertain to my research and the population I studied, refugees, about which I have come to care a great deal.

My research focused on the sociocultural change experienced by a population as a result of a major transition in their lives. This transition was from Vietnamese citizen, to refugee, to resettled refugee in the United States. The point that I intercepted them in this process was in a refugee processing camp or one step shy of being resettled in the United States. At this point they were still refugees, they could still be denied admittance to the United States. The environment in which they lived was a refugee camp. As such the arguments that applied to

refugees and refugee camps apply to the population I studied.

These arguments are not in any real sense theoretical. There is no theory of refugees, of why people who are categorized as refugees behave as they do. Thus to situate this study in the larger contexts of refugee studies or what other social scientists say about refugees I had to consider what the arguments concerning refugees and refugee camps were. It was in my exploration of the literature on refugees and the issues addressed by other researchers that I discovered arguments which I have come to care about. I also discovered that unless this dissertation addresses these issues I will not be satisfied with it. Consequently, the approach that guided this research, an approach that I had hoped would stand alone as a cause for writing it, will be equally applied to explaining the refugees' behavior as well as addressing what I perceive to be some central questions concerning refugee studies in general.

Dependency: The Central Question

Almost every study of refugees I have encountered addresses not the question of why the refugees do what they do but why the refugee population studied does not do something else. This is easily discernible by descriptions of refugees as dependent, helpless, passive, disempowered, in essence as something other than what they ought to be.

The implication being that the refugees should be independent, capable, active, expected. This seems to me to be a questionable approach for two reasons. First, this categorization of refugees has become so pervasive that it threatens to become the defining characteristic of what a refugee is. I fear that this is happening without serious consideration of whether or not it is an accurate characterization. Second, this approach constitutes a reversal of the logic of doing research. I understand social science research to be about explaining why people do what they do. The approach I took to my research on the refugees in the Philippine Refugee Processing Center was to apply a theory by generating hypotheses specific to the situation and population and testing these hypotheses through observation.

In the case of refugee studies it seems that in the absence of theory there is only the expectation that refugees should, but do not, act in ways that can be considered indicative of self-sufficiency, independence, etc., or something is wrong. The anatomy of my portrayal of the issues in the question that will be addressed in chapters two, three and four where the issue of refugee dependency is discussed.

The Organization of the Chapters

Chapter two raises the issue as a general concept. Chapter three is a discussion of refugee dependency as applied to refugees in the FEPC. In chapter four I conclude the discussion on refugee dependency with some thoughts on why refugees might be mis-characterized as dependent and why I believe they are not.

Chapters five and six constitute an introduction to the FEPC with a review of the history and structure of the institution and glimpse of what life there was like for the refugees. Chapters seven, eight and nine constitute the counter-argument to refugee dependency in the FEPC. In these chapters I explore the differing roles played by the diverse groups that participated in the creation of the FEPC environment. These chapters also explore the ambiguity in authority within the FEPC, and the, sometimes, conflicting nature of the interactions of the various groups. Chapter ten addresses the issue of how the refugees adapted to the FEPC. Chapter eleven includes a brief summary and offers conclusions that can be drawn from the application of a perspective other than one of "refugee dependency" for understanding the behavior of refugees in the FEPC.

The FEPC: A Brief Introduction

Opened on January 21, 1945, the FEPC was originally a partial solution to the increasingly overcrowded condition

of indochinese refugees in first asylum camps (FACs) throughout Southeast Asia in 1976-78 (age 1976-1981). The intent was to provide a place for refugees who had been accepted already by third countries for resettlement to complete their medical and resettlement processing before departing for their final destinations. Doing this processing in the FACs would have entailed longer waits in the FACs and led to higher refugee populations in those first asylum countries, where attitudes against refugees were becoming increasingly hardened.

The Philippine government administered the PRPC under an agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As called for in the agreement (UNHCR 1978), the PRPC was a transit center; its basic purpose was to facilitate the movement of refugees from first asylum camps to resettlement countries. In addition to having their basic needs met during their stay, refugees in the PRPC completed their medical and resettlement processing and received an orientation to the third country where they would be resettled.

The PRPC was located on the East coast of the Batang Peninsula in the municipality of Marikina; it was 182 kilometers, approximately three or four hours driving time from Manila. The location was close enough to Manila to maintain administrative ties between the city and camp offices and to facilitate the transfer of equipment and

material during the construction phase and, later, of food and other basic necessities required to operate the center. In addition, Manila was close enough to permit the efficient transfer of arrivals and departures between the PRPC and the Philippine Refugee Transit Center (PRTC), which was adjacent to the Aquino International Airport. Refugees stayed in the PRPC for one night when they entered or left the Philippines as they could meet their flights, or if they had to be in Manila for medical or other reasons. The location was also thought to be far enough away from Manila to prevent the potential problems of having a refugee camp near a large metropolis.

The PRPC was laid out in three parts (see Figure 1.1), a central administration and staff residential area, phase I, and phase II. Within the two phases were the refugee neighborhoods, six in phase I and four in phase II. A neighborhood consisted of 24 to 32 buildings, each building with 16 billets. Each billet was approximately 2.5 meters wide and 8.5 meters long with a downstairs living and sleeping area and an upstairs sleeping loft, which covered two-thirds of the downstairs area. A billet was supposed to accommodate up to 16 people, though rarely did that many people actually reside in one billet. There was a toilet block for every four buildings, with the occupants of two billets sharing one toilet. Each billet had two room lights, one downstairs and one upstairs, with electricity




Figure 2.2: Phase Map

provided from sunset to 1:00 pm. Water came from two large cylindrical water tanks with taps at either end, the occupants of each building sharing a single tap. The water was turned on from about 4:00 to 7:00 in the morning and from 5:00 to 7:00 in the evening.

The administrative core area contained offices, a hospital, a guesthouse for official visitors, a central place where special events were held, a canteen, and the post office. For the refugees the most important place in the core area was a wall on the PRPC administration building where the new departure lists were posted two or three times a week. If possible, refugees managed to pass by every day to see who had their names on the departure list. For those who had completed their requirements and were waiting for departure, the daily checking was almost a must.

From the inception in 1940 to the end of December 1940, the PRPC housed 147,444 refugees. They came from all of the first asylum countries in Southeast Asia except China and Vietnam. During the period I stayed in the camp, the average daily population fluctuated between 14,000 and 18,000. Until 1947 the refugee population of the camp was multi-ethnic, including Lao, Khmer, Hmong, and Vietnamese (see Table 1.1). In 1947 the camp population became essentially Vietnamese, approximately half being first asylum camp "boat people," and the other half coming through the Orderly Departure Program (ODP).

The organizational structure of the PRPC resulted from a division of labor and responsibility in fulfilling the camp's various missions. As the implementing agency under the Philippine government, the PRPC administration was responsible for the provision of basic services such as food, housing, water, medical services, community organization, and security. Numerous voluntary agencies (volags) were responsible for resettlement and medical processing, education, training, recreation, and mental health services (see Figure 1.2). While the PRPC administration was technically in charge and responsible for overseeing the volags, its power was actually limited. The fact that the PRPC administration had to rely on the UNHCR for funding, while the volags were either governmentally or self-funded, often at higher levels, restricted the control of the administration and, at the same time, gave the volags more independence.

The Research, Methodology and Scope

I conducted research in the PRPC from September 1981 to July 1986. The topic of my research concerned the adaptation of Vietnamese refugees to the PRPC. I sought to understand the effects of the refugee's previous experience in Vietnam and first asylum camps, the PRPC environment itself, and the refugee's expectations about resettlement on their adaptation to the PRPC. Throughout my research I

DIRECTORS IN MANILA

Director of PEPC and PRRC ----- United Nations High
Commissioner

for Refugees (or UNHCR)

ON-SITE ADMINISTRATION

Deputy Director's Office ----- Voluntary Agencies (see
below)

Administration and General Services Group

Electrical and Maintenance Group (or ENG)

Health Services Group (or HSG)

Food Distribution Services Group (or FDSG)

Processing, Community Organization and Social Services Group
(or PCOSSG)

[NOTE: a reorganization in 1980 combined FDSG and PCOSSG
into the Food Services and Community Administration Group,
or FSCAG.]

PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WORKING IN PEPC

International Organization for Migration (or IOM)

International Catholic Migration Commission (or ICMC)

World Relief Corporation (or WRC)

Center for Assistance to Displaced Persons (or CADP)

Philippine Refugee Refugee Bureau (or PRRB)

Salvation Army (or SA)

Community and Family Services International (or CFSI)

Philippine Red Cross Red Cross (or PRRC)

Advertiser Training and Development Agency (or ATDA)

Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (or JOCV)

OTHER INVOLVED AGENCIES

Bureau of Posts

Philippine Constabulary (or PC)

Joint Voluntary Agency (or JVA)

U. S. Refugee Coordinator (or REPCORD)

FIGURE 1.1 ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF PEPC

lived with refugees in refugee housing. This allowed me to utilize the methodology of participant observation as well as carrying out surveys, collecting data from various agencies working in the camp, and conducting structured interviews with refugees and staff.

In September 1966 I moved into billet 918B in the PRPC. At the time there were five other single male refugees living in the same billet. I continued to live in 918B, except for brief periods when I made trips to Thailand, Hong Kong, and Singapore to visit other Southeast Asian refugee camps and one trip back to the U.S., until July 1969.

During my stay in 918B I ate the same food as my billettates (they cooked it), slept on the same hard wooden platform, bathed at the same water-tap, drank the same water, sweated through the same heat, got drenched during the same wet seasons, endured the same typhoons, upheld and violated many of the same PRPC regulations, saw the same people they saw everyday, in essence lived much the same life as my billettates.

I also adjusted to new arrivals in the billet. I lived with 15 different refugees during the time I stayed in 918B. Some of these came as single individuals, some came with friends and some came as families. My billettates included men and women and children.

In addition to participant observation I also collected data systematically through interviews with redundancy

selected households; interviewed inmates in the camp jail, neighborhood leaders, and refugees running businesses; and formally and informally interviewed many other refugees, PRPC administration and voting personnel.

Many of the people I interviewed in the PRPC I interviewed as the result of a "problem oriented" approach to the PRPC where I investigated what were known as "incidents" to gain as wide a perspective as any single event as possible. Much of the data I collected as a result of pursuing incidents as presented in chapters seven, eight, nine and ten.

I will refer in this dissertation, during discussions or descriptions of the incidents I cite, to "Vietnamese culture" or the behavior I describe as being indicative of "being Vietnamese." The characterization of the Vietnamese refugee's behavior as being "Vietnamese" versus some other characterization such as "refugee" was the result of the process of participant observation where I witnessed behavior and then sought explanations from the refugees involved or other refugee observers. In characterizing such behavior as "Vietnamese" I am relying on my informants who considered such behavior appropriate for Vietnamese and said that people would behave the same under similar circumstances in Vietnam.

In an environment as artificial as a refugee camp it was difficult to know which behaviors were expressions of

Vietnamese culture and which behaviors were the result of the situation, i.e., being a refugee in a refugee camp. Clearly in such an environment, the Vietnamese could not completely recreate all aspects of their culture. I believe, however, from what I observed, and the expatriations given to by both refugee participants and observers, that Vietnamese refugees in the PRPC maintained the essentials of their cultural expectations of interpersonal behavior as well as their self-perceptions of their own desired status vis-a-vis the Vietnam and the people they left behind in Vietnam that led them to choose to leave Vietnam.

The PRPC could accommodate up to 20,000 refugees and often, during my stay, had 14,000 to 16,000 refugees transiting through the camp. In addition there was another 2000 plus employees, and an unknown number of local people working as market vendors, tricycle drivers and living as squatters on the periphery of the camp. In this respect, the PRPC was like a small city. Like most any small city, there was a dual aspect to the PRPC. One could see large numbers of people doing many of the same things, at the same time, almost everyday and one could see and hear about events that were anything but mundane and routine.

I sought to understand both the routine and the exceptional behavior of refugees as aspects of their adaptation to the PRPC. As a result of the decision to address refugee dependency, much of the data in this

dissertation is drawn from the exceptional aspect of the refugees' behavior. I must point out, however, that the exceptional behavior, as exemplified in the many cases I present, would not have been possible if the refugees had been under the influence of a refugee dependency syndrome. I must also point out that while the exceptional behavior I discuss related to incidents that took place in the PRPC was by no means unusual. On any given day, the security group would have three to four incidents to investigate or not upon and often many more. I have copies of all the incident reports produced by the security group for 1989, but have not processed the data because of the sheer size of the task. Consequently, I beg the reader's indulgence if the data presented herein appear too dramatic or sensational and ask the reader to consider the many cases I present in light of the possibility of the refugees concerned being dependent, passive and helpless.

In fact, now having had time to evaluate the PRPC from a more distant perspective and to compare the PRPC with brief visits to other Southeast Asian refugee camps, I feel that the PRPC was actually a good model for a refugee transit center. Furthermore, I feel the refugees benefitted from their time in the PRPC. This issue is addressed more specifically in chapter ten, but I will give a briefer explanation here.

The PRPC was a mid-point in the refugees' transition from refugee life to life in their resettlement country. As a mid-point in their transition the refugees experienced a unique set of circumstances including the security in knowing they had been accepted for resettlement, an environment dominated by the presence of other refugees of the same culture and ethnicity, and an introduction to their resettlement country in an environment that did not directly challenge the efficacy of their ability to carry out the tasks necessary for daily life.

It is difficult to describe the relief and change in perspective of refugees who have lived with the uncertainty of not knowing whether the goal they set out to attain, resettlement in a third country, for a long period of time is finally going to be realized. Once accepted for resettlement the refugees can begin to think about the long-term future in terms of possibilities and not concentrate on the short-term future. They can begin to entertain ideas about the place they are going and how they will have to adjust.

In the PRPC the refugees were still surrounded by other refugees of the same culture and recent experience as refugees. As a result the aspects of their culture and experience as refugees that they brought to the PRPC continued to serve them in terms of knowing how to behave with the people around them. In addition, most of the tasks

required to get through the day involved interactions with other refugees and, for those I lived with, other Vietnamese. Thus the basis for inter-personal interaction in most aspects of daily life, including getting tasks done, entertainment and recreation, and generally solving the problems that arose, was unchanged while in the PRPC. This meant that the refugees were free to consider the possibilities raised by their future in another country in a relatively non-threatening environment where their basic cultural principles were not directly challenged. They could think about the future, including the information and language they were taught in classes, without having to confront it directly during the period they stayed in the PRPC. In this sense I believe the time spent in the PRPC was beneficial.

Refugees as a Social Problem: Why Dependency is the Central Issue

One further aspect of this dissertation requires explanation. Why did I choose dependency as the central issue? As the appendix shows that introduce dependency as the central issue and that briefly outline the chapters in this dissertation reveal, I think, and hope to demonstrate in the case of the PRPC, that refugees are not dependent. I will argue that refugee dependency, as both a characteristic ascribed to refugees and a result of life in a refugee camp, is applied inappropriately. If I am correct in this

conclusion (a judgment the reader must make), then there are two questions that must be asked. The first question is why refugees are inappropriately characterized as dependent. The second question is, why does this matter? What are the implications for our understanding, as social scientists, of refugees and the transition they experience and the further implications for policies that affect that transition?

The first question is the more difficult of the two to attempt to answer. Implying that assertions of refugee dependency are inappropriate or inaccurate characterizations of refugees or refugee camps leads to the question of the place and interpretation of "data," the observer's description and perception of refugee behavior.

In the case of refugee camps, for example, there appears to be a discontinuity in the data constituted by descriptions of the refugee camp environment and descriptions of the refugees' behavior that is resolved in favor of a kind of environmental determinism that must result in dependent refugees. One example is Rogge's (1980) description of the River refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border. Rogge begins by ascribing a "care and maintenance character" to the camps.

Unlike many other world regions hosting large refugee communities, where at least some attempts are made to create a degree of self-reliance in hosting refugees' basic day to day needs, in Thailand this has never been the policy: from the outset camps have taken on a complete care and maintenance character. (Rogge, 1980:8)

The ease and maintenance character of the camps is the result of the provision of basic needs to the refugees by United Nations organizations and the activities of NGOs within the camps.

Both the UNRWA and UNHCR camps have always been wholly dependent upon weekly or bi-weekly rations provided by the international community. Such rations are basic: rice, vegetables, cooking oil and canned fish are the staples. Fuelwood is also provided in some camps. Water pumps have been installed in all camps, and basic housing, usually consisting of a one room tented a green hut, has also been provided (Hogge, 1990:7).

Hogge's argument is that the dependency of the camps is illustrated by the official absence of a money economy. In the same argument, however, Hogge provides examples of how the refugees either get around the restrictions or violated them to create a market economy.

The near total dependency of the UNHCR camps, is illustrated by the 'official' absence of any monetary economy within the camps. No cash is supposed to be circulating inside camps. Refugees who worked for NGOs or UNHCR are paid in kind (toothpaste, soap, canned goods, etc.) and are expected to barter any surpluses. In reality however, a limited market economy has materialized since money flows into camp with relative ease, and in fairly large sums, primarily as 'illegal' remittances from resettled Kurds. Meat, fish, tomatoes and other goods are traded through the fence with the full knowledge and cooperation of Thai authorities and guards, who clearly reap considerable profit from "laundering" these activities. (Hogge, 1990:9)

In addition Hogge provided descriptions of a whole range of economic activities engaged in by the refugees. Hogge characterized these activities as "undesirable" and suggested that the "boredom and dependency" of camp life might be the cause of many of the activities.

A much less desirable form of economic development has been the growth of a dynamic night-time industry in Site 2. Restaurants and bars have become widespread throughout the camp and have remained in various alcohol and drug abuse problems. An illegal video industry has also developed. Prostitution and gambling have become common and are controlled by a number of organized crime syndicates, some of which are also extorting fee from local businesses for 'protection' as well as engaging in an illegal trade in stolen goods. A related problem is that of serious human rights abuses that have become commonplace throughout the camp; some are clearly a product of crime and vice while others are perpetrated by the camp's Thai authorities or by the Thai Military (Lawyers Committee, 1987). It remains debatable to what extent these activities are solely a product of the boredom and dependency created by protracted camp life or to what extent they are 'normal' developments that can be expected within a quasiurban population of over 180,000. It must also be remembered that many of Site 2's controlling elite were smugglers, black marketers or just plain bandits along the border before being consolidated into the resistance under the KRMF and driven into Thailand by the Vietnamese (Boege, 1988:11).

In the example above, Boege maintained that the refugees in the camps were dependent. In spite of the descriptions of the refugees' economic activities, activities that were discouraged by the UN agencies, and in fact, because of them.

A major problem encountered in all the camps is how to break the cycle of dependency and of people accustomed to having everything done for them. How does one convince people to again make decisions for themselves rather than wait for them to be made by others? How does one rebuild self-esteem and self-confidence that years of camp life have eroded? (Boege, 1988:11)

The data that Boege presented regarding the refugees' behavior in economic activities would appear to contradict the assertion that the refugees were dependent in the camps

of being unable to make decisions for themselves, yet Rogge maintained that the camp environment and the experience of "years of camp life" left the refugees in just that very state.

When I encounter studies of refugees where they are characterized as dependent I also expect to find descriptions of refugee behavior that supports such a general characterization. I expect, for example, to find descriptions of the refugees' listlessness, refugees' failure to act in situations where possible responses are clear, the refugees' inactivity and lack of initiative. I do not expect to find descriptions of refugees initiating alternative activities to get around the restrictions imposed by camp authorities. When I encounter both general characterizations of refugees as dependent and descriptions of refugee behavior indicative of initiative and decision making, there is some confusion as to why the question of the origin, and acceptance, of a general characterization of refugees as dependent is left unanswered. This is the case with the example given above. The only clue as to the origin of the idea that the Jews were dependent comes from the general description of the refugee camps themselves as being dependent on external support for their existence. In essence, a kind of environmental determinism, where the type of institution under analysis and the institution's relationship with other institutions or agencies determines

the character of the institution's effect on the inhabitants. This again brings us to the question of what data are most relevant in determining whether the refugees can be characterized as dependent or not, and how the data are interpreted.

Issues concerning the interpretation of data are not new in anthropology. In 1954 Ward Goodenough discovered that his analysis of residence patterns among Trobriand society was different from that of John Fischer, who studied the same communities three years after he did. Goodenough had argued that the Trobriand post-marital residence patterns were predominantly patrilocal, while Fischer's data seemed to indicate that the Trobriand were bilateral (Goodenough, 1954:22-23). Goodenough argued that the difference was either the result of the differences in the information used to classify an individual's post-marital residence, or a difference in the interpretation of the data. Goodenough concluded that both factors were at work (Goodenough, 1954:24). For example, Goodenough discussed how the classification of an individual's post-marital residence changed from generation, and that depending on how many ascending generations were considered, an individual's present residence could be classified patrilocal, avunculocal or matrilineal (Goodenough, 1954:27-28). As a result of the problems in classifying individuals, Goodenough argued that using such classifications for whole

cultural groups as a basis for comparisons was a fundamentally different exercise from identifying the determinants of individual member's residence decisions.

Whatever may be the purposes of an ethnographer in describing a culture, he has the duty of describing it in terms which fit the phenomena. If he is going to describe residence, for example, he cannot work with an a priori set of residence alternatives, albeit he has defined them with the utmost care. He has to find out what the actual residence choices which the members of the society studied can make within their particular socio-cultural setting. The only way he can do this is to construct a theory of their residence behavior in accordance with the scientific scheme of theory construction. This means that he must try to conceive categories of residence and criteria of choice which give the simplest and most accurate account of their behavior. He must try to validate them by using them to predict the future residence choices of betrothed persons, or by predicting where pairs of persons would live if they were married to each other and seeing whether his predictions agree with those which members of the society would also make for such hypothetical marriages (Goodenough, 1958:24).

Browning (1975) pointed out the confusion of the kind of analysis advocated by Goodenough, calling it "cultural analysis of social relations" (Browning, 1975:124) and a "fine grained" analysis (Browning, 1975:124) and contrasting such an approach with the "false consciousness" used by some anthropologists, who...

have tended to imagine lineages as being solid groups out there in the world, with composed of worn bodies, and to imagine these groups as 'building blocks' out of which 'social structure' is built (Browning, 1975:124).

In a further, and very telling, comment, Browning points out that "kinship norms specify how people should or would

behaves to one another in a world where only kinship mattered (Gossing, 1978:128)."

In much the same way, advocates of a refugee dependency syndrome tend to see refugee camps as a world in which only the relationship between the refugees and the camp administration or assistance providers, matters. Analyzing refugees in terms of the relationship between the refugees and administrators or assistance providers is much the same as analyzing a society in terms of "kinship terms." There is a lot more happening, a wider range of decisions to be made, than that encompassed by any one set of relationships. In much the same way that a lot of social variability can be covered up under classifications such as matrilineal or patrilineal post-natal residence, a lot of variation and initiative can be subsumed under the blanket term "dependency." Furthermore, in the same way that a priori categories of kinship could predetermine the way data are interpreted, a priori categories of institutions, such as "totalizing," can predetermine the way data on the behavior of the inhabitants of an institution, such as a refugee camp, are interpreted.

Another example, and one probably closer to the issue of refugee dependency, concerns the notion of a "culture of poverty." Vaynsline (1988) rightly pointed out that the notion of a "culture" carries the connotation of a closed system in which the behavior of individuals considered to be

members of a culture is explained by attributes (norms, rules, values, beliefs) of that same culture. The concept of a "culture of poverty" encloses the members of such cultures, as defined by the classifying characteristic of being poor, in such a way that the classifying determinant, poverty, must be explained by factors internal to the culture. Such a cultural enclosure tends to exclude factors external to the population as possible causes for the culture's perpetuation.

Valentine rightly pointed out that sociological data, largely in the form of census data, cannot be used to infer cultural traits. Valentine presents a biting criticism of the conclusions reached by Foster, Glazer (see Valentine, 1968:20-22) and, finally by Moynihan, which found their way into a report for the United States Department of Labor (Moynihan, 1965) and then national policy, on the problem of black poverty in the U.S. According to Moynihan's 1965 report (as quoted in Valentine, 1968:22), the problem with "negro society" was the "negro family." "At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of negro society is the deterioration of the negro family. It is the fundamental source of weakness in the negro community at the present time..." Moynihan's support for this conclusion, according to Valentine, was "demographic data on households-- dissolved marriages, illegitimacy, welfare rates, ADC (Aid

to families with dependent children) figures, and so forth (Valentine, 1948:117).

Tracing the origins of the culture of poverty concept, Valentine analyzes and critiques the work of Oscar Lewis and others who applied the concept in studies of poor, urban blacks in the United States (Valentine, 1948:108-115). As a result Valentine asks the highly relevant question: "what is a culture not a culture?" In the discussion that follows Valentine might just as well have phrased the initial question to ask: what is a culture not a culture, but a subculture? In essence, a subculture as the learned and shared patterns of behavior, the symbolic aspect of which is determined by its relationship with the larger culture from which it is different or deviant and which led to the classification and defining of the subculture in the first place. There could not be a "culture of poverty" if the behavior of poor people were not discernible from the behavior of the not-poor.

To resolve the matter of interpreting the behavior of populations considered "cultures of poverty," Valentine recommends ethnography (Valentine, 1948:117). In terms of evaluating the utility of what is essentially a label [culture versus subculture] denoting the cause of what is considered deviant behavior, Valentine's recommendation to pursue ethnography has relevance for the issue of refugee dependency. Valentine points out that the label "culture"

or "sub-culture" has implications for the formation and implementing of policies designed to relieve human suffering, as well as relieve the larger society of the consequences of a sub-population engaging in deviant behavior. The same is true for refugee studies in that there are different conclusions to be reached concerning the policies to be implemented in refugee assistance depending on whether refugees are perceived as dependent or not.

At the conclusion of his discussion, Valentine presents hypotheses to be tested through ethnographic research to resolve the matter of interpreting the behavior of the poor as cultural or subcultural. The same can be done concerning refugee dependency.

Hypothesis: Refugees are dependent.

Refugee dependency is characterized by passiveness, helplessness, lack of initiative, and the inability to make decisions related to achieving international goals without the direction of external actors (refugee camp administrators, assistance providers, refugee assistance bureaucrats).

Dependent refugees will demonstrate these characteristics through behaviors such that they will be passive and not respond to alleviate deprivations; they will be helpless and will respond, if they respond at all, to deprivations only through appeals to individuals or agencies who are perceived to be empowered or powerful; they will lack initiative and not take action to alleviate deprivations without the direction of others external to the refugee community; they will be unable to make decisions

toward achieving internalized goals without consultation with, and approval from, external actors such as refugee camp administrators, assistance providers, refugee assistance bureaucrats.

Null hypothesis: Refugees are not dependent.

Refugees are not characterized by passiveness, helplessness, lack of initiative and the inability to make decisions related to achieving internalized goals without the direction of external actors (refugee camp administrators, assistance providers, refugee assistance bureaucrats).

Refugees will demonstrate a lack of dependency through behaviors such that they will not be passive and will respond to alleviate deprivations; they will not be helpless and will respond to deprivations through actions, both individual and collective, that address, and seek to minimize or relieve, perceived deprivations and that may challenge or initiate cooperation with the individuals or agencies who are perceived to be repressed or powerful; they demonstrate initiative and take action to alleviate deprivations without the direction of others external to the refugee community; they will make decisions toward achieving internalized goals without consultation with, and approval from, external actors such as refugee camp administrators, assistance providers, refugee assistance bureaucrats.

Chapters three, four and five in this dissertation lay the ground work for the hypothesis that refugees are dependent. Chapters eight, nine and ten in this

dissertation provide ethnographic data to test this hypothesis.

Beyond the issue of whether certain general classifications of populations are matters of interpretation is the issue of why certain interpretations gain acceptance, especially within anthropology, without supporting ethnographic detail and evidence. This problem might be better framed by asking what is resolved, i.e., what inconsistencies are resolved, by subsuming a population under a covering classification that masks the details of individual behaviors, variations in behavior between individuals, and the relationship of individuals to the larger culture or society? Below I suggest, but do not test, a hypothesis to account for the disparity in how refugees are perceived and described and the way they actually behave.

The conventional answer to the question posed above would be that there are historical or cultural predispositions held by the audience or attending population that determine the form or content of information that the population will accept as relevant. The attending population here consists of social scientists and policy makers, policy implementers and humanitarian assistance providers concerned with refugees. The historical or cultural predispositions of this group that would appear to lend credence to arguments of refugee dependency could be

explained by the "rationalization of control" aspect of refugee dependency. If refugees are dependent: either as (1) a result of the actions of those administering, or providing assistance to, refugees and creating the environments in which refugees live such as refugee camps that lead to refugee dependency; or (2) refugees are dependent as a result of the psychological trauma resulting from the experience of becoming and being a refugee; or (3) a combination of both, then control, the power and responsibility to direct and determine the affairs of refugees, lay with policy makers, policy implementers and humanitarian assistance providers (a significant segment of the attending population receptive to the notion of refugee dependency) and not with the refugees themselves. Even though there is contained in the notion of refugee dependency an implicit criticism of a significant segment of the attending population, i.e., they cause or exacerbate refugee dependency, the existence of refugee dependency reinforces the idea that they are in control.

Refugee Dependency as "Ideology": the Construction of Bichary and Chelise

This is an age when refugees have attained the status of a recognized social problem, an historical by-product of World War II. It is also an age when European and North American countries have determined the agenda of worldwide

organizations such as the United Nations by imposing their cultured notions of social and economic progress as well as filling the voids. When international problems arise, such as large numbers of people crossing international borders, it is the worldwide organizations such as the UN that have the resources and support to act. Furthermore, organizations such as the UN, imbued as they are with notions of social and economic progress, can act with purpose and direction. Refugees are thus a recognized social problem of international dimensions requiring action with purpose and direction, hence the need for action by organizations like the UN and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Refugee dependency as one aspect of the larger social problem of refugees (including food, water, housing, and security as well as a durable solution involving their future) requires action. This need for action arises irrespective of the possibility that refugee dependency is an artifact arising as a result of responding to the other aspects of refugees as a social problem, i.e., the provision of assistance. The assertion that refugees are dependent does not negate the need for action to cope with the other aspects of refugees as a social problem. In fact the suggestion that refugees are incapable of making decisions, in an insidious way, reinforces the need for action by external agents. Asserting refugee dependency can be seen as simply identifying another need, a need as basic

as the usual catalogue of basic biological needs, the need for direction. In addition, placing blame for refugee dependency on the same entities that seek to aid them simply reinforces the idea that those same entities have control over the refugees and can determine not just their present circumstances, but their futures as well.

Conversely, arguing that refugees are not dependent carries the implication that the refugees may not need as much assistance as external agents argue that they do, and further that the assistance rendered refugees does not have as great an effect on them, i.e. exert as great a degree of control over them, as assertions of refugee dependency would seem to indicate. This argument can be seen as undermining the basic upon which policies are taken to assist refugees, i.e. under the rubric "humanitarian assistance."

This "refutation of control" argument may be valid. If so, however, it is likely to meet with quite a bit of resistance. The reason is the scope of carrying this argument to its logical conclusion. In essence, this same argument could be applied to any study of a people considered to be in a deprived state that reaches the conclusion that their deprived state is a result of power differentials within the society. Such a conclusion would then be seen as denying the power structure and the place of the powerful within it by ascribing cause to their actions. Even if moral objections are raised against the

conditions that lead to the deprived state of those considered less powerful, or even powerless, no viable alternatives to such a situation can be considered. Essentially such a argument establishes a kind of natural state to such arrangements. After all, why would the powerful have become powerful if there were some aspect of the process by which they became powerful that would lead them to change their ways upon achieving a position of power? Consequently, blaming the powerful for the condition of the powerless and leaving appeals to the powerful to relieve the condition of the powerless serve only to reify their position as powerful.

The alternative to this argument, an alternative that would have to include some measure of participation by the powerless in creating the conditions in which they live, is pejoratively known as "blaming the victim." Thus any resort to asserting any measure of responsibility for, or capability to change, the deprived condition of the powerless implies some measure of participation by them in the creation and maintenance of the deprived condition in which they live, a condition in which they are "victims," and such implications "blame" them for their own victimization. Given the disclaimer that would have to be entered by those who consider themselves advocates for the deprived and powerless, but who would be holding these same deprived and powerless people partly responsible for the

condition in which they live, such an argument has little future.

Consequently, I could argue that the receptivity among the attending population to the assertion that refugees are dependent is a result of the perception of dependent refugees reinforcing the perception of control over refugees by a significant proportion of the attending population. What this means is that those who critique the treatment refugees receive, on the basis of how that same treatment illustrates dependency, are actually supporting the perception of those who make the decisions about how refugees are treated, that they have the power and control over refugees that they perceive themselves to have and, as evinced by their choice of occupation, want to have.

Since I am making the argument in this dissertation that refugees may not be dependent, and in fact that the refugees in the FRC were not dependent, this one further step is necessary as the argument presented above would apply whether refugees are dependent or not. In essence, how does this "reification of control" and the receptivity of the attending population translate into a skewed view of refugees? For example, why in the excerpt from Koppa given above does he maintain that the refugees in Site 2 were dependent while presenting evidence (that I would consider) to the contrary? Are people who make the refugee dependency argument in debate with the people who run

refugee camps and provide assistance to refugees such that their arguments are designed to reinforce the perception of control by the latter? I do not think so. I do think such arguments have that effect, but I do not think it is intentional. No, those who argue refugee dependency (with the possible exception of Teitelbaum, see chapter four), I believe, truly perceive the refugee to be dependent.

I believe the refugee dependency assertions represent a resolution of several kinds of dissonance experienced by researchers studying a contemporary social problem, or contemporary populations experiencing immediate social problems. These dissonances are experienced by someone attempting to write about contemporary populations as things "you cannot say." For example, you cannot say anything "good" about being a refugee. "Good" in the sense that you cannot say anything that would imply that people choose to become refugees. People must be forced to be refugees; they cannot choose to be refugees as an alternative strategy among many, possibly competing or equivalent, strategies. They must become refugees as a result of a choice so constrained as to be no choice at all, of leaving or facing persecution.

In addition, for the most part, the conditions in which refugees are found are not the best (though I would argue that refugees often make the best of these conditions) and thus constitute a deprived population. The refugees cannot

have chosen to live in these conditions because they cannot choose to become refugees and also because to argue that they choose to live in a deprived condition leads to "blaming the victim." Thus the conditions in which they live are the result of decisions made by those who are in the business of creating and running refugee camps. These people, however, are in the business of running refugee camps on the basis of providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees and, thus, must have the best interests of the refugees in mind. Harrell-Bond has written on the difficulty of evaluating humanitarian assistance:

Humanitarian assistance is governed by compassion and compassion has its own mode of reasoning. It is the confusion between feeling and thought which causes distortions. Technical assistance, which is the aid of development programmes can be evaluated, but compassion is a moral virtue which cannot be measured. It is the moral loading of humanitarian assistance which denies the need for review and which prevents scrutiny. It is not simply that compassion evades logical logic and fact, although it often appears to do so, but rather that the assumptions that lie behind compassion are often based upon false premises. Western notions of compassion tend to be inherently ethnocentric, paternalistic and non-provisional. Many humanitarian aid programmes fail for precisely these reasons. Because the logic of compassion is believed to be morally right, it is the reality which must be wrong and which must be bent to conform to a compassionate template. Discussion of aid programmes conducted under the banner of humanitarianism concentrates therefore not on reasons for failure, but on competing claims to moral rectitude. The struggle for moral supremacy can be fierce indeed (Harrell-Bond, 1988:26).

The problems of evaluating humanitarian assistance are not insurmountable, however, as Harrook (1989) has demonstrated in an evaluation that calls into question the moral mode of

humanitarian assistance, and Mason and Brown (1988) who stressed the problems that even the best intentioned people experience in attempting to provide assistance.

Nevertheless, there is a disconcerting suspicion that criticisms of those whom we have entrusted with our generosity will be misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented by donor populations and lead to the conclusion that the problems encountered in attempting to provide humanitarian assistance are insurmountable and the entire effort a waste. Caring about total strangers, no matter how difficult the circumstances, is a fragile business. Caring for total strangers represents a point where people are at their most vulnerable having put their best intentions and good opinion of themselves on the line in an act of trust. Betrayal is easy and painful. Hence, criticisms of such efforts, and especially criticisms alluding to the possibility of assistance having detrimental effects on those who are supposed to benefit, tends toward overgeneralized abstractions. Refugee dependency, as I hope to demonstrate in subsequent chapters, is an overgeneralized abstraction that is used to criticize some aspects of humanitarian assistance to refugees (e.g., a lack of refugee participation, the extended length of time some refugees spend in camps, the tendency of some people to overcontrol when entrusted with responsibility or simply the essential inequality in the relationship of those who give and those

who receive) without ignoring the good intentions of those implementing the assistance and then, hopefully, not endangering the trust that donors invest in such progress.

I present the argument above as a possibility only. In actuality, I am not confident that the argument above explains why refugees are labeled dependent in the research literature on refugees. In reality, the only way that refugees could totally avoid being labeled dependent would be to reject the assistance they are offered. In rejecting assistance, however, they would also be rejecting the status of refugee and whatever rights or protection that might accrue to them as refugees since the two often go hand-in-hand. Is there then something in the perceived inequality in the relationship between the giver and receiver of assistance that leads the giver to perceive dependency in the recipient, making dependency an inevitable consequence of giving and receiving assistance? I can accept that this might apply to those providing assistance, but not for independent researchers. To the degree that these perceptions apply to research purporting to be social science, there is an apparent lack in either methodology or theory since, as I argue in subsequent chapters, the data -- the observable behavior of refugees -- should lead to the opposite conclusion. Thus we are back where this discussion began, with the examples of Boyce, Goodenough and Valentine. The point made by Goodenough, that classifications of some

aspect of a population made on the basis of their ability for making comparisons between populations may not be accurate representations of the criteria that people actually use to make decisions, is appropriate in the case of refugee dependency. To the degree that refugees are not dependent, describing them as such leads to a misunderstanding of the criteria refugees use in making decisions. I am not sure that this is a crucial point, however, for I do not think refugees care very much whether social scientists see them as dependent or not. The point made by Valentine, however, that encompassing labels such as a "culture" or "subculture" imply differing access to the effects being labeled, i.e., poverty, and thus have implications for the formation of policies that may affect their lives, is both appropriate and relevant. Let us give an example.

Refugee Dependency and Policy Implications

I conducted research on the repatriation of Cambodian refugees from refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border from July 1988 to October 1988, for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). The focus of this research was the reintegration of the returnees back into Cambodia. One of the factors I explored was the returnees' secondary migration or movement from the destination they were repatriated to by the UNHCR to other

locations. In the process I discovered that adverse consequences could result from the implementation of policies based on the perception that refugees are dependent.

In the case of the Khmer repatriation the general perception that the Khmer were dependent refugees led to some false assumptions as to what they would do when they repatriated back to Cambodia. One example was the secondary migration of the returnees.

One of the major problems the UNHCR had to resolve was where to repatriate the refugees to within Cambodia. In the original UNHCR plan the refugees were to choose their destination in Cambodia. A survey was conducted in which the refugees could put a desired destination as well as their place of origin. When too many refugees chose to return to Battambang province, and the provincial government resisted, the UNHCR changed the choice of final destination to the place of origin.

Place of origin, however, could and did mean several things and not necessarily where the refugees considered themselves to be from, or where they wanted to return to. Place of origin could mean the last place in Cambodia they lived before going to the border, such as the site of the last Khmer Rouge labor camp they worked in. Place of origin could also mean the place where they were conscripted into one of the three resistance armies from, or the last place

in which they had unsuccessfully sought refuge from the fighting during the Vietnamese invasion. Too often, because the survey asked for only one place of origin per family, the place of origin was the husband's. The husband's place of origin was not where the family should have gone. Traditionally, Khmer had matrilineal post-marital residence patterns where the husband would go to live with his wife's family, and it was to the wife's family's village that the refugees should have returned.

Consequently, a lot of refugees were registered in Cambodia to places they did not want to be. This was not supposed to happen. Furthermore, if it did happen people were supposed to stay where they were put anyway. As part of the repatriation assistance returnees received a food ration for 400 days (six months in Phnom Penh). The UNHCR was in charge of the operation; the food was provided by the World Food program; CASE was contracted to transport the food; and the CRC, the Cambodia Red Cross, did the actual distribution to the returnees. The food was distributed at food distribution points, usually a village. When returnees went to their final destination they were given a ration card and told where their nearest food distribution point was. The idea was that the returnees would stay in one place, at least partly because they would be dependent on the food distribution point. At the time I left Cambodia in early October returnees could not change their food

distribution point, though the possibility had been discussed.

The reason that allowing the returnees to change their food distribution point was under discussion was because it was not working. Returnees were moving anyway and in large numbers.

The perception that the refugee population from the Thai-Cambodian border was prone to dependency and thus incapable of making decisions for themselves led to the assumption that they would stay in the villages or sites where they were initially resettled. This assumption was based, at least partly, on the belief that they would be dependent on the supply of food provided by UNHCR and the CRC. Consequently, no allowance was made for secondary migration and changing the food distribution points of returnees was deemed to move. Once the repatriation began and the food distribution point system was in place there was a reluctance to change the system. The consequence for the returnees was a net reduction in the amount of assistance they were given either as a result of the higher costs incurred in transporting their ration or in their failure to acquire it, yet they moved anyway.

Conclusion

This case, like that of Vajpayee presented above, demonstrates that there are consequences in terms of policy to be considered when general assertions or perceptions of a population do not accurately reflect the basis upon which the members of the population make decisions.

While this case does not explain why assertions of dependency are made, it does demonstrate the importance of making sure such assertions are based on data and, as accurately as possible, reflect the degree that dependency really affects the behavior of refugees. This last point, however, may be the most important of all, that researchers should take the making of assertions of refugee dependency seriously.

TABLE 1.3
 REFUGEE PROCESSED THROUGH PRPC BY ETHNIC GROUP

YEAR	VIET. (Thousands)	KHMER (Thousands)	LAO (Thousands)	TOTAL			
1980	13887	48.74	7838	37.48	8838	22.88	27838
1981	13838	48.88	13887	37.38	5888	28.34	28871
1982	18328	83.88	7838	38.83	1372	8.82	28328
1983	18887	38.34	13814	53.18	3833	38.88	28276
1984	18878	47.83	13871	43.88	2852	8.32	28843
1985	18884	88.18	7382	37.87	3421	28.32	28188
1986	13371	43.22	388	3.22	4888	28.38	23265
1987	14387	48.38	828	2.71	8841	27.88	24323
1988	24218	82.28	2841	8.22	2782	8.22	28742
1989	28843	88.34	382	3.18	882	2.88	28827

SOURCE: PROCESSE, PRPC

VIET. = Vietnamese

NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATION

Neighborhood Leader ----- Community Administration and
 Organization Officer (or
 COAO)

Assistant Neighborhood Leader --- Secretary
 Interpreter
 Counselor

Elected Leaders for: Peace and Order
 Mail
 Food

Appointed Leaders for: Sanitation
 Health-Care/First Aid
 Neighborhood
 Information
 Training

Building Leader
 Asst. Building Leader

FIGURE 1-3 ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY BASED
 STRUCTURE (CBS)

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONTEMPORARY REFUGEE FLOW
FROM VIETNAM

The refugees who fled Vietnam with the departure of the United States military and political presence in 1975 and those who left as "boat people" in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s were not the first refugees Vietnam produced. During Vietnam's long history of warfare with China, the Chams and the Khmers, and the internal conditions that prevailed in the intervals when they were not fighting anyone else, Vietnam has generated refugees. Most of these refugees have disappeared, their flight and fate unrecorded in history.

One of these refugees, however, Nguyen Aha, might be considered Vietnam's most famous refugee. This chapter begins with Nguyen Aha's flight from Vietnam and his eventual return to unite North and South Vietnam for the first, but all too brief, period in Vietnam's history. The story then crosses into more contemporary history as Vietnam was split again and the first and second Indochina Wars set the stage for the present day "boat people" refugee flow.

The picture that emerges from a reading of Vietnam's history and the brief presentation here is that the

existence of refugees is not a novel or particularly unique event in the history of Vietnam. Furthermore, the contemporary refugee flows that drew world attention briefly in 1978, and then were seriously beginning in 1979, actually had their roots as far back as 1954. The tendency to address refugee issues as an immediate crisis which commands attention as an "emergency" calling forth relief efforts unfortunately precludes a deeper understanding of the nature and causes of refugee flows. The lack of an historical perspective to refugee flows tends to narrow the perspective to one in which refugees are perceived as having no choice but to flee some immediate life threatening situation. There is little room in such a perspective for the possibility that choosing to become a refugee might be one among many possible choices people face. Furthermore, in choosing to become refugees, people may be making an historically grounded decision that, though difficult, has precedent.

Nguyen Adu Vietnam's First Famous Refugee

In 1977 Nguyen Adu was on the run. He was a refugee, fleeing the takeover of Southern Vietnam by the Tay Son brothers from the North. By 1948, his flight, like so many of his future countrymen, would eventually take him to Thailand.

Nguyen Adu was the last of the Southern Nguyen dynasty which had ruled the southern half of Vietnam since 1800. Nguyen Adu, however, was not interested in staying in a third country; he wanted his own country back. He was hiding from the Tay Son in Siam and seeking help in reclaiming control of his country. He would eventually turn to the French but with reluctance. He tried to solicit the aid of the English, the Dutch, the Portuguese and even the Spanish in Manila. The English were in the process of losing America, the Dutch were busy enough in Indonesia, the Portuguese had never had much success in Vietnam, and the Spanish just were not interested either. Through all of these appeals, Pigneau de Beham, a Frenchman and the Bishop of Aden, kept pushing the French alternative. In Pigneau, Nguyen Adu found an ally, but for a price. The price was the initial French interest in Vietnam, originally religious and commercial, that led to French colonization in 1803 (Chandler at al 1943:114). The French colonization of Vietnam set the stage for the refugee flows that followed, including the flow of refugees from Vietnam after 1875, the subject of this dissertation.

In view of the topic examined here, it is interesting to note that the French conquest began with the provision of aid to a Vietnamese refugee. The French, though the most successful, were not the first Europeans to go to Indochina in search of trade, money, souls, and more trade and more

money and more souls. The French were the only ones tenacious enough to stay.

The Portuguese, as usual, were the first in and the first out. In the process of prowling around the South Pacific and the various guile and wile around Southeast Asia running the spice trade, the Portuguese finally wound up off the coast of Vietnam in 1515. The Portuguese retained their control of the trade routes throughout Southeast Asia through the rest of the 16th century and thus represented the only real European presence in Indochina places like Vietnam, where they had established a trading post at Faifo, fifteen miles north of what is now Ho Chi Minh City.

The Portuguese success, however, inspired others, including the English and the Dutch. The Dutch got there first with the north. In 1482 the Dutch set up their own East India Company with the intention of securing a monopoly of trade in spices from Asia. The Dutch conceived the idea of a monopoly as being free from competition by other European states, such as Portugal and England, but also free from local rulers. The idea, simply put, was to sell as dear as possible, by securing a monopoly on the desired market in Europe, but also to buy as cheaply as possible by pre-empting local rulers through colonial domination. By 1602 the Dutch had succeeded in restricting the Portuguese to sea and city in India and Macao on the Chinese coast.

The Dutch set up their first factory in Vietnam in the South but were soon invited to set one up in the North as well. Because of the continuing rivalry between the Trinh of the North and the Nguyen of the South the Dutch had to choose. They chose the North and were expelled from the South in 1634. The English tried to establish a factory in 1613 and failed, they tried again and failed again and were finally successful in 1672. The French finally showed up in 1686. The French factory, however, closed soon after it opened, the English closed theirs in 1687 and finally the Dutch departed in 1702. The essential problem with trade in Vietnam for Europeans was their inability to employ the same tactics as the Vietnamese that had worked so well elsewhere.

The war between the Trinh in the North and the Nguyen in the South had come to an end in 1671. This ended the possibility of a divide-and-conquer approach since both the Trinh and Nguyen seemed to accept the stalemate. The Vietnamese, true to historical form, also were able to mobilize against foreigners. They were able to prevent the Europeans from the sort of piracy and plunder that had allowed them to dominate trade in other places. This decreased the profitability of their efforts in Vietnam with little hope for improvement. In addition, the feudalistic structure of Vietnamese society limited the demand for European goods since the vast majority of the population would have nothing to trade with or for.

The European penetration of Vietnam, consequently, took a very different turn than in the rest of Southeast Asia. Religion became the conduit for the insertion of Europeans and European ideas, and in the end, determined which Europeans would succeed in imposing their unique brand of civilizing on the Vietnamese. With the success of the Dutch and English over the Portuguese came the decline of Catholicism in Southeast Asia. The Dominicans and Jesuits, who had established missions throughout Southeast Asia, had had to abandon many of them and many of their missionaries were idle. In 1618 two of them went to Vietnam and established the "South-Chinese Mission" at Faifo, the Portuguese trading port. In 1627 a French Jesuit arrived in Hanoi as part of the Catholic mission to Vietnam. This man, Alexander de Rhodes, and his time in Vietnam were to prove pivotal in Vietnamese history. His accomplishments came both in Vietnam and in the larger world of the Catholic hierarchy.

In Vietnam Rhodes proved himself both an able scholar and missionary. He learned the language, supposedly in six months, and wrote the first catechism in Vietnamese and published a Latin-Portuguese-Vietnamese dictionary. All of this in *quoc ngu*, the romanized form of the Vietnamese written language that had been developed by an Italian and a Portuguese Jesuit. Though *quoc ngu* was not his invention, Rhodes employed it more successfully than anyone else. *quoc*

Rgo used Roman script with special markings to indicate the five tones of the Vietnamese language. Before Quoc Rgo, Vietnamese was written with Chinese characters, and reading and writing was almost exclusively the province of the mandarin class of scholars and civil bureaucrats. As a missionary, Rhodes is supposed to have baptized as many as 4,200 converts in two years, among them the lordly and the noble. While the two Vietnamese were actively pursuing the destruction of each other, foreign missionaries were tolerated. As the war wound down to its eventual stalemate, the importance of European ships laden with weapons declined and so did the tolerance for missionaries. Rhodes was expelled from North Vietnam in 1846. He went to the French headquarters in Macao and continued to work, and between 1848 and 1849 he managed to get back into North Vietnam several times. By 1849, however, even the South was denied him. In 1849 Rhodes embarked on his second Vietnam-related career, that of military. He went to Rome to plead for a mission to Vietnam that would be free of Portuguese control. Rhodes apparently saw the incipient decline of the Portuguese in Southeast Asia. This was evident to him in both the larger power struggle, as the Dutch took Palawan, and directly by what he perceived as a lack of initiative of the Portuguese Jesuits in Macao. Tired of the run-around he received in Rome, where the Portuguese were still feared, Rhodes went to France. In 1850 he published a book that

appealed to those with materialist interests, writing that Vietnam was not just a rich missionary field but rich in gold and pepper as well. In 1684, however, Rhodes was dispatched to Paris, where he died in 1688. Rhodes did live long enough to see, in 1688, the Frenchman appointed to be Apostolic Vicar in Vietnam.

Someone, apparently, in France had read Rhodes' book. The French was their Apostolic Vicarage from Rome through their willingness to pay for the mission to Vietnam. In 1684 the Catholic evangelization of Vietnam became the prerogative of the newly created Society of Foreign Missions. In the same year the same people who had agreed to pay for evangelizing Vietnam also created the French East India Company. Created sixty years later than the Dutch and the English, the French East India company is proof once again that a bad idea never dies. By 1689 the dual French motives of missions and mercantilism were firmly bonded. Battinger relates an example of a letter written in the mid 1680s by the English agent of their local factory in Hanoi wherein he describes his predicament at the purpose of the French, who had a house ostensibly to regulate Franco-Vietnamese trade but was actually an 'undercover' mission (Battinger 1992:118).

The line between taking money and saving souls was beneficial to both traders and missionaries. After 1672 missionaries were no longer welcome in North or South

Vietnam. Sincere missionaries often had to be introduced under the cover of conducting business. It is not all that difficult to understand the reluctance of the Vietnamese rulers of the time to grant Christian missionaries a place in their society. Two reasons are adequate. First, Vietnam was ruled by emperors who had derived their understanding of society and social relationships from China and the influence of Confucianism. The state was patterned on the family and national loyalty on filial piety. The emperor was like the father, like a father, the emperor ruled by virtue of his moral authority - his ability to do the right thing, to behave morally. This in was an idealization because moral authority could be revoked by incompetence, mistakes or weakness, as with any ruler. In essence, the invocation of moral authority was an explanation for success, and revocation was an explanation for failure. Nevertheless, the introduction of the idea that a supernatural deity determined morality and communicated it through priests, especially foreign priests, was not very appealing to a Confucian ruler. The second reason for the unpopularity of Christian missionaries was the result of the Vietnamese observation that where foreign missionaries went, political trouble soon followed. The Vietnamese had witnessed the attempt of the French to conquer Siam in 1893 through a plot hatched partly by the two French Jesuit missionaries in Siam for Vietnam who operated mainly in Thailand. The

attempt failed, Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that remained independent throughout the European colonial ages.

From 1870, when the two Vietnams suspended hostilities, to 1888, when the French entered Yunnan in force, Vietnam remained free of external meddling. Several colonial schemes were hatched but for various reasons have reached fruition. The French could not bring themselves to give up their claims in India and directed all of their resources to their losing effort against the English. Even the opportunity presented by the Tay Son rebellion in the 1770s when a popular uprising led to the overthrow of both the Southern and Northern governments and the unification of the country, could not entice the French government to support the schemes of its agents and admirals in Southeast Asia. With the loss of their claims in India in 1770, the French were more inclined to take out their frustrations by supporting the American rebellion against the English. It took the perseverance and tenacity of another pivotal French cleric to convince the French government to involve itself in Vietnam.

Pigneau de Behain was also on the run from the Tay-sons. In 1781 the Tay Son captured Saigon and Pigneau fled, first to Cambodia and then to Thailand. Despite this setback, Pigneau was effective. He was effective as a missionary, a diplomat, a politician, and a general.

Pigneau was, in other words, a typical Jesuit. Pigneau finally convinced Nguyen Anh to turn to France for help. Nguyen Anh sent his son, Prince Chuoi, to Pigneau and in 1786 they went to Paris to convince the French court to support their effort to take Vietnam back. The seventeen year old Prince Chuoi charmed the salons of Paris with his exotic good manners, and Pigneau charmed the military elite with his plans to conquer Vietnam and to establish a base of operations from which France could control the commerce with China that passed through the South China Sea. Pigneau got the go-ahead from the French court. What Pigneau did not know, however, was that the Governor of Pondicherry in India, who was supposed to mount the expedition, was instructed to make his own assessment and decide if it was feasible. Governor Conway knew it was not feasible then to mount an expedition to Vietnam. He simply did not have the resources and was actually inclined to halt French activity in India since he felt it could not be adequately defended. Conway decided to do nothing, and in 1788 the government in Paris agreed with him. In 1789 when Pigneau was told he decided to do it anyway, on his own. He passed the hat among French merchants in Southeast Asia and collected enough to buy two ships and hire a necessary army, consisting partly of French deserters. Nguyen Anh had managed to return to Vietnam in 1787 and begin to retake South Vietnam. He was aided in this by an internal conflict

among the three Tay Son brothers, who had led the rebellion, and by a Chinese invasion of Northern Vietnam in 1788. When Pigneau got to Vietnam with his little army Nguyen had actually been ruling South Vietnam for a year. The process of defeating the Tay Son was a slow one since neither the Tay Son nor Nguyen Anh had mass followings. The peasants of Vietnam were more likely to sit back and see who was going to win and then decide who to support than choose loyalty to a leader and pay a price they knew would be harsh. The South was not really secure until July 1788, after the fall of Qui-Nhon the key Tay Son southern fortress whose siege was directed personally by Pigneau. Pigneau died that same year and Prince Canh a year later.

It was not until 1802 that Nguyen Anh defeated the Tay Son at Hue and Hanoi and unified the country. Because the French had reneged on their treaty with Nguyen Anh, he felt he owed them nothing. To Pigneau, Nguyen was grateful, but he never became a Christian. Pigneau's legacy in Vietnam was the survival of Nguyen Anh and his subsequent victory. As such, Pigneau's legacy was not what he would have wished. Nguyen Anh, who took the name of Gia Long as emperor, was inherently conservative. He maintained the Confucian form of government, the mandarinate, and the social structure that went with it. His successors were even more conservative, especially concerning Christian missionaries. Gia Long tolerated them out of gratitude to Pigneau. His

successors did not have his gratitude to a dead benefactor. Furthermore they had to contend with an ever more entrenched civil bureaucracy, consisting of mandarins who were intensely opposed to foreign missionaries and their message.

As interesting sidelight to the long history of the French missionizing efforts in Vietnam was that it led to the first American intervention in Vietnam, in 1848 as a result of an attempt to protect French missionaries in Vietnam. The U.S.S. Constitution was cruising Southeast Asia when the captain heard that the Bishop of Vietnam, Dominique Lefebvre, was about to be put to death in Hue. Captain Jack Percival put into Haiphong on May 18, 1848, took several Vietnamese officials as hostage, and held them for four days until Hue assured him that the bishop would not be harmed. Percival did this on his own initiative. When Washington heard about it later, the U.S. government dispatched the U.S. ambassador in Singapore to Vietnam to offer a formal apology.

Contemporary Refugees From Vietnam

Nguyen Min was not the first Vietnamese refugee -- and definitely not the last -- although he may, in Vietnamese history, be the most famous. Vietnam has been producing refugees, and receiving them (1) for centuries. This has largely been the result of a history rife with wars, both

internal and external, with their immediate neighbors as well as with France and the United States;

The End of French Colonial Rule and the Partition of Vietnam

The history, and to a large extent the cause, of the contemporary refugee flows in Southeast Asia does not begin with the fall of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to communist governments in 1975. The true beginning lay in 1954 with the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the end of the First Indochina War, and the end of French colonialism in Vietnam. The war formally ended with the signing of the Geneva Accords in May 1954. The Geneva Accords provided for the partitioning of Vietnam into the North and South at the approximately parallel, subsequent to nationwide elections that were supposed to unify the whole country. As part of the partitioning process people were permitted to choose where they wanted to live, either in the North or the South. From August 1954 until May 18, 1955, the period provided in the accords, there was an exchange of population between the North and South. During this period 143,042 people moved north (B.S.I., 1983:4) and 560,394 people moved south (Benedictson, 1983:181; DOI, 1983:1). For many of the more than 700,000 refugees who moved south this was the first step in a much longer process that would lead them, eventually, to refugee camps throughout Southeast Asia and finally to destinations all over the world.

According to Schuchman, approximately 300,000 of those who moved south were military personnel and 640,000 were civilians. More than two-thirds, 75 percent (634,148), of those moving south were Catholics, 11 percent (181,827), were Buddhist or Muslim, and 1,241 were Protestant (Schuchman, 1983:142). The predominance of Catholics in the refugee population was ascribed to several factors. Kelly (1977) mentions the overlap of Catholic Vietnamese and those with ties to the French who would have good reason to fear reprisals from the new North Vietnamese government. She also mentions the extreme anti-communism that predominated in the Catholic church in the 1950s and the longstanding, historical animosity between Catholics and non-Catholic Vietnamese (Kelly, 1977:13-14). Both Kelly and Schuchman note that the Catholics were better organized, thus better able to get the message out and move as a community (Kelly, 1977:13-14; Schuchman, 1983:142-143). Kelly also mentions the organization of the Catholics around the parish priests who often also served as village mayors and judges (Kelly, 1977:14). In one area within the Red River Delta, according to Schuchman, the bishop maintained armed forces that facilitated the movement of Catholic refugees to the port of Haiphong, where they had to go to embark on ships for South Vietnam (Schuchman, 1983:143). One other reason that undoubtedly had an impact on the Catholic population was the appointment of Ngo Dinh Diem, a devout Catholic and

Warthorn, as Premier of South Vietnam (D.I.G., 1949:4). The D.I.G. report also mentions several instances where the unity of the Catholics, often moving as they did as whole parishes, and the leadership of the parish priest helped in the evacuation from the North and resettlement in the South. During the period when the refugees were moving south there was street fighting in Saigon between the government and the Binh Xuyen, a sort of Vietnamese mafia. Word of the fighting reached the embarkation camps in the North, and some refugees refused to board ship to the South until they had been assured by their priest that it was safe in Saigon (D.I.G., 1949:11). The arrival of large numbers of refugees in the South taxed the resources and organizational capabilities of the government and, in some cases, led to the better-organized Catholics -- through their leaders, the parish priests -- being able to secure assistance more readily than the Buddhist refugees (D.I.G., 1949:10). According to the D.I.G. report, the Catholics having as communities also alleviated some of the stress of losing their identity as individuals.

For those familiar with the tragedy of mass migration, perhaps the most heartbreaking aspect of Vietnam's exodus was that Vietnamese refugees, unlike most, never lost their identity as individuals. The sense of anonymity, of being alone and unidentified, which has been the saddest characteristic of refugees in other mass exoduses, was minimal. Most of Vietnam's refugees came to freedom in groups, were transported to the South in groups, and arrived in reception

centers with host door neighbors and friends, their status as a member of a little Delta village maintained in the midst of the crowded reception centers.

Primarily responsible for the group migration were the village priests who kept their flocks together. Their parishes, though smaller, still existed. They brought with them to the South the main structure of their former communities which gave courage and security to the refugees in their strange new surroundings (D.T.S., 1969:22).

The movement south and the resettlement as villages and communities, often under the leadership of the village priest, were to have an important impact on the future refugee flows. As Kelly pointed out, some of the new resettlement villages in South Vietnam were 'transplants' from the North and in 1975 moved again, this time to the United States.

Villages like Phuoc-Tay, forty kilometers from the port city of Vung-Tau, from which so many refugees left for the U.S. in 1975, were northern villages gone south with their parish priests. Many of these 1954 immigrants set forth for the United States in April 1975, operating under the same assumptions that had resulted in their flight in 1954, and were led, in many instances, again by their priests (Kelly, 1977:14).

Kelly mentions the large number of interviews she conducted in her study at the Indian Town camp refugee reception center where the individuals reported themselves, or their parents, having been born in North Vietnam and going South in 1954. She also mentioned the prevalence of a North Vietnamese accent among the refugee population (Kelly, 1977:14-28).

The movement of the refugees from the North to the South was a major undertaking in terms of transporting them, primarily by air and sea, and resettling them. The movement of the refugees was undertaken as a joint exercise by the remaining French Expeditionary Force and the United States Operations Mission in Vietnam (USOM). The French committed \$4 million annually until 1964 (Schachtman, 1968:166) and the U.S. granted \$96.1 million, \$55.8 million of which was for transportation costs alone (D.I.S., 1968a). Since, according to the Geneva Accords, Vietnam was still one country that just happened to have two separate governments pending a national election, the refugees going both north and south were, by international law, internally displaced and the United Nations had no role in their resettlement.

The refugees were given assistance in the form of tools, housing and road construction, land clearing, the construction of various public buildings such as schools, hospitals, communal halls, markets, etc... (Schachtman, 1968:166), as well as a subsistence allowance while they were in reception centers in Saigon (SOG, 1962:15) and a relocation allowance. The relocation allowance ranged from 100 to 140 piasters on arrival in Saigon and 700 piasters when they reached a resettlement area. This was later changed to a lump sum of 400 piasters on arrival in Saigon with a possible 140 piaster bonus if the refugees settled in the forested, mountainous, and sparsely populated highlands

(D.I.G., 1963118). The entire scope of the resettlement effort is too broad to detail here. Both the Schabbschian article and the D.I.G. report present lists of the achievements of the resettlement effort. Both reports also conclude with extremely over-optimistic views on the future of refugees in Vietnam. The D.I.G. report concludes with an address by Bui van Lang, the Vice President of the National Committee of the Republic of Vietnam for the World Refugee Year.

The hardest part of the refugee problem in Vietnam, Cambodia, has been solved. This, however, does not mean that there will be no more refugees.

For one thing, the Chinese and Vietnamese, sharing the Communist expropriations of the northern region, continue moving south every month in small groups, by land and by sea. Our government always grants them necessary assistance in order to facilitate their re-settlement.

On the other hand we must envisage the hypothesis that once day normal relations will be re-established between the north and the south. At that time with the free movement of people that will follow, we are certain that thousands of refugees will flee to the south. The figure will exceed that of 1954. (DIB, 1963-64)

Schabbschian simply begins the conclusion of his article with, "the refugee problem no longer exists in Vietnam" (Schabbschian:171).

Refugees during the Vietnam War

The exodus of people between the north and south of Vietnam was the first contemporary mass movement of Vietnamese refugees, but by no means the last. In fact many

of the policies and practices conducted as part of the war by the governments of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States were designed to create refugees, or internally displaced people. The assumption that guided these policies was that people who were moved to supposedly secure zones would also be controlled populations and unavailable to the National Liberation Front (NLF). The "agraville" program that Diem instituted in 1955 was an attempt to move a planned 500,000 peasants into hamlets, stretching from Saigon to the North, that would be under the control of the RVN. The plan failed when the peasants refused to construct or move into the hamlets (Kobak, 1985:540). The same approach was tried again in 1961, this time under the name of the "strategic hamlet program." The plan called for fortifying the 11,700 hamlets in South Vietnam and concentrating the population in them. According to Kobak the purpose was twofold. The first aim was to concentrate the population and the second aim was to weaken the NLF.

...police, self defense units, as well as the RVN apparatus in each hamlet was strictly to control population movement and destroy the NLF infrastructure, attempting first to create totally secure clusters of hamlets from which to expand to others (Kobak, 1985:542).

Kobak quoted "a senior ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) strategist", Hoang Ngoc Lung (3), who described the strategic hamlet "as a concentration camp of sorts" (Kobak, 1985:551). Kobak continued;

Peasants were ordered to abandon their houses and lands for new sites in defensible, often quite distant locations. The cash and building materials they were allocated were inadequate, and they were compelled to give much of their labor to build stockades and defense installations. The ARVN officials governing them were, as the Marine pacification expert Lieutenant Colonel William S. Calson described most of the pacification efforts of that period, there, 'to loot, collect back taxes, reinstall landowners, and conduct reprisals against the people.' [3] When people refused to move into strategic hamlets, the ARVN used artillery and aircraft to compel them to seek refuge in them (Hoiko, 1985:131).

The strategic hamlet program was a failure in every respect. The NLF continued to recruit people from them (Stechen, 1988:112), and even to take them over, essentially dismantling them (Hoiko, 1985:134). Most importantly, they increased the alienation of the peasant population from the government by striking at the very heart of peasant Vietnamese society, the village (Hoiko, 1985:134-137; Fitzgerald, 1973:180-188). Failure though it was, the strategic hamlet program was responsible for forcibly displacing more than eight million people (Hoiko, 1985:138; Stechen, 1988:112), or more than half of South Vietnam's estimated 12-13 million population.

With the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, the strategic hamlet program essentially died and so did non-military approaches to the pacification of the countryside. Although the same approach was tried again and again under different names such as "New Life Hamlets" (Fitzgerald, 1973:187), and "the Revolutionary Development Program" in 1968, the "Accelerated Pacification Program" from November

1944 to January 1949 and the "Community Defense and Development Program" from 1951 until the end of the war (Gomsett, 1985:278). The approach to pacifying the countryside became more sporadic with "free fire zones" and "free bombing zones" (Whelan, 1989:140-54). In essence, the free fire, or bombing, zones were any areas deemed outside the "Strategic," or "New Life," hamlets or any area considered under Republic of Vietnam (RVN) control (Fitzgerald, 1973:147). This represented a change from moving people into supposedly controlled but insecure hamlets, to supposedly controlled but insecure refugee camps and to the cities. Fitzgerald provides a glimpse of the logic as it was revealed in an interchange between General Westerland and the press.

Two years before--that is two years too early--Westerland had utilized his new strategy for 'pacification.' 'Detail now,' he said in 1948, 'the war has been characterized by a substantial majority of the population remaining neutral...in the past year we have seen an escalation to a higher level of intensity in the war. This will bring about a moment of decision for the peasant farmer. He will have to choose if he stays alone. Detail now the peasant farmer has had three alternatives: he could stay put and follow his natural tendency to stay alone in the land, living beside the ground of his ancestors. He could move to an area under government control. Or he could join the VC...Now if he stays put there are additional dangers. The VC can't patch up wounds. If the peasant becomes a refugee, he does get shelter, food and security, job opportunities and is given a hope to possibly return to his land. The third alternative is life with the VC. The VC have not made good on their promises; they no longer have secure areas. There are 2-33 bombings, the VC tax demands are increasing; they want more recruits at the point of a gun, forced labor to make supplies.

the battle is being carried more and more to the street.'

'Camp's that give the villagers only the choice of becoming a refugee?' one journalist inquired. 'I expect a tremendous increase in the number of refugees,' answered Montenegro (Pittagorski, 1973:483).

Montenegro's expectations were not. Figures on the numbers of refugees vary. According to Kolko (1985:181), the U.S. Senate put the number of refugees between 1964-73 at 5.8 million. The RVN's figure for the period 1960-73 was much higher at 7 million, 'or almost one-third of the population or well over half of the peasantry' (Kolko, 1985:181). For a description of the process by which villages were infiltrated by the NLF and then subsequently destroyed by the RVN and the U.S. and the consequent plight of the villagers and refugees, Jonathan Schell's "The Village of San Bao" is very revealing (Schell, 1988:81-134).

A parallel phenomenon was the urbanization of South Vietnam. According to Kolko (1985:201), the percentage of the urban population in 1960 was 28 percent. By 1971 the percentage of South Vietnam's urban population had increased to 43 percent. Kolberg et al put the estimate of agglomerated people in South Vietnam at half of the 28 million population (Kolberg et al., 1979:143). The consequences for the -- often forced -- urban migrants in terms of poor living conditions, socio-economic decline, and the destructive effects on traditional family and village society are amply provided in Pittagorski (1973:483-496, 523-526) and Kolko

(1949:100-107). South Vietnam became, beginning in 1974 and during the course of the war, essentially a nation of displaced people.

Displaced People as Refuge-Seekers

Placing a substantial percentage of the population of South Vietnam in the category of 'displaced people' presents the opportunity to look at the later refugee flows in a new light. In terms of general statements applicable to the forced migrations of peasants in South Vietnam during the war as part of the various pacification programs, Hansen and Oliver-Smith's characterization of forced migration provides an excellent summary.

Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982) distinguished between voluntary and involuntary migrants on the basis of powerlessness.

In sum, forced migration is distinguished from voluntary migration by the diminished power of decision in the former, sometimes reaching an extreme in which the forced migrants are totally powerless" (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 1982:4).

In the case of rural South Vietnamese peasants who were forcibly removed to agravilles, "strategic" or "new life" hamlets, who were often presented with the option at gun point, to advise support for either the NLF or the RVN, or who attempted life in an uncontrolled 'free fire' or 'free bombing' zone, powerlessness is an apt characterization. Hansen and Oliver-Smith point out other salient

characteristics of forced migrants that are equally applicable to the rural peasants of South Vietnam.

Another important distinguishing factor is the original absence on the part of forced migrants of a desire or motivation to leave their place of residence. A change or changes in the environment that are detrimental to the individual or collectivity deprive the collectivity (or various members of it) of security and establish new, more dangerous conditions. People who would have remained where they were under the earlier conditions now must leave or face assault, injury, imprisonment, or death (Rumsen and Oliver-Smith, 1993:4-5).

The choices presented to the rural peasants in South Vietnam during the war, as revealed by the quote from Fitzgerald earlier in this chapter, clearly fall into the categories of leaving, when they would rather stay, or facing assault, injury, imprisonment, or death. War, as practiced in Vietnam, here characterized by *hoiho*, easily represented a change in the environment that was detrimental to the individual and the collectivity.

The United States in Vietnam unleashed the greatest flood of firepower against a nation known to history. The losses suffered were monumental. . . . The Pentagon's final estimates of killed and wounded civilians in South Vietnam between 1943 and 1972 ran from 700,000 to 1,375,000 while Service members for the same period were 1,180,000. Deaths in these two assessments range from 150,000 to 415,000; "wounded" killed were 400,000 minimum, and a substantial part of these were civilians (Khalo, 1993:100).

The numbers are staggering--at least one million people moving north or south in 1975, an estimated eight million people displaced into strategic hamlets, 4-7 million refugees, between 700,000 and 1.3 million civilians wounded

or killed, 582,000 "enemy" fatalities. Behind the numbers lay incalculable human suffering in loss, grief, and social disintegration (see for example Bayly, 1989; Bush, 1987; Shuey, 1993; Stojan, 1984).

Beyond the individuals suffering what do we know about the sociological consequences of forced displacement and migration? Much of the literature is directed at the effects of forced migration as a result of large scale development projects or, more infrequently, natural disasters. The consequences of people being uprooted from homes and communities where they have lived all of their lives and where ties to the land and the community go back for generations are, however, similar regardless of the cause.

The disruption and trauma which involuntary migration and resettlement inflict upon people are profound. Forced migration and resettlement tend to be totalizing phenomena. Generally speaking, resettlement projects may involve or create rapid and radical changes, in environment, in productive activities, in social organization and interaction, in leadership and social structures, in world view and ideology. The process is invariably difficult and painful, engendering feelings of powerlessness and alienation as people are uprooted from their familiar circumstances. While communities suffer acute degrees of disintegration as community structures, social networks and even kin groups may be dispersed to different resettlement sites. The affective ties between individuals and communities and their material environments are destroyed by uprooting and resettlement. These ties lie at the core of both individual and collective constructions of reality and freedom from their past concrete manifestations undergo both individual psychological well-being and community social health generally. (Cohen-Smith, 1992a).

Unfortunately, much of the research on displaced people, and much of the interest in their plight, came after the war was over in 1975 and Vietnam was essentially closed as a research area. Consequently little, if anything, has been published on how the South Vietnamese displaced people coped within Vietnam. We do know that, as a result of the re-education camps instituted by the new government, many ex-NVH veterans, former government officials and others with ties to the former regime in South Vietnam and the U.S. presently there remained displaced in the camps.

There is agreement that for Vietnamese peasants, whether subject to a "moral economy" (Scott, 1976) or a patronal one (Poplin, 1979), ties to the land through either village membership, private ownership or patron-client relationships were crucial. During the French colonial period the ties of the peasantry to the land, and a share of what they produced from it, were eroded. The new government in South Vietnam after 1954 promised land reform but failed to follow through (Korten, 1988). The war brought free fire zones, bombing, defoliation, which increased the barriers between people and the land almost to the scale of a major natural disaster, and all with the concomitant consequences as described for displaced people by Silver-Smith.

The Causes of Contemporary Vietnamese Refugee Flows

The causes of contemporary Vietnamese refugee flows must be pursued in Vietnam's distant past as well as in its recent history. Refugees have played an important role in Vietnam's history. Individual refugees, such as Nguyen Khoi, and mass refugee movements such as the movement of Northerners to the south in 1954, have altered the course of events in Vietnam. Furthermore, as researchers we should pay heed to the lessons that can be found in the history of the uprooted. Once people have uprooted themselves from a place they have lived in for generations and moved, sometimes as whole communities, as the Northern Vietnamese did when they went south, in the hopes of rebuilding their lives, the ties that bound them to a place, any place, have been weakened. If the people who have uprooted themselves find in the new places to which they go that their hopes are not realized and that, in fact, conditions deteriorate, as was the case for many Northerners and Southerners in South Vietnam during the war, the likelihood that they will move again increases.

The most common approach to describing the flow of Southeast Asian refugees in 1975 and after is to begin with why they fled (Kelly, 1977:11-13; Hirschman, 1982:32-33). Given the destruction and dislocation typified by the war, one also has to wonder why more did not flee, and why some took so long to do so. These are important questions to be

addressed when they determine the legitimacy of the claim of those who did leave Vietnam, to refugee status.

Why They Did Not Leave

Several factors affected the Vietnamese' evaluation of the consequences of deciding to flee. Other factors affected the ability of Vietnamese to flee their country, given their desire to do so. These are two separate considerations. The first issue addresses the Vietnamese' decision to leave their country. Despite the large number of refugees that did flee, making the decision to leave Vietnam was not an easy one. The consequences for loved ones left behind as well as the consequences of becoming a refugee had to be evaluated. The second issue addresses the ability of those who did decide to leave Vietnam to accomplish the task.

One important factor in evaluating the consequences of leaving Vietnam was the importance of reestablishing ties to kin, friends, and neighbors that had been severed by the dislocations of the war. As Cohen pointed out, displacement can lead people to value the reestablishment of interpersonal ties over what might, to an outsider, be better ignorance against vulnerability.

Whether or not they suffer further displacement, once people have learned from bitter experience that life is uncertain, possessions tenuous, and human relationships brittle, it is to be expected that their coping techniques will take account of such

possibilities even though these conflict with other urgent goals which they wish to attain. (Colson, 1991:22)

Colson's statement above was in reference to the failure of refugee resettlement policies that attempted to disperse Cuban and Southeast Asian refugees when they were resettled in the United States. The creation of Cuban enclaves in South Florida and Southeast Asian enclaves in southern California through post-resettlement secondary migration emphasized the importance of preestablishing ethnic, kin and friendship ties even though such a narrowing of options makes for increased vulnerability (Colson, 1991:22). The same might be said of Vietnamese after the war with the added consequence, as described by Colson (1991:22) that the recently displaced may adopt coping strategies that are "mutually incompatible," as people struggle with uncertainty about the short- and long-term payoffs, and affected people may try to make a minimum of decisions which require long term commitments (Colson, 1991:22). Becoming a refugee in a foreign country that is halfway around the world, has hostile relations with your home country, and may become a permanent home, is clearly a major decision involving a long-term commitment.

The most important feature impeding refugee flows immediately after the war, however, were the lack of alternative places to go and, when alternatives were discovered, the opportunity to leave. Vietnam is surrounded

on three sides by China to the North, Laos to the Northwest, and Cambodia to the West. East of Vietnam is the South China Sea. None of the countries bordering Vietnam represented safe havens for refugees fleeing Vietnam. China aided North Vietnam in the war, and both Laos and Cambodia also became communist in 1975. All three, at least initially, were sympathetic to the new government. The alternative was escape by boat and thousands of miles of ocean to areas, to destinations where the kind of welcome a Vietnamese refugee could expect was, in 1975, unknown.

Opportunities to leave Vietnam were limited both at the end of the war and after. The success of the North Vietnamese in 1975 and the rapid fall of South Vietnam was a surprise to everyone, even the victors (Teng, 1985:258-259; Solis, 1985:150-151). The United States government and its embassy in South Vietnam were completely unprepared (Barrow, 1983:448). The evacuation plans were inadequate and implemented too late. As a result, many who wanted to leave Vietnam with the departing Americans could not.

Why They Did Leave

A significant number of Vietnamese did flee Vietnam with the Americans. Approximately 125,000 Vietnamese with ties to the United States were evacuated from South Vietnam before it fell to the North Vietnamese on April 30, 1975. These 125,000 became the first of the many Vietnamese

refugees to go to the United States. Though the initial number was small in comparison to the more than 1,000,000 Vietnamese who have found their way out of Vietnam into resettlement in the West, that first 140,000 was of crucial importance to the refugee flow that followed. They represented the creation of an option, resettlement in the West, especially in the United States, that had not existed before.

The option represented by that first 140,000 Vietnamese to leave was not just escape from Vietnam, but the possibility of finding a place where they could live the kind of life they had known before. For those who followed, mostly by boat but also on foot and later on planes, carrying their experiences of life in post-April 30, 1975 Vietnam with them, escape represented the possibility of recreating the life they had known before 1975 for themselves and their children. The motivation to leave was not purely that life under the new regime in Vietnam was worse economically or less "free" in some political sense. The decision to leave reflected the reality that life in post-war Vietnam did not represent how they intended or expected to live. According to Hansen and Oliver-Smith:

Migration becomes a means of escaping from a threatening situation, but the forced migrant is more oriented toward retention or reestablishment of past conditions than the voluntary migrant. (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 1991:3)

Whether the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants is apt is open to debate. It is, however, an accurate depiction of the motivations of forced migrants, including refugees. In terms of the Vietnamese refugees, Ritchson has described the situation beautifully.

part of the motivation for escaping is to maintain the old way of life elsewhere under a government that permits that kind of freedom. For the Vietnamese who plan to resettle, the priority is primarily not to adapt or be assimilated into another society...but to reconstruct respected cultural values in a more tolerant setting... This issue lies at the heart of the cultural confrontation that occurs first in the camps and later in the resettled communities. Far from being passively overwhelmed by events, as policy makers tend to assume the category of refugee means, many Vietnamese decide upon a course of action - departure - in order to secure this specific outcome and maintain what has been threatened (Ritchson, 1990:8).

Ritchson is correct here (see also Chan, 1991:286-287). Further, the point to be made is not an insignificant one. To say that a refugee population makes a deliberate decision to leave their country of origin and go to other countries for the purpose of obtaining asylum -- the assurance they will not be sent back to their country of origin -- and possibly resettlement in a third country is also to imply that the refugees in question made a choice and were not forced in the sense of not having any other choice. Choice implies, if logic and not some rhetoric is applied in the analysis, that a comparison was made between present circumstances and either preferred past circumstances or preferred possible future circumstances, and the refugees chose to leave, perceiving that either the preferred past

circumstances could be recreated or the preferred possible future circumstances could be achieved. Given that the information the refugees had concerning possible future circumstances was limited since they had not lived in the countries to which they sought to be resettled, the most powerful motivation was their preference for recreating what they had known before.

The validity of this argument is based on both the assertion of choice on the part of the Vietnamese refugees and their motivation to recreate what were their self-reported perceptions of what Hirschman called "respected cultural values." The validity of this assertion is based on, and therefore dependent on, the refugees' perceptions of their place in the Vietnamese society they left. To what degree these perceptions can be considered "cultural" in the sense of representing "Vietnamese culture" from an objective perspective is limited. Vietnam, and Vietnamese culture, have undergone significant stress. The imposition of colonialism and a foreign culture (French), wars against the French and then between Vietnamese and against US forces in Vietnam, have had profound effects on Vietnamese culture and left few if any areas of the country and culture untouched. Unfortunately, there are no real sources that document the changing culture of Vietnam as a subject in itself, especially the changes experienced by those whose status was

most affected by the war and its aftermath, the urban middle and upper classes of South Vietnam.

Conclusion

Most of what is written about refugees discounts that refugees have made a choice in becoming refugees. The common perception is that the life the refugees left had to have been so horrible that conceiving the refugees' flight as the result of a choice is abhorrent. Consequently, when refugee populations are described, there is an absence of a presentation of them as real, live human beings. Refugees are presented only as victims of their own governments, the countries where they may be given asylum, and the organizations and agencies -- both international and non-governmental -- who attempt to help them. In essence, the refugee population is demonstrated and definable only in terms of third-party agencies, such as the kind of assistance due victims, the violations of human rights they have suffered, the assistance they present to countries of first asylum, and finally, in the case of Southeast Asian refugees, whether they are in reality economic migrants or refugees. This last category is a covering argument for the perception that resettlement countries have taken all the Southeast Asians they want.

Much of the discussion about refugees could be settled, and a lot of confusion avoided, if it were recognized that

refugees are like people anywhere else and are making choices based on what they think, believe, even hope the final outcome will be. I seriously doubt that such a re-evaluation of refugees is likely because the stakes -- the relative positions of those involved in dealing with refugee inflows, those working in assisting refugees, and those receiving the benefits of having refugees as client populations -- would be severely disrupted.

As Fighery de Solaiz found out in attempting to secure a Catholic foothold in Vietnam by assisting Nguyen Xhe, a Vietnamese refugee, it is better to be in the position of speaking on behalf of refugees than letting them do their own talking. Things have not changed much since 1975.

The next chapter is a review of just how entrenched the notion of dependent, passive, helpless refugees is in the literature on refugees. Subsequent chapters chapters present a view of the environment, the Philippine Refugee Processing Center, where the refugees made choices and decisions, acted on them, and took the consequences.

Notes

1. In 1479, for example a fleet of junks carrying 1600 Chinese refugees arrived at Da Nang. The Chinese were partisans of the recently defeated Ming in China. They requested permission to resettle in Vietnam. The Chinese were allowed to settle in the area around what is now Hanoi and became a prosperous agricultural community (Hall, 1700-1744).
2. The reference is to Huang Ngan Tang, "Strategy and Tactics", "Indochina Monographs" series, RPT, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1979-80.
3. The specific reference is to Gordon Ls. William A. Carson, *The Imperial* (New York, 1948), 174.

CHAPTER THREE DEPENDENCY: THE CENTRAL ISSUE

Introduction

In this chapter I will present some of the earliest references to dependency, what dependency has come to mean in the literature, and an analysis of the psychological and sociological assertions of refugee dependency.

I will use extensive excerpts from referenced works. There are two reasons for this approach. The first, as the reader will see in many of the excerpts, is the prevalence in the literature of references to unidentified third parties as the ones who label refugees as dependent. The second reason for this approach is to present, as much as possible, exactly what people say regarding dependency. The issue being addressed here is what -- as far as it can be determined -- dependency is, what it refers to, and whether the concept is appropriate.

The Issues: Refugee Dependency

In almost every study of refugees that does not exclusively concern the political, historical, or legal aspects there is some discussion of the issue of dependency among refugee populations. The discussion involves a wide

range of refugee populations and disciplines represented among researchers including psychology, religion, anthropology, and sociology. Regardless of the pervasiveness of the issue, however, there is little clarity or agreement on what dependency, or the 'dependency syndrome,' is. It is also very difficult to determine where, when, or how this issue came to be so closely associated with refugees. It seems to be so commonly accepted as an issue to be addressed that it hangs, metaphorically, around refugees like a cloud that follows them around through successive researches and analyses by successive generations of researchers. There are essentially two approaches to refugee dependency. The first is a psychological view where the behavior or self-reported perceptions of refugees that indicate a lack of initiative, a lack of motivation to act in the refugee camp environment, or a reluctance to contemplate and plan for the future, are considered indicators of an internal dependent psychological state. The second view is a sociological assessment that particular kinds of environments characterized by a "care and maintenance" regime supported by assistance external to the population and environment -- such as prisons, concentration camps, mental hospitals and refugee camps -- leads to the acquisition by the assisted or confined population of a dependent state of mind.

In both of these points of view the initial approach is that people whose lives have been disrupted, people who have experienced a high degree of uncertainty in their lives, are psychologically vulnerable. In the psychological point of view, such people are vulnerable to certain kinds of psychopathologies that predispose them to become dependent on those who intervene and organize their lives. In the sociological point of view, such people are vulnerable to organized and constrained environments where they learn, or internalize, the limits and constraints imposed by those who seek to aid or control their lives to such a degree that they become incapable of operating outside the organization and constraints of such environments.

These points of view present several questions in assessing the relevance of a "dependency" model for refugees. First, are refugee populations psychologically vulnerable to a dependency mind-set? Second, are the psychopathologies reported by psychologists that indicate a dependent state of mind applicable to the general refugee population? Thirdly, do refugee camps represent organized and constrained environments that are analogous to prisons, concentration camps, and mental hospitals? In essence, do the various factors that have been drawn together to create a refugee dependency model accurately reflect the refugee experience? Further, does a refugee dependency model give any good indication of what refugees are likely to do, i.e.

the persistence of a dependent state of mind when they leave the refugee camp environment?

I have found in my research on the Vietnamese refugees in the PACO that the dependency model presents an inaccurate picture of what life in a refugee camp is like and what effect the refugee camp experience has on refugees. As a result of this inaccuracy there persists a distorted view of refugees which makes it all the more difficult to achieve any real progress on determining and understanding the changes people go through during the process of becoming and being a refugee.

Perceptions of Dependency: The Origins

The earliest reference to dependence among the inhabitants of an institution similar to a refugee camp is in Alexander Leighton's study of the Forton relocation center, where Japanese-Americans were interned during WW II.

There were some instances of excessive clinging, extreme dependency, and clinging for support to various members of the Administration. Such persons were likely to agree to any administrative proposal, however ill advised, and would even maintain that their food was satisfactory when it was inadequate by any normal standards. This sometimes made things easy for the Administration, but more often it became clear in time that such reactions served poorly not only the welfare of the individual but also the administrator who found these persons too weak to take responsibility and incapable of initiative (Leighton, 1950:164).

The characteristic Leighton seemed to be referring to here were to a psychological dependence on administrators for

'support' leading to acquiescence and over compliance. The nature of what the support of administrators conveyed, such as self-esteem or status, was not clear. It also seemed to be characterizing dependency here is a more active sense, as in the 'soliciting for support' which could be contrasted with other characteristics often linked to dependency such as apathy or helplessness. Leighton discussed these characteristics separately, not as personal characteristics but as a response to stress.

Principle 3: Withdrawal, apathy and indifference arising from disturbed emotions and thoughts may serve to protect the individual from some of the forces causing the disturbed emotions and thoughts and enable him to survive until conditions improve; operate to limit the continuance or increase of the forces causing disturbed emotions and thoughts; lead to extremes of selfishness, isolation, personal deterioration and unreliability.

In the center, withdrawal from painful contexts, lying low, not 'sticking your neck out' were, perhaps, the most widespread of all reactions. It was obviously a middle-ground, conservative attitude and a considerable asset to the Administration because of its very inertia. Although it operated against active cooperation and initiative, it worked equally to retard radical aggressive behavior and contributed such stability to the community. In spite of being extremely noncooperating, stability made for reliability (Leighton, 1945:245).

The distinction that Leighton drew between dependence and apathy was clear from the recommendations he made on how to deal with various situations. Recommendation 7 was a response to the problem of dependency.

7. Cultivate cooperation, but not extremes of compliance and dependence; there are 'yes men' of all races and creeds and they are usually poor assistants (Leighton, 1945:275).

Recommendation 8 was a response to an acceptable amount of apathy, withdrawal and indifference and the extremes.

8. Regard extremes of withdrawal, apathy, and indifference as bad signs, but accept mass inertia as characteristic of people and learn to rely on its stability (Leighton, 1944:279).

It seemed that Leighton felt that a certain amount of withdrawal and "not sticking your neck out" was not necessarily a negative characteristic among the interned population. In the case of the Poston Center he felt that such an attitude could be counted on for some stability even in difficult circumstances.

Discussion of dependency among camp inhabitants as a widespread and significant problem seems to originate with psychological assessments of the Displaced Persons (DPs) in Europe after World War II. It also seems that in these discussions the notion of dependency came to take on some of the negative value and association with refugees in general that characterizes the present situation. Initially other terms were applied to the refugees to describe the characteristics that seem to be associated with dependency. One of these was apathy, as in Sakis' discussion of "D.F. Apathy."

There was a feeling as if the personality were going to be disoriented. Despite the wide variety of symptoms, ranging from violence to apathy, the most conspicuous and widespread feature seemed to be premeditation and apathy. The displaced persons need this state of disorganization "D.F. Apathy." (Sakis, 1950:77)

There were five factors that Sakis identified as leading to "D. P. Apathy." The first was political uncertainty because of new communist governments in the Baltic countries and the fear of many of the DPs of what would happen on their return. In addition there was general uncertainty as to what the future held if they did not return since Sakis' research concerned conditions before the Displaced Persons Act was passed in 1948 and the DPs were granted the opportunity to resettle in the United States (Sakis, 1955:74). The second factor was a lack of food; initially the DPs had to live on a ration of 1700 calories per day, which was not enough (Sakis, 1955:75-80). Third was isolation from family and loved ones still in the home country. There was no news from home because of restrictions that came with the fall of the "Iron Curtain" (Sakis, 1955:81). Fourth was what Sakis called a "lack of continuity". The DPs had to face too many changes including the communist takeovers in 1939, the war and Nazi occupation, and DP life (Sakis, 1955:81). Fifth were the conditions in the DP camp which led to "congested living quarters and frequent interruptions and irritations" (Sakis, 1955:82).

Murphy (1953) gave an extended description of the same phenomena, introducing the concepts of "infantile regression," and helplessness that have become so closely

associated with refugees, and presenting a problem that goes beyond Leighton's discussion of dependency and stolidity.

The situation is in essence initially due to the collapse of will power which we considered in the chapter before last. The psychoanalyst like Sigmund Freud or Dr. Priefer can testify only to the most extreme cases, but the administrator will recognize their descriptions as fitting, in part, the great majority of refugees seen in the first weeks or months of the camps' existence. Whether it is apathy, or helplessness, or undue excitement, or stolid apathy, the underlying phenomenon of regression to a more or less infantile stage in which ability to plan had disappeared and concerted effort can only be haphazard. The problem is not simply one of infusing structure and co-ordination within a newly collected mass of people--such rule-learning requires time in any group--it is the problem of getting people to apply knowledge or skills or simple thought processes such as taking a decision, which they previously possessed. I will remember in such a period how difficult it was to find any doctor prepared to practice his own profession, and how those who were competent at first--not having undergone any recent acute attack--gradually lost this competence as the full realization of their refugee status ate into them to produce a tension similar to that from which their colleagues were by then recovering. In such a situation the autocratic paternalism of the camps is not only almost a necessity, it is probably beneficial; and the collective support which even the unwilling sharing of adversity produces give the camps their psychological 'raison d'être'... The greatest fault about the camps is that this necessary paternalism of the first days is prolonged with long after its value is exhausted and after it had become a barrier to further recovery. (Murphy, 1948:85)

In addition to the psychological issues of regression and helplessness, Murphy mentioned the 'autocratic paternalism' of the camps that, though initially beneficial, becomes a 'barrier' if it persisted. Autocratic paternalism is another issue that will arise in later studies of refugees to be dealt with here.

In a further elaboration Murphy described the conditions that lead to what he called the "D.F. Camp Mentality" which was very much like Sakis' "D.F. Apathy." Further, Murphy brought in "dependency" as one of the causal factors for this kind of "mentality".

The physical conditions of the camps naturally vary widely, but it is remarkable how uniform their effects are.....The actual dwellings may consist of anything from improvised tents to the luxurious officers' quarters of some disbanded army, but the essential point was that there should be a segregation from non-refugees, a sharing of certain facilities, a lack of privacy, and a sense of dependency. Overcrowding is also common, but the term is a relative one and the number of persons per unit area of living space may be no greater than among the surrounding population. What may be more important, although not universally found, is the limitation of the area, enclosed or otherwise, within which the whole compass of daily life is conducted.....The four factors first mentioned, however, are the key ones in the production of what has been called the D.F. camp mentality, and where they are absent, no matter how poor or how improved the accommodation may be, that characteristic mentality is rarely found. (Murphy, 1955:59)

According to Murphy, dependency was not a problem in itself, but a contributing cause, one among several, that produced a psychological state that later came to be associated with dependency itself or the "dependency syndrome." Murphy elaborated later on the nature of the sense of dependency and its cause.

While lack of privacy was depriving the refugee of one of his main escape valves, the other main features of camp life were putting extra demands on his powers of social adjustment. The crowding, the sharing of facilities, and the sense of dependency all imply the assumption of new roles and new situations, and in speaking with refugees in camps it is clear that it is the difficulty in assuming these new and complex relationships which gives rise to most of

their everyday troubles. Even where the rules are not accepted the failure of others to accept some rule remains a source of irritation; and few refugees are so completely anti-social and isolated--apart from some of the criminals whom some camps notoriously collect--as to be able to disregard neighbors so closely entwined with them. What usually happens is that in time camp-dwellers develop a very high degree of social sense and social interdependency, this development usually taking place at the expense of the individual ego. For while experience in social intercourse is useful to the ego, it is usually sterile unless accompanied or supplemented by the experience in the exercise of personal responsibility. It is this experience of personal responsibility which the camps so commonly fail to provide. (Murphy, 1955-60)

Here Murphy asserted that it was the meaning of new rules and complex relationships (of which a sense of dependency was one) in an environment lacking in privacy and emphasizing social interdependence and in which personal responsibility was not an important characteristic which gave rise to the GP's problems.

The problem that Murphy specifically mentioned above being

...apathy, or helplessness, or manic excitement, or violent aggression, the underlying phenomenon is a regression to a more or less infantile stage in which ability to plan had disappeared and concerted effort can only be voluntary. (Murphy, 1955-56)

Let us be clear about this point. Both Leighton and Murphy referred to dependency as a psychological state, either inherent in, or learned by individuals, that in concert with other factors (see Baka's reference above) led to behaviors they found to be characteristic of people in particular situations or institutions. These behaviors included apathy, preoccupation, helplessness, manic excitement or violent aggression. Over time this

explanation has been reinterpreted to such an extent that dependency has come to be the "blanket" term for all of these behaviors.

It is interesting to note that during the same time that Murphy and Rubin were witnessing what they later wrote about, the post war period from 1945-1948, there was enough known about the detrimental psychological effects of camp life for the researcher to put forth specific recommendations on how to avoid them. Pieter-Amende (1948; 1973) writing on mental hygiene in refugee camps concluded:

Refugees who are uprooted and kept in large numbers and in a subnormal manner in camps tend to form aggressive crowds. Their pent up energies tend to explode in mass reactions. Or, they become victims of... a process (that is) not basically a mass phenomenon, but rather a matter of complete isolation of the individual leading to apathy and resignation. (Pieter- Amende, 1973:247)

She offered some specific recommendations as:

- (1) the type of dwelling units
- (2) the nature of illumination
- (3) the degree of organization of camp life;
- (4) the contact with the outside world;
- (5) the atmosphere of the camp. (Pieter-Amende, 1970:247)

Regarding the types of dwelling units she suggested the following:

Where the residential unit is very large and gloomy, people are more likely to become buried in the mass and to lose contact with their surroundings inside and outside the camp. The smaller and brighter the camps can be kept, the better... when a camp houses over 500 people... such camps should be sub-divided into smaller communities capable of being handled separately...

And these smaller units should be given attractive names instead of Block I, Block II, etc. Where the refugees are obliged to be accommodated in large rooms, light partitions walls should be constructed. Darkness in the dwelling rooms and corridors has a fatal effect on the camp inhabitants, and light should never be concealed.

Regarding the number of inhabitants, as was mentioned above:

Agglomerations of more than 100 can be eased from the thought of anonymity and lethargy if the single immense block is broken up into smaller sub- divisions but only if the members are in contact with one another and with their leader so that each unit has a life of its own.

Regarding the level of camp organization:

Over and over again the mistake is made of confusing indispensable organization with organization as an end in itself. Organization is only a means; if it operates soullessly the individual has the helpless feeling of being caught up in the cogwheels of a machine.

Regarding contact with the outside world:

If camp schools cannot be made part of the local schools, the two types of schools should be in friendly and close contact with one another. Interchange of pupils and teachers may even be possible. The local teachers should be instructed in refugee and camp psychology. Camp clergy and doctors as well as refugees should furnish the local press with a kind of regular chronicle concerning life and events in the camp. If the press only gives reports of the mistakes or sporadic social absents and if the only contact between local community and camp consists of the local police, it inevitably promotes a false judgment of the camp inhabitants, even without intending to do so.

Regarding the atmosphere of the camp:

The factors already discussed have a considerable influence on the atmosphere of the camp. But the moral and mental health of the inhabitants depend on two further factors: first on whether he expects soon to find a way again into active life, and then on the atmosphere generated by the camp leader and his staff.

The camp leaders and their colleagues must be:
 -- carefully selected. Army officers and policemen are certainly not more suitable than members of other professions, and women;
 -- trained on the job in refugee psychology and in leadership;
 -- well paid, since they are performing an important function, and the availability of men and - womenpower is governed by remuneration as in other occupations;
 -- given ample holidays, since the work is arduous;
 -- carefully supervised. Camp leaders who, even after training, are unsuitable from a psychological point of view, who take a dominating and belittling attitude, must not be allowed to remain, even though they may be organizational geniuses (Fischer-Schmidt, 1970:287-289).

Fischer-Schmidt's recommendations addressed many of the problem factors mentioned by Sakis and Murphy regarding the camp living conditions, the lack of privacy, the overcrowding, the isolation from the rest of the world and the style of the camp administration. These factors, in addition to the other ones mentioned, the uncertainty about the future and the unknown present state of loved ones, combined to create the "D.P. Apathy" or "D.P. mentality."

It is important to note the combination of situational, psychological and environmental factors employed by Leighton, Murphy, Sakis and Fischer-Schmidt. It is also important to note the specificity with which they sought to identify and annotate the factors that contributed to undesirable reactions to camp life. It is also important to note that dependency was only one among several factors that contributed to the camp resident's responses.

These studies, among many others, reflect the initial dominance of psychologists and psychological analysis that

set the stage for later research on the impact of becoming a refugee. These studies introduced the labeling of certain types of personality or maturity types and emphasized psychological problems, with an emphasis on the individual and a psychological process reaction--the regression to some earlier psycho-developmental or "infantile" state--to being a refugee (cf Pedersen, 1955; Seligman, 1970). Many of these trends persist into the present and, though I have presented some early examples, I am not suggesting that they originate with them. Very often the later references or characterizations of refugees as apathetic, helpless, or dependent are made without recourse to previous studies, or the later references reflect a newer interpretation. The prevalence of inferences of refugee dependency seems at times to be more indicative of a general "folk model" (Lawless, 1978) concerning refugees that has developed from encounters with these earlier characterizations than a serious attempt to build on the work of these earlier researchers.

Regressions of Refugee Dependence: Psychological Viewpoints

As mentioned above, Burpy thought that the most fundamental psychological effect of the DP camp experience was a regression to an "infantile" or more basic psychological state. Though many of the behavioral characteristics of this state have been accepted by social

alienated and alienated under dependency, the argument concerning psychological regression among refugees or migrants continues.

Chan and Loveridge (1987) provided a similar picture of refugees in Hong Kong.

A refugee arrives in Hong Kong confused, disoriented, vulnerable, sometimes half-alive - living a nightmare of Kafkaesque proportions. He is hanging by a thread to both external and internal life. (Chan and Loveridge, 1987:752)

After being interviewed by immigration officials of both Hong Kong and the UNHCR and assigned to a camp, a hut and a bed, the refugee was then,

bewildered and isolated in his confusion, his sense of being really alive in a real world under assault. The refugee's first inclination is to preserve at all costs what remains of his identity by burying it. (Chan and Loveridge, 1987:752)

After being confronted with officials in uniform, the refugee, according to Chan and Loveridge, felt reverberations of Vietnam or re-education camp so that refugee distrusted camp officials and camp regulations and lied about his or her name, age, formal relationships with other refugees, or all three. The lies the refugee told became reality and the refugee became alienated from herself. Then if the refugees decided to tell the truth the officials did not let him. Thus the refugees in small ways began to cut him or herself off from their own history and identity.

From the moment of the refugee's first brush with officials, he frequently exhibits a paranoid reaction, partly as a result of recent experiences in Vietnam, but partly also because, with his ego under enormous pressure, he regresses to what Klein (1955) calls the paranoid position of infancy (Chen and Lowridge, 1969:70)

The refugee was then paranoid and infantile and thus, susceptible to infantile paranoid fantasies. The refugee then attempted to validate these infantile paranoid fantasies by projecting them on the camp officials who cooperated by persecuting him. As Chen and Lowridge explained:

An almost symbiotic relationship grows up between refugee and officials, whereby the latter become the external projection of all that the refugee instinctively hates, fears, and which, because authority so completely collided with the projection, blocks any successful attempt at a healthy integration or reintegration of the ego. (Chen and Lowridge, 1969:70)

We then had a refugee living in a world of infantile paranoid fantasies that were validated by the camp officials. However, not all camp officials were bad and persecuted the refugee. There were those within the camp who cared, the teachers, social workers, doctors. This duality of temperament between caring and non-caring was a result of the ambivalence with which refugees were treated in Hong Kong. The colonial British government had a policy of offering asylum to all Vietnamese refugees. The local Hong Kong Chinese, however, resented the freedom with which the Vietnamese were allowed in while their fellow Chinese

who sought to cross the border between Hong Kong and China were summarily deported back to China.

Since the refugee was in an infantile state, however, the duality was described by Chan and Laveridge, in Klein's terms they say, as the "bad breast" and the "good breast". The "good breast" did things for the refugee, making no demand; the "bad breast" did things to the refugee, making all kinds of demands. The nurses and non-nurses did not "communicate with each other in a way out of which a degree of institutional ego might be born" (Chan and Laveridge 1987:153).

The final result of all of this, according to Chan and Laveridge, is that the refugee was rendered inept because he had no control over what was done to him or for him. The lack of control led Chan and Laveridge to ascribe Seligman's (1975) concept of helplessness to refugees. Seligman hypothesized that when there was no relationship between an individual's efforts to gain reinforcement or avoid punishment and the actual delivery of reward or punishment, they developed a mental state of helplessness whereby they gave up trying to do anything. The concept of helplessness was applied earlier to Vietnamese refugees in the closed camps in Hong Kong by Mitchell (1966).

The refugee becomes not just physically helpless in terms of freedom of movement, but psychologically helpless when he learns that old skills and attitudes no longer apply and there seems to be no guarantee that

requiring new ones will help him out of his predicament. (Witkeov, 1984 in Davis, 1988:198)

Thus, according to Chan and Laveridge the process of becoming a refugee left people in a psychologically infantile, paranoid fantasy state where nothing they did mattered or gave them a perception of control over their lives, leaving them helpless and passive. In the conclusion of the article Chan and Laveridge did leave remarks saying that the longer refugees spent in the closed camps in Hong Kong the more likely, and more pronounced, these psychological states would be.

Chan and Laveridge are, however, not alone in ascribing similar characteristics to refugees. Krystal and Petty (1980) equated the adjustment of migrants to dealing with the loss of a complex object. They suggested that the complex relationship, complex here being something like a matrix of perceptions and feelings, to the native land was similar to, and forced at the same time, as an individual's relationship to their mother. "Thus the physical environment, the climate and the landscape of the native land are perceived vaguely as co-extensions of the mother" (Krystal and Petty, 1980:118). Instead of just the good and bad breasts, Krystal and Petty extended the analogy to other physical concepts. There is the mother-tongue (Krystal and Petty, 1980:119) and the motherland, "the unconscious equation between native land, earth, city or mountains, and the mother or her breasts" and the "life-long relation with

earth as a mother" or mother-earth (Kryetel and Petty 1943:120) as symbolic representations of the complex relationship to the native land or complex object. Kryetel and Petty argue that, as the immigrant becomes more secure in his new home, more accepting of the new land as a motherland, and if they have exaggerated ideas of the new land, such as of the U.S. as a land "flowing with milk and honey" (Kryetel and Petty 1943:124), the "mother-identity of the new land tends to extend to all of its women" (Kryetel and Petty 1943:125) and the Oedipal conflict is revived. Men can experience a resurgence of restriction society, women can experience pathological guilt at their own success. In their conclusion Kryetel and Petty express their,

impression that migration initiates a potentially dangerous regressive trend which ultimately perpetuates or revives passive oral desires for the mother of early infancy. These desires tend to be projected onto the land of adoption and to predispose the immigrant to experience the inevitable frustration of migration as a repetition of rejection by the mother of infancy. (Kryetel and Petty, 1943:131)

There are common elements running through all the above discussions of the psychological stages of refugees or migrants. The most important is the tendency to ascribe regressive tendencies to refugees and migrants, and to ascribe to those who have experienced a physical movement, a psychological movement back to childhood.

Explanations of Refugee Dependency: Sociological Perspective

The sociological view holds that particular kinds of environments characterized by a "care and maintenance" regime supported by assistance external to the population and environment (such as prisons, concentration camps, mental hospitals and refugee camps) leads to the acquisition by the assisted or confined population of a dependent state of mind.

Some sociological studies seem to have had a major impact, and to some degree legislated the notion of helplessness, dependent refugees who can exert little or no control over their lives. Koss (1972), for example suggested a motivational and "kinetic" distinction between certain types of migrants and refugees and equated the movements of refugees with that of a billiard ball, "devoid of inner direction their path is governed by the kinetic factors, friction and the vectors of outside forces applied to them" (Koss, 1972:131). In the same article Koss describes the state of refugees whose flight has secured them asylum...

He has arrived at the spiritual, spatial, temporal and emotional equivalent to man's limbo of midway-to-nowhere and the longer he remains there, the longer he becomes subjected to its disorienting effects. (Koss 1972:132)

In terms of the discussion about the relationship of refugee camps and refugee dependency, probably the most significant development was the application of Erving

Seiffert's thesis is *Asylums* published in 1963. Seiffert's major impact was through his description of the characteristics of "total institutions" and the effect of the total institution on inmates. He characterized "the central feature" of total institutions:

...as a breakdown of the barriers separating these three spheres of life. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the inmate's daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a predetermined time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit (typed rulings and a body of officials. (Seiffert, 1963:4)

This description of a total institution bears a strong resemblance to refugee camps. By analogy, it was thought that the effects of experiencing a total institution that would be applicable to refugees in refugee camps; for example, the differences between life inside and outside the institution and the difficulties encountered by refugees when they finally leave the camp.

Thus, if the inmate's stay is long, what has been called 'disorientation' may occur -- that is, an 'unlearning' which renders him temporarily 'incapable of managing certain features of daily life on the outside, it and when he gets back to it. (Seiffert, 1963:15)

Other analogies are to the prison-like characteristics of refugee camps and prisons as total institutions (Raynall, 1986:37) and to the "presentation of the self" adopted by refugees in dealing with camp administrations and other

bureaucracies [see Chen and Loveridge, 1987, discussed above].

Hitchcock draws an analogy based on Goffman in describing the processing of Vietnamese refugees into Phnom Sikanh. The initial processing of refugees into Phnom Sikanh took several hours during which they were addressed by the camp supervisors stressing the regulations and restrictions of the camp and the punishment that follows any transgression. The refugees were then interviewed individually, given medical examinations and finally, in single file, led away to their accommodations.

One implicit function of the exercise is to provide a lesson in submission, to impress upon the Vietnamese their helplessness and dependency upon Thai authorities. Goffman has documented the technique in his discussion of many kinds of total institutions. (Hitchcock, 1987:22)

The reference is to Suttman's description of the admission procedures in total institutions where the inmate "finds certain roles are lost to him by the barrier that separates him from the outside world....and typically brings other signs of pass and mortification as well" (Suttman, 1981:18). Hitchcock continues:

The refugee is dependent on the good will of those who receive him. They in turn will find him easier to manage if he is perceived not as an individual who is used to organizing his own life but as a refugee who is in need of protection. This practice expects that refugee status will come to represent whatever is necessary for the smooth running of the camp. (Hitchcock, 1987:23)

This statement references Goffman's where he describes the end result of the initial processing to be one in which the inmate is "separated away" and "shaped and coded into an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery" (Goffman, 1961:14).

In a later work Goffman alludes to the all-encompassing nature, the totality, of total institutions and the effects on inmates or, in the case Goffman studied, Vietnamese refugees.

The implications of the findings go beyond the situation of the Vietnamese to other kinds of institutional living as experienced, for example, by the elderly, the mentally ill and the criminal. For this reason, the work of Goffman (1961) and Foucault (1977, 1982) provide relevant insight, even though neither refer to refugees per se. Both are concerned with power struggles and the strategies employed by the dominant bodies to maintain their supremacy not by suppression but by the consequences of the groups themselves. For example, in his discussion of a mental institution, Goffman points out that there is no need for the authorities to secure a 'cultural victory' over the patients' own conception of self lodged in their experiences of the outside world. Such behavioral changes as do occur result from a suspension of opportunities for such normal expressions and are manifested not as an accommodation into the ethos of the institution but as a de-socialization that makes the return to the outside world increasingly difficult with the passage of time. Compliance is achieved by the ability of the institution to 'create and sustain a partitioned kind of tension between the home world and the institutional world and use this partitioned tension as strategic leverage in the management of men' (Goffman, 1961:24).

As has been shown, the Vietnamese are 'vulnerable to such "leverage" in a similar way, because the institution represents the route whereby the goals they may have chosen may be secured, in return for certain prescribed forms of behavior. Such forms do not necessarily equate with acquiring a potentially useful understanding of Westernized culture, but instead the skill required to live in an institution is

order to leave it as soon as possible. (Hirschman, 1992:282-284)

Hirschman's point was essentially that the skills that refugees learn in order to minimize their problems in refugee camps, and thus maximize their opportunity to leave the camps as soon as possible, are not transferable to the lives and problems they will be confronted with in Western cultural settings where they will be resettled. Since camp administrators control both access to the refugees' goal (exit from the institution) and the means to securing that goal (compliance with administrative dictates while in the institution), the administration does not necessarily have to actively suppress the institutionalized population to secure compliance.

Is the behavior of the refugees in this situation dependent? If the refugees choose to behave compliantly, to conform to the administrative dictates no matter how irrelevant they might be to life outside the institution in furtherance of the goal of being resettled, is this dependency?

Perceptions of Refugee Dependency, Bureaucracy, Administrations, and Relief

Thus brings us to the larger issue of the effects of bureaucracies and bureaucratic control over the refugees' lives in events subsequent to their flight. The question is whether there are long-term effects resulting from the

bureaucratic control of the refugees while in refugee camps and settlements and during the refugee's resettlement or repatriation. Further, if there are such long term effects, whether these experiences train the refugees to freeze the attainment of their goals in terms of conforming to bureaucratic dictates, thus forming a dependency on bureaucrats or bureaucracies for direction when seeking and selecting alternative courses of action? Several researchers have suggested that the answer to these questions, is yes.

The problems of reestablishing relationships of dependence and independence are not limited to crises within the family. The basic human needs that individuals and groups have for both dependence and independence are not easily satisfied under the unstable situations of transmigration (Dugas, 1968). Migrants from traditional societies tend to depend on government agencies when they have no access to familial support systems. Emergency assistance is often necessary for the alleviation of the immediate and painful needs of dislocation, and the practical needs of uprooted groups. Nevertheless, bureaucratic agencies may foster long-term dependency on the part of those seeking help, which increases the burden to the recipient as well as to the giver of aid. Under such conditions, both government bureaucracy and privately owned agencies need to establish new social structures that provide health and economic supports without obstructing the coping initiatives of the uprooted. (Casino et al., 1968-9)

In the case of a refugee camp in Africa, Norrell and I discussed the role of the relief agencies as a contributing factor in creating refugee dependency.

Nor did I initially question the notion that refugees become negatively dependent as had been reported to me by experienced workers in the field. The stereotyped view that refugees everywhere are excessively and unreasonably dependent is the

widely accepted for one not to be tempted to believe it has been made in fact.

I did, however, suspect that a major reason for this psychological dependency might lie in the manner in which relief is given and the supplementary role which the refugee is forced to assume in the initial period of his emergency. (Marshall-Road, 1964:2)

The responsibility for the failure of the settlement policy has been laid at the feet of the refugees themselves. Representatives of the international humanitarian community usually arrive at the scene of an emergency influx of refugees some time after it has begun. The refugees they encounter are often in extremely poor physical condition. It is necessary to provide food, shelter, water and medical services, and to concentrate effort on saving lives. During this period it is believed that refugees adopt attitudes and behavior which impede their progress towards self-sufficiency. These negative responses--usually referred to as the 'dependency syndrome'--are thought to develop when refugees are the objects of relief.

The prevalent theory suggests that by the time it is possible to consider longer-term solutions, dependent behavior has already become entrenched. Among relief organizations, a kind of working hypothesis has developed: the more you give, the more dependent people become. In order to counteract this attitude, various forms of external pressure have been placed on refugees in settlements with a view to encouraging them to take on more responsibility for themselves. Such 'pressures' range from paying 'incentives' to refugees who have built their own houses or sanitary facilities, to the threatened or actual withdrawal of food rations. (Marshall-Road, 1964:10)

Marshall-Road also discussed the perception of the refugees as being 'children' of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Marshall-Road, 1964:80-81). She said that before refugees moved into settlements they were aware of the local or national host government as granting asylum, but in the settlement they become "under UNHCR." Part of the reason for this, she argued, took place as the very

beginning when the refugees were transported to the settlement, i.e., a process of becoming dependent on an 'outsider' giving kites, cooking pots, bowls, hockets, food -- in this case rice -- not a staple but a prestige food (Marriott-Mood, 1984:81). "In fact," she pointed out, "the entire aid program became dominated by the distribution of material aid" (Marriott-Mood, 1984:83).

Lyneil Long (1981) made much the same argument in reference to the Hmong living in Ban Vang, a refugee camp near the Thai-Lao border in Thailand. She, however, extended the argument the refugees were dependent on to include the international relief system.

Although refugees gain certain legal and political protections, they also become dependents of a complex international relief system. Without a political solution, that relief may be institutionalized through refugee settlements or camps arising from recurrent business or civil wars.

From this perspective, the international relief community's concept of the dependency syndrome applied to the Hmong and other refugees blames the victim. Ban Vang as an institution defines specific roles and responsibilities to the refugee and relief worker-- and prepares the refugee for the dependent bureaucracies of modern welfare systems. Although individuals-- both relief workers and refugees-- resist this institutionalization, they are caught in a larger geopolitical order that ultimately controlled their fates. (Long, 1981:86-87)

Nicholson argued much the same about the imposition of a refugee identity upon Vietnamese by the experience of living in Phanet Nihon camp in Thailand.

The implication is that refugee status is the only identity available to the individual rather than being one of a range of possible identities. Refugee status is the individual rather than one aspect of his. The

word 'refugee' is capable of a number of definitions and interpretations. One of the consistent tendencies of those who administer refugees is to act as if 'refugee' refers to the individual as a whole. Such a view encourages the idea that a group of such individuals may be treated as an anonymous category of persons bearing the label 'refugee'. The alternative position is to recognize that the term may describe the social, mental, or physical condition of a person, but cannot by itself denote a person. To put it another way, the Vietnamese do not turn into refugees but instead are categorized as such by those who administer them. The tendency when holding the first view, is to equate all the characteristics of refugee status, helplessness, dependency and so forth with the supposed characteristics of the individual who holds that status. (Hitchcock, 1947:20-21)

Hitchcock also argued that as a result of the need to maintain control over the refugees, relief agencies have reduced their status to that of children. This is different from the psychological regression discussed above. In this case, Hitchcock argued that the status was imposed from outside, not regressed to within, the refugee.

The continuing problem is to maintain control over the refugee for the duration of his stay in the camp. This is partially achieved by treating refugees in a similar fashion to children when it is appropriate to keep powerless and dependent. (Hitchcock, 1947:22)

Hitchcock also refers to Murphy in describing an 'authoritarian paternalism' to camp authorities,

Murphy noted a similar attitude amongst administrators of post World War camps and described it as 'authoritarian paternalism' which discouraged the emergence of willpower amongst refugees. (Hitchcock, 1947:23-24)

The Supreme Command of the Royal Thailand Government has an emergency district task in controlling large numbers of refugees within its territory, some of whom like the Vietnamese, are held in closed camps.

Restrictions within the camp of Mount Mishon were adopted in the hope that fairly unpleasant conditions would deter more refugees from coming to Thailand. Towards those who still came the attitude of the authorities is similar to the 'autocratic paternalism' that, according to H.A.M. Murphy (1955, p. 593), characterized the behavior of landlords of the post-second World War refugee camps in Europe. (Mitchem, 1990:188)

This is what Murphy wrote:

It may seem strange that the devolution of authority and the development of democratic responsibility is not to be found more often in camp administration. The regressed behavior of newly arrived refugees certainly encourages the promotion of persons of authoritarian tendency to the post of camp director, and such persons naturally tend to retain an autocratic form of control. But with the almost inevitable shortage of supervisory staff and at times one might expect the frequent transfer of subordinate functions to democratic committees, leaving the director the unshared use of real power at a higher level. Under the such were autocratic regimes of the F.O.M and concentration camps--where all the features as far mentioned were also present--some form of self-government below a certain level very often developed. Why then has it not been found more often among refugees? ---the expertise of democratic government is commonly regarded as the highest point in social development which mankind has attained. It is not something which can be achieved by children, and it is usually one of the first things to be abandoned by communities under strain. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, all the countries from which refugees have recently come had voluntarily relinquished democracy for dictatorship between the wars, or--in the case of British India and Palestine--had hitherto never attained that form of rule. Hence to expect people with so little civic training and in a state of mental convalescence to fall naturally into democratic ways, is optimistic. The transition from paternalism to self-determination, even when desired by the administration, must always be difficult and very gradual. That it ought to be persisted with is certain, but as the transitional stage increases instead of relieves the administration it is understandable that the effort is too often abandoned and autocracy resumed. (Murphy, 1955:68)

As I mentioned above in the discussion on Murphy, Murphy did consider the persistence of an autocratic paternalism to be a barrier to "further recovery" by the refugees. Here Murphy is very explicit in explaining the factors that promoted autocratic paternalism in the DP camps: possible analogy to repressive mental states by seeing children cannot achieve democracy, community strain, lack of civic training, a state of mental convalescence. Murphy did not say that autocratic paternalism was an imposition for the purpose of maintaining control. Kitchener argued that the autocratic paternalism of Francis Wilson was to maintain control and to maintain conditions that might serve as a deterrent to further refugee influxes. The factors Murphy pointed to were all characteristics of the refugee population itself as they entered the camps. They were not acquired or imposed identities by the camp environment or administration.

Stein, referring to Rubin and Murphy, attempted a similar extrapolation when he implied that their use of dependency was as a product of camp life, not a contributing factor to other behaviors.

One of the most useful descriptions and analyses of refugee camps is a brief essay by E.B.R. Murphy (1980). Murphy notes that although the physical conditions of camps may vary widely, the effects tend to be uniform. The most important characteristics of the camps are segregation from the host population, the need to share facilities, a lack of privacy, plus overcrowding and a limited, restricted area within which the whole compass of daily life is to be conducted. This gives the refugees a sense of dependency, and the clear signal

that they have a special and limited status and are being controlled. (Stein, 1981:228)

Is this what Murphy meant? I do not think so. I think that Stein gives a sociological interpretation, or extrapolation, of what Murphy meant. In the same vein Stein referred to Sakis and "O.F. Apathy" and the behavior of refugees in Southeast Asia.

Sakis writing in 1983 (the same that appeared in Murphy in 1988) spoke of 'O.F. Apathy' to describe camp conditions after World War II. In many of the camps in Southeast Asia the behavior of today's refugees is only too reminiscent of that period. (Stein, 1981:224) (Insert mine)

Stein gave no references to studies on the camps or the behavior of refugees in Southeast Asia to support this. This assertion had more the flavor of a prophecy than a known fact. Subsequent studies have reflected similar perceptions (Rushden, 1981; Harland, 1983; Tallacron, 1983; Kitchcock, 1988; 1987 and 1990).

Kitchcock and Stein attempted to go-opt or extrapolate from a psychological assessment to a sociological assertion. These represent two very different points of view.

Kitchcock, though often referenced above as a wide range of issues, also pointed out another factor that contributed to dependency in refugee camps. The refugees have nothing to offer to those who provide them asylum, meet their basic needs and provide services. They cannot establish any kind of reciprocal relationship with those who aid them.

In all the camps there are remarkable similarities in the ways the Vietnamese feel that their status

is being perceived. They know they are subject to an institution that is not intended to demonstrate individuals but instead adopts such universal categorizations as apply to those who are needy, helpless and in distress. Part of the reason why this occurs is because there are few direct reciprocal relations between refugees and their helpers; such relations are mainly between the assisting agencies and the administration. The refugees find that they are subject to the shared definitions and agreed terms of the other two parties. (Hitchcock, 1988:154)

Hitchcock, as have many others, also pointed out that the longer refugees remained in camps the greater the negative effects of camp life.

For those who have not been accepted, such new rejection is an additional confirmation that they have no further strategic role in deciding their fate and must wait for others to take the initiative. The pattern of daily life in the camp imprints itself ever more firmly upon the perceptions that refugees have of themselves. Apollonides claims to be a strategy for securing resettlement and expresses a hesitant mode of existence, accompanied by increasing lethargy and a sense of pointlessness.

The extent to which there is self-doubt and dependency is likely to be related to the ability of such people to make contacts and fulfill personal and material needs within the Vietnamese community. (Hitchcock, 1988:155)

Some authors have stressed the economic nature of the dependency in refugee camps.

Both the UNHCR and UNRWA camps have always been totally dependent upon weekly or bi-weekly rations provided by the international community. Such rations are basic rice, vegetables, cooking oil and canned fish are the staples. Fuelwood is also provided in some camps. Water yards have been installed in all camps, and basic housing, usually consisting of a one room bamboo and grass hut, has also been provided.

The near total dependency of the UNHCR camps, is illustrated by the 'official' absence of any monetary economy within the camps. No cash is supposed to be circulating inside camps. Refugees who worked for UNHCR or UNRWA are paid in kind

(household, soap, canned goods, etc.) and are expected to further any expansion. In reality however, a limited market economy has materialised since money flows into camp with relative ease, and in fairly large sums, primarily as 'illegal' remittances from resettled Khmer. Meat, fish, tobacco and other goods are traded through the fence with the full knowledge and cooperation of Thai authorities and guards, who clearly reap considerable profit from 'taxing' these activities. (Hogge, 1980:6)

Hogge's assertion of economic dependence was confusing to us. He said that the camps and the Khmer were dependent but went into detail about the economic activities, both legal and illegal, especially in site 1 and site 8 camps. For example, he discussed the night-time industry in restaurants, bars and prostitution, and the illegal video industry in Site 1 camp (Hogge, 1980:8-11).

Raynall was more explicit in her description of the effects of economic dependency in the Khmer refugee camps on the Thai border.

It generated the marginal camp economies and underlying economic insecurity constantly undermine people's sense of autonomy and self-esteem. The complexity of physiological needs and the way in which such needs cannot easily be separated from social and psychological needs are frequently ignored in emergency assistance programmes, where the emphasis is on getting sufficient food to people to stave off starvation. It is only when this initial stage is successfully overcome, as is the case in the Khmer border camps, that such complexities are thrown into sharp relief. No longer masked by simple deficiencies in food delivery, the real underlying problem begins to emerge - namely the total inadequacy of enclosed camp systems to provide long-term living environments. (Raynall, 1988:123)

Barnes and Oliver-Smith (1989) distinguished between voluntary and involuntary migrants on the basis of

powerlessness.

In sum, forced migration is distinguished from voluntary migration by the diminished power of decision in the former, sometimes reaching an extreme in which the forced migrants are totally powerless. (Rosen and Oliver-Smith, 1982:4)

By focusing on powerlessness Rosen and Oliver-Smith maintained the integrity of a class of people consolidated involuntary migrants, a class of which refugees are only a part, since it also includes victims of natural disasters and development project relocations.

Powerlessness also played a role in the conditions of dependency that Keywell described in the Khmer refugee camps on the Thai border.

A common metaphor that the Khmer use to describe their situation is 'like chickens in a cage'. One man encapsulated this feeling of imprisonment and dependence when he said, 'Life here is like a prison. We are like wild animals in a zoo. Paragons and Thai come and look at us. They give fruits to our children.' Both Khmer and agency workers pointed out that this feeling of imprisonment had intensified since 1980, when the camps were moved inside Thailand, making the camp inhabitants prisoners of both their own resistance leaders and their Thai hosts.

The sense of powerlessness nevertheless and contributed to distress caused by the total uncertainty about the future -- giving people the feeling of being in limbo with no end in sight. People find it virtually impossible to talk about the future or indeed to envisage a future which is different from the present. As one Khmer said, 'If I thought about the future then life here would become unbearable.' Another old woman stated categorically that 'I don't think about the future. If I think about the future I can't do anything... I have no future. It is hopeless.' (Keywell, 1984:134)

In all of the references to dependency I found only one explicitly defining and discussing the "dependency

syndrome." Roger Rosen argued that the dependency syndrome existed among Afghan refugees in Pakistan and explained why he thought it could be described as a syndrome.

Basically, the refugees in Pakistan, and all over the world face a new and equally serious problem: their life has been transformed fundamentally into a life of dependency. Refugees are dependent on aid for physical survival; they are deprived of the means and possibilities of influencing their own situation and destiny--they have become receivers. Among Afghan refugees, as among many other refugee groups, this means a slow process of disintegration of cultural identity, moral standards, self-esteem -- and perhaps in the long run, a loss of ethnic identity. In the present phase it is becoming increasingly recognized that mental and social problems are more important than problems of mere physical survival. (Rosen, 1981:18)

The situation of dependency has many expressions, any of which act as feed-backs so as to further aggravate dependency -- through poor health, passivity, despair, and social disintegration. This is one important reason I have chosen to face the problem as a 'syndrome'. It has many aspects often functioning as a vicious circle: dependency creates passivity, and passivity creates dependency. (Rosen, 1981:18)

Mental problems are caused chiefly by the frustration of economic dependence and their inability to influence their own situation. (Rosen, 1981:21)

One author, a Catholic Priest, the Rev. Nicholas Cufarese, equated helplessness and dependence with a lack of freedom in the closed camps in Hong Kong.

The second camp I visited was a 'closed camp' housing refugees who arrived after 1981. As far as physical conditions are concerned, the closed was better than Jubilee--cleaner, better organized, nicer rooms. But the spiritual atmosphere was another story. 'Closed camp' means that the refugees are actually prisoners in the camp while they wait resettlement. They cannot go out and find work; virtually everything

is done for them. Helpless and dependent, they have no freedom. (O'Rourke, 1989:28-29)

Other authors have argued that cultural factors can predispose some populations to some forms of dependency while others argue that cultural factors can lead to resistance to some forms of dependency. Tzuc Rye characterized the reciprocal relationships between patrons and clients found in Asian cultures as a kind of dependency.

To the extent that people with status could exploit their positions explicitly, they were expected to do so in ways that would benefit those of lower status who were in need of help. In Southeast Asian cultures this process produced the various systems of patron-client relations. Such an exchange relationship included a form of dependency in which, in return for unifying difference and awe, inferiors could expect security and understanding. (Rye, 1989:48)

In Asian politics patrons and clients seek each other out for different but equally compelling reasons, and the spirit of mutual dependency is quite different from the western expectation that the bonds which tie superiors and inferiors are likely only to allow the former to manipulate the latter for their own interests. (Rye, 1989:51)

Thus, the Western belief that progress should result in ever greater scope for individual autonomy is not taken as self-evident by most Asians, who are more inclined to believe that greater happiness comes from suppressing self-interest in favor of group collectivity. (Rye, 1989:54)

Bayard described the cultural preferences of the Alger for certain foods and the lengths they would go to get them as evidence of an assertion of their cultural identity and as a resistance to being characterized as dependent recipients.

In addition to the need for variety in the diet, cultural values strongly influence food preferences.

For example, beans are included in the ration to provide extra protein. But in Kampuchea beans are not a staple food and are usually eaten mixed with sugar as a dessert. The Khmer each prefer fresh fish, which is abundant in Kampuchea, to the dried fish provided in the ration, which they strongly dislike as it is of the lowest quality. They will go to great lengths to obtain fresh fish or even tinned fish. At another level this determination to acquire fresh fish, or even cash for that matter, is an assertion by the camp inhabitants of their specific identity as Khmer rather than as featureless dependent recipients. (Kaywell, 1980:122)

Disruptions of Refugee Dependency: Sociological Views of Refugee Dependency and the Repatriation and Resettlement of Refugees

The sociological view of refugee extends to the "variable" solutions for refugees involving repatriation and resettlement. This section introduces arguments about refugee dependency involving their repatriation or resettlement and the possible long-term effects of dependency in refugee camps.

In the case of future repatriation Kopp notes that the services in the camp that the refugees have come to expect and depend on may cause problems if the same level of service is not available in the area to which the refugees will be repatriated.

The health and educational services provided in most of the camps are significantly superior to those available in Cambodia. There is no question that infant and child mortality is very below levels prevailing inside Cambodia and that literacy and general educational attainments are considerably higher than across the border. While these are clearly desirable products of

camp life, they have also created an additional dimension of dependency: camp residents have become accustomed to reliable health care and basic education, sanitation programs and parasite and insect-vector controls have also reduced camp residents' immunity to many of the diseases still widespread inside Cambodia. Likewise, many of the mental health problems are being kept in check because of the availability of medications and counselling services; such facilities are absent in Cambodia. And for the many handicapped, survival has also been facilitated by innovative programs in the camps. This dimension of the dependency problem has, to date, been largely ignored. (Rogge, 1988:13)

In the case of resettlement Bar-Tsed notes how the focus and concentration on the policies and activities of resettlement bureaucracies may impede the adjustment of new immigrants. Bar-Tsed argued that the desocialization and resocialization process was one of total-and-error learning (Bar-Tsed, 1968:15). He distinguished between 'social' and 'formal' (or bureaucratic) institutional contexts. The formal contexts had a possible detrimental effect through disrupting (a kind of age regression to an earlier, less mature state) and categorization (Bar-Tsed, 1968:15-16). He referenced Hoffman and the relegation of inmates to the 'child-mode' in total institutions arguing that the chief role of the immigrant was a via the resettlement bureaucracy is comparable to that of the inmate in a total institution.

...the immigrant is less exposed to the bureaucratic situation than the inmate of a total institution, but the subordination of the basic needs depends as thoroughly on the bureaucratic institutions that the situation which, normally, is open, and characterized by partial dependence, assumes the attributes of a closed institutional setting. (Bar-Tsed, 1968:18)

Bar-Touf argued that the closer the tie to the bureaucracy to the exclusion of other social context the more concentrated the effects of the interaction. These concentrated effects elevated the importance of certain behaviors, including: (1) information gathering both for getting useful information and to generate a perception of being on the inside, (2) distinctive presentation of the self to reduce the ambiguity of the client category, which is exemplified by (a) type-castings to build up a stereotype to call to bureaucracy and (b) personal myth to exaggerate one's high status or suffering, (3) the manipulation of the interaction:

The basis of manipulation varies from the acceptance of the bureaucratic principle and its extreme exploitation to the negation of the system and its personalization as far as possible. The personalizing tendencies stem from the same approach of breaking the bureaucratic system, which is at the basis of the distinctive presentation of the self. The immigrant tries to change the impersonal bureaucracy-client relationship into a more humanized face-to-face contact. (Bar-Touf, 1989:27)

Manipulating the interaction leads to a reliance on just an official "personal contacts." Bar-Touf considered these approaches to be the result of trial and error and to be adaptive. Non-adaptive behavior patterns, according to Bar-Touf, included overconformity, alienation, and aggression. Relevant to this discussion are overconformity and alienation.

Overconformity with the role of the bureaucratic client implies unmeaningful learning and lack of autonomy. This is the result of exclusion

identification with the client role. The immigrant renounces any decision making and transfers all responsibility to the organization. He develops extreme dependence, is anxious to please and emphasizes those weaknesses which make him eligible for organizational aid. This pattern, akin to the 'conversion' pattern described by Goffman, contains elements of self-degradation and of yielding to authority.

Alienation is a much discussed phenomenon and the immigrant situation seems to have all the preconditions for its generation. Neither autonomy nor learning are manifest. The symptoms of alienation are passivity, lack of interest in the new milieu, lack of belief in the future, unwillingness to accept guidance or help, suspicion toward people and institutions. (Mar-rose, 1981:40)

Stein argued that such the same effects resulted from the differing expectations of the refugee and the resettlement caseworker.

Neither the government nor the agencies are able to satisfy all of the refugees' demands. As their requests are frustrated the refugees become suspicious and bitter. Denied what they believe is owed them, feeling that the agencies seek to control them, the refugees suspect 'counterfeit-nurturance', that is aid given to humiliate and subjugate the refugees rather than free them of genuine ability. A vicious spiral can set in: refugees are helped because they are helpless; they must display their need and helplessness; the caseworker passes words to all who are ready and must shield himself from emotional involvement; the cool attitude of the caseworker conveys suspicion to the refugee about his trustfulness; if they won't believe the truth the refugee inflates his hearing exaggerated stories the caseworker becomes suspicious. (Stein, 1981:317)

With the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 many Western nations accepted thousands of Vietnamese refugees. The climate that prevailed at the time and the governmental and private voluntary organizations' involvement led to policies

and policy statements regarding how resettlement would be implemented and evaluated. Included in the policies and policy statements was an emphasis on refugees attaining self-sufficiency as soon as possible as well as criteria defining what was meant by self-sufficiency and dependency:

Kaines (1988) in discussing the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of refugee resettlement programs pointed out how the task was made arbitrarily easier by the U.S. government's policy:

Yet a consideration of such effects is rendered arbitrarily easier because of the federal government's haste to turn this operationalization of the concept of self-sufficiency. Briefly put, the concept through the early 1980s was increasingly interpreted not as broad, multi-faceted and self-sustaining self-sufficiency, but rather as minimal economic self-sufficiency to be attained as rapidly as possible. The goal was often further restricted to ease rapid employment, a phrasing that avoids the most definitional problems of self-sufficiency (i.e. that it is an attribute of households and not of individuals). Thus out of the definitional labyrinth emerge two specific goals: rapid employment (either more people employed after the same period of time or the same number of people employed after a shorter period of time) and reduction of dependency (fewer people on assistance after the same period of time or the same number of people on assistance after a shorter period of time). (Kaines, 1988:204-205)

According to Kaines, the federal government's involvement and goals defined and directed the resettlement program.

Virtually all aspects of the programs were explicitly directed towards this goal of 'reducing dependency'-- the particularly unfortunate phrasing that gained wide currency. (Kaines, 1988:205)

Further he pointed out that,

...a wide ideological campaign was waged chastising refugees (to some extent) and those who served them (to a greater extent) for the development of an 'entitlement mentality' and for the self-serving maintenance of a 'refugee industry.' (Haines, 1988:200)

Thus it was not only the refugees who were dependent and developing an "entitlement mentality," but the service providers as well.

One author even applied the argument of attaining self-sufficiency or becoming self-supporting to the question of when a refugee ceases to be a refugee. Hakovirta seeks to answer this in his definition of what a refugee is.

Refugee is here defined as a person who (a) is outside his home country (b) due to persecution or violence, and who (c) has not yet become self-sufficient in his country of asylum. In other words, a person is considered a refugee when he has fled from his state of nationality or habitual residence because of political, religious, ethnic or other kind of persecution or to avoid warfare or other violence. He ceases to be a refugee if he returns to his country of origin or becomes self-supporting in his country of reception. (Hakovirta, 1984:17)

The emphasis on refugees becoming self-sufficient resulting from public pressure to account for the money expended in resettlement programs led to the quantification of refugee dependency. One example of the quantifiability possible can be found in the most specific definition I found of "welfare dependency", which was "the ratio of family welfare income to total annual income" found in Hubert (1987:1487). Here, as Haines pointed out, the unit

in the household, and "dependency" can be quantified in specific ratios of dollars.

Montgomery (1987) pointed out the resettlement policy in Canada had such the same focus.

Basically, the Canadian government's immigration adjustment policy is two-pronged. One aim is to help newcomers find jobs and prepare themselves for jobs (the employment wing of the Canadian Employment and Immigrant Commission (CEIC)). The other aim is to provide a minimal level of financial support to government sponsored immigrants, for up to a year, until they find a job (the Immigrant wing of the CEIC). Obviously there is a sense of urgency, both by the CIC and the newcomers, for the immigrant to begin working and "wean" himself from public dependency. (Montgomery, 1987:85)

Wright argued, however, that economic self-sufficiency as soon as possible has always been the goal of those involved in resettlement. He argued that this was true even when resettlement was primarily the responsibility of private voluntary agencies (VILASS) with minimal government involvement.

Historically, refugee resettlement was carried out by the VILASS as voluntary undertakings at their own expense. Their objective was simply to bring the refugees to economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. (Wright, 1981:240)

Wright argued that the situation has changed. The change has, however, been the result of extraneous factors, not a change in the goals or the agencies involved in resettlement.

While bringing refugees rapidly to economic self-sufficiency remains the objective of the voluntary resettlement agencies, two important changes have taken place that have significantly affected resettlements: (1) the growth of the welfare state,

which has sought to raise the standard of living of those at the bottom of American society, and 3) a change in the type of refugee being resettled. (Wright, 1981:141)

Cultural factors, Wright argued, resulting from the changes in the origins of refugee populations, interacting with the welfare state, could have an effect on the potential for dependency.

Since 1975, especially in the past year or two, the refugee system has included rural Khmer and many of the Lao tribes, the Thai Dao, Lao Thung, the Hain (Yao) and primarily the Hmong. While in terms of our government's obligation to refugees the Hmong have a stronger claim than most, their resettlement in a modern technological society, undoubtedly a wrenching experience for them, poses unprecedented problems for our system of resettlement. Many of them are unlettered in their own languages. Most have engaged in slave and mercenary agriculture and military operations all of their lives. Few have held jobs in our sense of the term. Few have been exposed to the amenities of our western dwellings, nor could any of them have any more appreciation of our culture than we do of theirs.

The risk of creating dependency on the part of this group of refugees is increased by the fact, in every part of the country, the benefits available under the welfare system enable them to live at a level higher than they have experienced in their homelands. They may be unaware or insensitive to such pressures and reactions as exist among the destitute population to prevent the gross abuse of the welfare system.

Counterbalancing these risks, however, is their general willingness to follow the counsel of their tribal leaders who are usually better informed of conditions here. Through the period required to bring them to self-sufficiency, however, and despite the risks of creating dependency, public assistance is often necessary. (Wright, 1981:144)

Dependency Questioned

Up to this point the researchers I have drawn from have ascribed, or admitted the possibility of, dependency among

refugees. The studies referenced below call this dependency into question.

Some researchers have argued that purely quantified ratios or statistics can be misleading indicators of "dependency" unless other factors are considered as well.

Sack (1984) has argued that the general economic and employment conditions prevailing are important factors.

Self-sufficient, long-term employment is the primary goal of refugee resettlement...Widespread faith in the assumption that refugees will find adequate jobs in the U.S. labor market has been challenged by limited scientific evidence that shows the longer an immigrant lives in the United States the better his or her economic position. Such an optimistic observation, however, has led to a disturbing paradox. On the one hand, reports indicate that refugees are doing well in the labor market, progressing with each year toward an acceptable level of labor force entry. On the other hand, refugees' use of public assistance remains relatively high, even after several years in the United States.

Concern over the rate of public assistance utilization really characterizes the problem-- and therefore the refugee themselves--as a "dependency" or public assistance problem. Viewing resettlement as a dependency problem, however, leads to distortions in perspective. Discussions of resettlement take as their starting point the question of how to reduce assistance, and proceed from there to devise incentives and solutions as if such actions were independent of employment conditions faced by both refugees and native-born workers (Reich, 1984:13).

Sack argues that unless the general economic conditions are taken into account statistics on resettled refugee characteristics, such as labor-force participation, lead to the perception that there is an "attitude" or "welfare mentality" problem.

Actively seeking work, as part of a measure of participation, is both an attitude and a behavior. Too often, however, it is interpreted solely as an attitude; the person outside the labor force does not want or need to work. When this kind of interpretation is applied to refugees, who as I have suggested previously are often seen possessed of a 'dependency' problem, the relatively large numbers of people are not actively seeking work (in the labor force) are seen as lacking the mentality to work. And the mentality is then interpreted as a 'cultural mentality' (Kuch, 1944-5).

Montgomery (1946) makes essentially the same argument regarding the resettlement of Sino-Vietnamese and Vietnamese in Alberta.

Salmon, though having been included in the preceding section for his overview of the effects of government policy, called the definition of dependency used in resettlement into question.

...the notion of self-sufficiency poses major problems as a program goal. These problems begin at the definitional level. The term has very broad potential reference. Self-sufficiency, or self-reliance, has been argued to be a core American value that applies to all areas of social and economic life. While this helps explain its appeal as a program goal, it does not provide much precision to its meaning. Another troublesome question is whose self-sufficiency is at issue. If self-sufficiency is limited to strictly economic issues, for example, it is not individuals who are self-sufficient but households. Thus a problem of sort designation is introduced into any implementation of this goal: self-sufficiency necessarily refers to transitional sets of persons many of whom are, by definition, not self-sufficient as individuals - children, for example. One solution is to define self-sufficiency as the absence of receipt of cash assistance by a household...or perhaps the situation of all refugees should be considered in the aggregate and in terms of the relative absence of the elderly (and thus use of certain assistance programs) and the disproportionate presence of children (and thus greater likelihood that

marginal individual incomes will be insufficient for the economic self-sufficiency of the household) (Baines, 1989:282-283)

In an argument similar to Koch's, Harrell-Bond also questioned the assertion that the supposedly dependent behavior of the refugees she studied was caused by an "attitude" or "mentality." She questioned whether a lack of participation by refugees in activities perceived by aid workers might simply be the result of a lack of food. For example, she pointed out that the refugees would be in such a bad state physically that they were unable to perform the work to make themselves self-sufficient (Harrell-Bond, 1984:104-105).

The real and apparent lack of support for each other, the refusal to cooperate under circumstances where cooperation appears advantageous, and the prevalence of destructive and anti-social behavior patterns and frustrations aid workers and researchers alike. These behavior characteristics are often referred to as the 'dependency syndrome', a blanket term used for all the unfavourable social behaviour found in the settlements. However, like all blanket terms, it can hide more than it reveals, and in the case of Sudan, this way of categorizing refugee behavior leads to wrong diagnoses of its cause and thus inevitably, wrongly aimed aid projects. (Harrell-Bond, 1984:105)

The stark fact is that refugees in Yei River District did not have enough access to an adequate diet, even under the assistance programs. The aid programs has not alleviated hunger. While policy makers search for clever techniques to engage the co-operation of refugees in a process which will lead them towards economic independence through agriculture, they have failed to recognize that these efforts can never be successful until the basic food problem is solved. The shortage of nutritious food may itself be the basis for many of the psychosocial problems, and the behaviors associated with the so-called 'dependency syndrome.' (Harrell-Bond, 1984:105)

Christensen argued very pointedly that in one case the assertion that the refugees were dependent was entirely an unfounded misperception by relief workers who were unfamiliar with what the refugees were actually doing. He argued that the relief workers saw the refugees as dependent as a result of the need to justify their activities and their perception of themselves as "good Samaritans."

The relationship between refugees and officials of international relief agencies based in the camps seemed cooperative. The refugees appear to have confidence in the expatriate teams in the camps and the field personnel on the state were helpful and sympathetic towards the refugees. Yet the refugees are also dealt with by officials in Headquarters who only send up to the camps, but who play a major part in the design and implementation of camp programmes. Two sets of beliefs appeared to be shared by them. First, the refugees are considered as spoon-fed, passively dependent recipients of foreign aid, or as demanding, unproductive individuals who are reluctant to participate in camp maintenance activities unless they are unconditionally well paid for it. (Christensen, 1982:29)

The refugees generally appeared to be highly active. They are neither spoon-fed nor passive spectators of camp life. They turned out to be individuals who little by little pick up previous life-styles after having to start from scratch. They appeared willing to improve life in the camps and were full of initiative and ideas about how to use available resources such as relief aid as a means to improve camp life. (Christensen, 1982:31)

Consequently the image on the part of refugee agency officials of refugees as spoon-fed, passive dependents was not affirmed by the findings. Such an image based on a myth may sustain the need for the refugees and agencies as such and justify their role as good Samaritans. The assumptions may also reflect value judgements disguised and presented as quasi facts. These camp residents may be termed spoon-fed, passive dependents as a substitute for the real conceptualization of refugees, whatever it may be. (Christensen, 1982:41)

As a prelude to a discussion on labeling Marxer (1988) asked whether "refugees are indeed helpless, or merely labeled as" (Marxer, 1988:4). Marxer argued that the initiative and "indigenous technical knowledge" of "traditional" societies had been largely unrecognized and undervalued.

Experts and administrators depend on "scientific" knowledge to legitimize their superior status. They have a vested interest in developing FTK (indigenous technical knowledge) and imposing a sense of dependence on the part of their rural clients. (Marxer, 1988:5)

Perhaps the most serious problem is that indigenous populations themselves have now come to accept that there are different types of knowledge, and that their own is inferior. (Marxer, 1988:5)

Ultimately, labeling refers to asymmetrical relationships of power through which the labels are imposed on other people (Marxer, 1988:7)

Labeling is central to all policy formulation and administration. Moreover, it possesses its own dynamic characteristics: Those who create and successfully impose labels in effect determine the rules of access to and allocation of resources in society. (Marxer, 1988:7)

Marxer then discusses assistance programs and argues that assistance programs are part of the problem.

The expectation that NGOs operate in fundamentally different ways from international or national governmental aid agencies is not well supported by evidence. Gorman (1988:54) notes that NGOs can be as guilty as other donors in the top-down creation, articulation and implementation of programs. Confusion, mismanagement and misguided relief efforts are more common than most would care to admit (Gorman, 1988:55). NGO staff are often young and relatively inexperienced and turnover is high. Further, few detailed reports of any kind-- especially without case--are published. In addition there is little independent research concerning the operations or effectiveness of NGOs. (Marxer, 1988:18)

Mezur then reviews several studies that address the effectiveness of NGOs and lists the factors that "...are detrimental to refugees' becoming self-sufficient..."

(Mezur, 1988:12):

3) aid agencies and host governments often have conflicting goals which result in exacerbation of the refugees' situation. If refugees themselves have been ignored throughout the decision-making process in the three phases of relief, rehabilitation and development; and 3) the concept of 'humanitarian assistance' and the relief programs designed by aid agencies, as well as the laws and regulations designed by governments have contributed to the powerlessness of the refugee recipients. (Mezur, 1988:12)

Mezur also reviewed the results of the ICRA/UNHCR "Workshop on Development Approaches to Refugee Situations" held in 1985 that addressed the issue of refugees' self-reliance (Mezur, 1988:13). His conclusions were in his summation of the problems identified by the workshop participants:

The workshop participants expressed the view that 'prolonged care and maintenance programmes can exacerbate the gap between the refugees and the local population and can create a false expectation of assistance and cause inertia and a lack of initiative on the part of the refugees'. The earlier discussion on labeling leads to an alternative conclusion. It is the present nature of assistance programmes -- not merely those of a prolonged and maintenance character -- which create the so-called dependency syndrome through an active process of usurping people's initiative. Further, recognition that refugees would perhaps fare better outside of organized settlements conflicts with the administrative 'need' to observe, monitor and control. (Mezur, 1988:14)

Mezur, in the article referenced above, referred in his discussion on labeling to de Voe. de Voe also addressed the issue of labeling and refugees. de Voe (1981) pointed out that treating people as clients places them conceptually

is a category of persons "deemed needy and helpless in the minds of the donor or benefactor professionals, the charity agents" (de Vos, 1981:88). Specific to refugees de Vos argued that similar consequences ensued.

The professional initially frames the refugee as 'client' through an agreed upon set of criteria. This initial prejudicial judgment establishes the need hierarchy which is then matched to the services and expectations affected by the agency. In this sense, experts take custody of the refugees by taking custody of what they, the experts, have identified as the refugee's 'problem'. Refugees cannot affect their own release from the situation; only others can. (de Vos, 1981:89)

Other Views of Dependency

Not everyone who considers certain populations dependent considers dependency to be a purely negative attribute. Coello and Stein point to some of the positive social benefits of a protracted dependency in human development.

Are we learning to cope with the stresses and vulnerabilities that accompany our unique developmental schedule? Human beings develop from an immature and dependent organism into a functioning adult according to a program of growth that is longer than that of any other animal on earth. Such prolonged dependency makes human beings highly vulnerable, and sensitive to the attention, care, support, and respect of significant people in their world.

There are, however, some adaptive advantages to such a protracted dependency: human beings develop needs not only for a society--as do other animals--but for a culture that protects their social relations as well as their privacy (Grewer, 1970). Under favorable conditions, this helps prepare individuals to adapt to a wide range of environments, and to develop an extensive repertoire of coping skill to face the vast array of stressful situations throughout life, to identify with

significant adult males who are respected and loving caretakers, and to experiment with diverse social roles in preparing for future commitments in work, recreation, love, and other human relations. (Cosimo and Stein, 1984:21)

The questions this argument presents to a general discussion of dependency are whether the dependency ascribed to refugees has some positive effects and whether, as a result of the initial experiences refugees have in refugee camps when the refugees' mental state are psycho-developmentally repressed, as many of the authors cited above assert, dependency is inevitable.

Meir applied a definition of dependent, and independent, migrants drawn from Canadian immigration policy to the issue of information and information seeking.

... 'dependent migrants'--The term used by the Canadian immigration authorities for those who have been assisted in their application for immigration by a close relative in the country of destination, who has agreed to take full responsibility for their care, accommodation, and maintenance, and to give assistance in finding employment, if required, for a period of five years. In contrast, 'independent migrants' are persons who have applied for immigrant status entirely on their own. The Toronto study shows that knowledge of the new country is greater among independent than dependent migrants. (Meir, 1988:100-101)

Meir cited statistics that showed independent migrants knew more and had less difficulty adjusting than dependent migrants who often had exaggerated expectations from available reports from relatives (Meir, 1988:100-101).

Meir reported that independent migrants sought more information and new relationships than dependent migrants.

and the information independent migrants got was better and more correct about what services were available to them than was the information obtained by dependent migrants (Hair, 1980:810-811).

The definition that Hair uses for dependent migrants is very different from that implied by the resettlement studies of Bush and Palmer cited above. In those cases dependency was ascribed to those resettled refugees who were perceived as a burden to the resettlement, or welfare bureaucracy, not to sponsors.

Conclusion

The dependency syndrome among refugees has obtained semi-official recognition as a major issue, as it was the first item addressed in a list of recommendations by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies/UNHCR Workshop on Development Approaches to Refugee Situations in Faldoum 1-4 December, 1988 (Carned, 1989:124-240). The issue of a refugee dependency syndrome has acquired this status, I would argue, without serious consideration or documentation of what exactly the 'dependency syndrome' is, or the consequences of attributing dependency to refugees.

The discussion above, and the rather lengthy excerpts, have attempted to show the importance of the issue of dependency in refugee studies. While there are a range of views expressed on the issue, dependency is one of the most

common attributes ascribed to refugees, as well as one of the most common and difficult problems reportedly encountered in working with refugee populations.

With the possible exception of Murphy and Baker, none of the views presented above, or that I have encountered elsewhere, constitutes basic statements on dependency. There was, however, general agreement on when dependency was present. When refugees demonstrate a lack of initiative or appear to be prevented from demonstrating initiative, where initiative was expected by outside observers, the refugees were perceived to be dependent. This, unfortunately, does not tell us very much. There are not, for example, (as I at least have not yet located) any discussions by refugees who experienced a situation which had also been described by outsiders as dependent. Thus, there is no easy way to compare the expectations of outsiders with those of the refugees themselves on how much initiative might be appropriate. Consequently, the issue of dependency has the dual characteristics of being both somewhat nebulous and crucial.

The views on refugee dependency vary widely. Some authors attributed the causes of dependency to factors external to the refugee camp or settlement, such as the violence that initiated the flight, the trauma of flight and separation from home, fears for those left behind and the larger political situation that may determine the future

causes of events. Others place the causes of dependency within the refugee living environment, the camp or settlement, and the physical, economic, social and administrative conditions that prevail there. Some authors described dependency as a singularly negative result of the refugee experience, while others see at least some positive aspects to dependent behavior, and others cast doubt on the relevance of ascribing dependency to refugee populations. Some authors described refugee dependency in terms that make it seem an almost inevitable consequence of becoming a refugee, while others ascribed the cause to the, possibly preventable, dependent relationship of the refugees on those who seek to aid them.

Regardless of the seeming diversity of individual author's views of refugee dependency, I believe that they can be placed into two general categories. One category is the psychological view. This view, exemplified by Murphy, Sakis, Foster-Amende, and Chan and Lowridge (as well as others), tends to take individual case studies and the psychopathologies they evince and extrapolate the causes to the refugee camp or refugee experience. In psychological discussions of refugee dependency what constitutes the "data," or dependent behavior, are individual case studies where specific instances are identified. The problems are then generalized to the larger

population and what they have experienced as refugees and are experiencing in the refugee camp environment.

The other general category is the sociological view where the refugee camp or refugee experience is said to represent an environment or experience that leads to dependency. The "data" for support of the sociological view are found in descriptions of the general experience of becoming a refugee, general descriptions of the camp environment or the social and bureaucratic resettlement environment, and, very importantly, analogies to other situations such as prisons, concentration camps and mental hospitals.

One of the major problems with the current state of refugee studies resulting in the perception of refugees as dependent is an overemphasis on the effects of the environments in which refugees are found, such as resettlement countries, areas of repatriation, and especially refugee camps. Discounting the refugees' cognitive expectations and the decision making capability inherent in the refugees' own desires and goals leads to a kind of environmental determinism that is very misleading. This is one reason that refugee studies are often characterized by theoretical approaches that use analogies between refugees and mental patients, concentration camp inmates, prisoners and children. I believe approaches that emphasize the maintenance, recreation and rebuilding of a

way of life for both individuals and groups who have experienced a period of profound uncertainty provide a better portrayal and will lead to a better understanding of the refugee experience.

One factor that has led to the overemphasis on the refugee camp environment to support arguments of refugee dependency, and an underemphasis on the refugees themselves, is a result of a lack of long-term participant observation of life in refugee camps. The data presented in this dissertation is the result of a two-year stay in a refugee camp. Furthermore, the research was conducted through participant observation while I lived with refugees in a billet. I was surrounded by refugees 24 hours a day. The importance of this factor will become clearer in the next chapter where the issue of dependency will be discussed further with an analysis of the literature on the HSC itself and the relevance of that literature for the larger topic of refugee dependency.

Notes

1. Much of this discussion of Mezur has involved excerpting a lot of information that initially appeared as peripheral to the central argument on dependency, but that was crucial to understand the context of the conclusion. This is necessary to avoid some of the confusion that results from citing research which appears to support arguments that the researchers might not support. Since this discussion is concerned as much with what has been said about refugee dependency, as it is concerned with whether refugee dependency exists, I think it is important to present as complete and accurate a picture as possible.

CHAPTER FOUR REFUGEE DEPENDENCY: THE PRPC

Introduction

I have been able to identify several published works analyzing the effects on the refugee population of their stay in the PRPC. Two of these represent research conducted in the PRPC in 1982 (Martinez, 1987; Kinsman, 1983) and one (Tallatoun, 1989) covers a period from 1982 to 1988. Other articles appeared as a result of a debate on the conditions in the PRPC and decrease refugee Training Progress in the journal *WFOC* (Kinsman and Wilson, 1982; Tallatoun, 1983). While this is not an immense body of literature, it is significant when compared to the dearth of data on life in other refugee camps in Southeast Asia (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia). The existence of even this small body of data and analysis is representative of both the greater interest in the population in the PRPC (two of the studies were a direct result of associations with resettlement programs in third countries where there was a considerable interest in the refugees) and the increased access to the refugee population of the PRPC afforded expatriates who live and work within the camp. My own research was conducted later than the studies noted above.

It ran from the fall of 1988 until the summer of 1990. During this time I pursued an ethnographic participant-observation approach and lived with refugees in refugee housing.

The discussion that follows is different than that presented in the last chapter. The assertions of dependency imputed to the refugees in the FRFC, and the descriptions presented to support them, represent a body of data that I feel qualified to critique. I will present, in as much detail as possible, the arguments put forth by previous researchers and comment on the appropriateness of the arguments and the data.

Earlier Studies of the FRFC

Knudsen Says People in Transit

The earliest, and the best, published analysis of the FRFC was Knudsen's (1982). Knudsen, an anthropologist, conducted a study tour of five refugee camps in Northeast Asia in 1982. Knudsen wrote, that "The object of the tour was to collect data concerning the way in which a stay in the different camps will tend to determine the adjustment of the individual refugee to the Norwegian community" (Knudsen, 1983:11). While the other four camps were discussed, the focus of the tour and the resulting book was on the FRFC in Høsten where the Norwegian government had, and still had

when I was there, a language and orientation program for refugees being resettled in Norway.

Knudsen's study is important for many reasons, not the least of which is that it was the first. Consequently, much of what Knudsen reported became basic statements in discussions on the effects of the time spent in the BEPC. This is especially true of the many statements Knudsen made on the detrimental side of refugee camp life. In an introductory essay on the common characterization of all the camps Knudsen visited he says, "...all the refugees we met describe their life in the camps as meaningless, pacifying, and time-wasting, with a loss of the right to influence their own situation" (Knudsen, 1985:17). He continues further on, "The camps can almost be seen as 'waitingrooms', where the individual simply waits for the opportunity to use his resources in the recipient country. The stay in the camps is seen as meaningless, unless it can be related to the period which starts on departure" (ibid: 7). The middle sections of Knudsen's book are largely descriptive, but some of his observations bear repeating for two reasons. First Knudsen's descriptions and analyses were used by later researchers and it is important to be clear about the work to which they are referring. Second, many of the descriptions Knudsen presents are addressed later in this chapter. The descriptions I give reflect some changes that have taken place in the camp in the intervening years. It

is important to take this into consideration when differing analyses are presented. In describing the camp management Evensen pointed out who had control of the camp.

The Philippine authorities have full control over the camp. This applies to interior security, order and exterior security. The road out of the camp is controlled by guards equipped with automatic weapons. Armed soldiers patrol the camp in the evening and at night. During our stay we saw little of them.

The camp leaders have sovereign control and authority. The decisions made by the management can in practice not be altered by the representatives of the individual countries. (Roudslev, 1343:11)

on the subject of the refugees' participation in camp organization Evensen described the refugee leaders' perceptions of working for the Vietnamese, not the Philippine camp management.

Although the representatives are "employed" by the Philippine camp management they claim themselves that they are working for the Vietnamese. Their job is to handle questions and conflicts among the Vietnamese which do not require the intervention of the camp management. The Philippine authorities will themselves, at all times, decide whether or not to intervene. (Roudslev, 1343:14)

on the subject of camp trades:

Refugees are enabled to establish in the camp factories, print workshops, hairdressers, tailor's shops or small cafes, and they can take up backyard gardening or other marketing activities. The Camp Management takes a positive attitude to such enterprises on the following grounds:

- 1) The refugees must be encouraged to be financially independent, and
- 2) These activities should prevent idleness and pessimism during the stay in the camp.

A refugee wishing to open a cafe or shop in the neighborhood needs only the permission of the leader. It is not necessary to apply to the Philippine camp management.

Rundsten argued, however, that such activities had a cost in terms of the refugees' participation in their preparation for resettlement.

The problem is that for many refugees such activities mean a reduction in the possibilities of learning a foreign language, or of gaining knowledge about the third country to which they are going.

Such activities therefore involve a contradiction in the camp. 1) They can help to increase the refugees' independence in the camp, while 2) these activities will weaken their acquisition of the linguistic proficiency absolutely necessary in the third country. (Rundsten, 1983:21)

In the work credit system, for example, Rundsten reported the refugees' perceptions of it as a penalty, not a reward system.

Many refugees do not consider that the work credit system is a training scheme of the type described above, to the advantage of the community, or a reward system. They consider that it is a penalty system, designed to control the refugees by forcing them to keep the rules, from fear of being held back in the camp. (Rundsten, 1983:10)

In the concluding two chapters, on the cognitive model the refugees have of the transit period and the consequences of the camp stay for resettlement, Gull he discussed the implications of the camp experience for the refugees. Several of these summary statements were reiterative of the meaninglessness and passivity themes. For example:

When refugees talked about life in the camps, the subject of the conversation was usually the meaninglessness of their present existence. (Gull, 1984)

Under the heading "The limbo state" there is:

This uncertainty about the future leads to a constant shift between hope and frustration. The

mental condition of some refugees was described by representatives of the relief machinery, both in Hanoi and in Laos, as "the limbo state"--according to them a mental condition in which the person felt himself forgotten and undisturbed by the world about, almost on the point of losing influence on his own condition (cf:173)

In discussing the problems Knudsen found in the camps the losses of meaningfulness and passivity came up again.

There are problems in all the camps: alcohol, disease, family violence, illnesses, loneliness, depression, etc. The refugees themselves feel that these problems are intensified by the organization of the camps: the meaningfulness, passivation, waste of time, uncertainty as to departure, etc. They feel themselves that these factors will also help to make their future adjustment to a third country more difficult. (cf:174)

Knudsen's most important points concerned the way refugees communicated their problems and the precursors factors that can act in concert with the camp environment to exacerbate refugee problems.

For many the difficult transit period becomes an existential problem, which they attempt to solve by under-communicating the daily problems of the camp--problems which have been caused just by: i) the escape (the break with Vietnam), ii) the uncertainty about the future and iii) the limitations in the camp. (cf:184)

It seemed to us that this communication system in the camps acted as a damper on open conflicts. The result is a withdrawal from problems, both one's own and those of others. (cf:187)

In the internal conversations among refugees, it nevertheless is apparent that it is not the actual organization of the camp alone which is the cause of these problems. The causes can also be found in the traumatic flight and the break with the family in Vietnam, and in the uncertainty attached to the future. (cf. point 3.10) (cf:174)

Knudsen made two very important points here neither of which was considered by later authors writing about the PRPC. The first was that the refugees under-communicated their problems. This under-communication of perceived problems tended to place the focus for all of the refugee's problems on the camp environment. The second was that the causes of many of the refugee's problems were a result of having become refugees, i.e. the break with the family in Vietnam and the uncertainty they faced as to their future.

Northland, Liminality and Refugee Transformation

Northland (1987) analyzed the PRPC applying Turner's concept of liminality. She introduced four modifications to Turner's (1974, 1979) original model of liminality. Three had been previously discussed by Mosak (1984), and one was her own. These modifications include the following:

(1) No reintegration back into traditional society. Refugees who make it to processing centers such as the PRPC are on their way to resettlement in third countries and have almost no chance of being repatriated back to Indochina². Furthermore, the "knowledge specialists" who are controlling the transition the refugees undergo and those who actually teach what the refugees supposedly need to know have not experienced the transition themselves and do not control the integration into the new culture. (Mosak, 1984:45; Northland, 1987:178)

(3) The cultivation of ambiguity is intrinsic to the refugee transition. Mortland notes, in quoting Hirsch, " '...a rite or phase that is liminal is the strict sense of the term can well afford to cultivate ambiguity,' since there will be a return to a normal order of things, 'such is not the case for stateless refugees whose [traditional] norms and values have already been stressed by the sudden confrontation with strange new values and norms' " (Hirsch, 1984:48; Mortland, 1987:138).

(4) The freedom to criticize and elaborate cultural beliefs found in traditional liminal transitions within a society "does not ultimately challenge the efficacy of traditional explanations once the ritual is over," but is a necessity in the transition to a new society. (Hirsch, 1984:46; Mortland, 1987:138-139)

4) Mortland added a fourth modification to the three above previously discussed by Hirsch. This was that the authority submitted to was not that of a "total community" but groups of individuals and organizations [e.g. village, camp administrators] beyond their community. (Mortland, 1987:179)

The modifications that Hirsch and Mortland introduced altered one of the basic premises of liminality in that it is a process of controlled social transformation in which the pre- and post-liminal states are clearly defined. It is in the clear definition of what is to be accomplished

through a liminal rite of passage in the minds of those who control the process that makes it an effective means of redefining status in a community. Furthermore, implied in the concept of liminality is the necessity of transcending individuals through a stage of being liminal, or de-socializing them, so they can be redefined. What Mortland and others learn about life in refugee camps, the effects of this period of liminality, are seen in traditional societies as a necessary part of the social transformation. In essence the modifications that Frank and Mortland make to the concept of liminality are those that give it its efficacy as a social transformation process, thus they proceed to analyze the liminal state of refugees with a crippled concept of social change that, by its altered definition, is no longer a process but a state of being. It is not surprising then that Mortland did not find the ZEPs to be an effective institution in socially transforming refugees but one that induces a liminal state.

In applying the modified concept of liminality Mortland focuses on the "total cultural context, examining six types of systems and how they serve to create liminality and powerlessness..." (Mortland, 1943-444). These six systems are: (1) possessions, (2) status, (3) spatial relationships, (4) temporality, (5) mobility, and (6) regulations. In discussing these six systems, two issues are central: first, the accuracy of Mortland's descriptions and second,

the efficacy of the distinctions inherent in these symbols in creating likability and powerlessness.

(3) Foodstuffs. Norland stated that refugees are "virtually nothing; everything they use on a daily basis, from clothes to cover themselves, to pots and pans for cooking, comes from and are distributed by them as power" (Norland, 1987:188). Much of Norland's language here is somewhat misleading. For example:

Even the manner in which these goods are distributed demonstrates the powerlessness of the refugees: soon after their arrival at the center, refugees are assigned to warehouses at the discretion of camp personnel to receive goods they will need while in the camp. (Norland, 1987:188)

In actuality there was a schedule of events for the refugees' processing into the camp. Household articles could be picked up on the same day as arrival or the day after. Usually they went when they had found out where to go from their neighbors or illicit sales. Under this topic Norland also discusses food distribution. She said it was "probable" that the food quality and quantity is less than planned because it is consumed by both staff and refugees that it was reduced by corruption. I believe that care should be exercised in making such assertions. In discussing the distribution Norland says:

Food is delivered daily at food stations in each neighborhood of the PRC, at the convenience of PRC staff. The choice of food, the queuing in which refugees receive it, the careful cutting up of vegetables and dividing up of meat, and the daily waiting they must endure until the food trucks arrive-

all confirm the control of the staff and the lack of it by the refugees. (Portland, 1987:188)

Again the use of "the convenience of the staff" and "the waiting they [the refugees] must endure" was somewhat provocative language. Food was delivered between 9:00 A.M. and 1:00:0 A.M. almost everyday during my stay. When it was late, the reasons could be varied but were primarily the result of late deliveries of fresh food to the camp. All fresh food was consumed the same day it was delivered. During certain parts of the year, especially the rainy and typhoon seasons, deliveries could be delayed. Furthermore most of the labor employed in allocation and delivery of food was provided by refugees who weighed the incoming deliveries and allocated food by buildings according to the numbers of adults and children in each building. The final distribution took place at each building by an elected building leader who allocated the food to each of the ten billets. The inferred picture of HRC staff casually loafing about while thousands of hungry refugees waited patiently on the "convenience" of staff was, I believe, a little misleading. Again, more should be ascertained, and such statements supported by observations. This admission is critical because otherwise an inaccurate impression is presented to people who have no other source of information.

Furthermore, refugees did own quite a lot. The white shirts and black pants worn by men and the floral pants suits, the al-dain, covered by whom were not issued by any

organization in the camp. Neither were the radio-cassette players or Walkmans that were commonly seen. Mortland did allow that personal possessions were not as important as other symbols of liminality because of the similar lack of possessions by the staff due to limited space, temporary housing, and the transient nature of some of the staff. This caveat was, however, more of an afterthought than a central point.

(2) *Elites*. Mortland posited a hierarchy of three classes. In descending order they were 1) non-Filipino European or American staff, 2) Filipino staff, and, of course, 3) refugees. This is a difficult area to discuss because Mortland made several allusions to subservient and imperious attitudes and behaviors without specific examples. Two examples Mortland did give were the parties that take place at the termination of classes and the disinterested Americans had toward the arrivals (arrivals) and goings (departures) of refugees, which were of vital interest to other refugees. First, Mortland says that the class parties were indicative of how staff and refugee social interactions must and can only occur in "proper and specific times and places," which "stabilizes ritually and systematically the purpose and importance of the center, not the refugees" (Mortland, 1987:242). If these parties were symbolic of anything it was probably the ambiguity that Filipinos perceive in institutional and personal

relationships. Teachers and students are supposed to be more than just givers and receivers of information. For many of the teachers these parties were also farewell parties for them as well. IOMC hired teachers on a contractual basis due to the fluctuations in the numbers of arrivals, and some teachers would only teach for one or two cycles and then have to leave. The attention paid to arrivals and departures was also determined by personal interest. If Filipinos or expatriates had friends among the departing refugees they would go to their departures, although I can testify that going to departures loses its allure after a year or so, especially after repeatedly saying goodbye to people with whom you have grown close, and in my case lived with. For the refugees who only stayed six months, departure was a constant reminder that they too would have their day. Since there were departures several times a week it was a constant reaffirmation of the transient nature of their stay in the PRC and the impending future change.

One aspect of the differing attitudes that Huxford does not mention was the fact that the refugees were going to a place, the United States, to which a large percentage of the Filipinos would also like to go and, in many cases, had applied to go to and been rejected. In this respect, the present status of the refugees was enhanced by the perception that their future was likely to be better than the Filipinos

There was also another class of people that in Mortland's hierarchy would come fourth. These were the Filipinos who operated the markets in the camp and those in the informal sector. There were at least 150 to 200 Filipinos who made their livings from the refugees as subsistent vendors. They sold everything from ice cream, cooking and lamp oil to beer, rum and whiskey.³ These people were squatters on PRPC land and technically were both living and making their living illegally since anyone not a refugee or staff had to have a visitor pass to be in the camp. Though the rules on this were obviously somewhat lax, if one of these people had a problem with staff or refugees who complained, they could be -- but rarely were -- harassed and expelled on sight.

(7) Sanctid. This area was a difficult one to address because of the changes that had taken place in the camp between 1982, when Mortland conducted research, and 1988, when I began. Mortland described several restrictions on where the refugees could go within the PRPC that did not exist in 1988. In 1988 refugees had access to all the facilities and offices in the camp. The JVA office, which handled any resettlement problems, and which Mortland said saw refugees only by appointment, had a staff member permanently assigned to the PRPC and had hours available for VADR-128.

East of Hartland's discussion of specificity involved the idea of a central core surrounded by increasingly peripheral areas, indicating the importance, or lack thereof, the closer or further people worked and resided from this core area. Hartland said, "The very layout of the center reflects the status of individuals and agencies within the PRPC" (Hartland, 1987:393). I am uncomfortable with ascribing a systemic value to a centralized administrative area that increased the efficiency of camp operations. There were two problems with this. First, there was a logic in the centralized location of administration offices. Close proximity facilitated communication among the various agencies, which speeded up the resolution of any problems and thus the processing of the refugees through the camp. Second, the refugees would have to perceive that those agencies located in the core controlled their lives. This was true in some ways, but not in others. Also located in this core area were the post office, the hospital, and the central money exchange office of the GDR, which were highly utilized by the refugees as services not as controlling entities. Another example was the UNRWA office that was located in the center of this core. In the PRPC the UNRWA has virtually no direct impact on the residents and very little influence on the various agencies operating there.

Residence patterns had also apparently changed between 1961 and 1968. ICRC had built two houses for two of its top officials next to the Buddhist Temple in neighborhood eight, quite a distance from the core. The director of CPRI had a residence on the very edge of the camp outside neighborhood four, a residence he rarely used, spending most of his time in Manila, USA that was as far from the core as it was possible to be.

Wortland's final point concerned spatial regulations. Refugees were prohibited from leaving the camp without permission, which was given "reluctantly and infrequently" (Wortland, 1967:164). It was still true in 1968 that refugees had to get permission to leave the camp. Permission to leave the camp was subject to certain stipulations. Refugees in most cases had to have a sponsor, who could be any staff member, either PRPO or vaing, and who had to indicate the destination and the time of departure and return. In some exceptional refugees could leave the camp without a sponsor for specific business such as making overseas phone calls or obtaining medical attention not available in the camp. Refugees I interviewed did object to restrictions on their mobility and some left the camp without permission, going and coming without any problem. If a refugee was caught "away without leave" (awol) they had to go to the camp detention center. In the interviews I conducted, this was the one aspect of the PRPO that was most

like "living under the commando." Restricting mobility out of the camp was, however, more an artifact of where the camp was located, what the camp was for, and the size of the population.

The PRPC's main function was to move refugees from first asylum camps to third countries. Refugees who could not be inserted could not be moved. The processing requirements imposed by the third countries where the refugees were being resettled meant that it was necessary, probably more so than in any other camp in Southeast Asia, to be able to contact refugees on a daily basis. Any changes in the refugees' medical or sponsorship status needed to be communicated to them as soon as possible, so that decisions could be made to prevent prolonged stays in the camp. In other transit camp situations where refugees do not depart on a timely basis (Chan and Laveridge, 1987), this argument might be seen as a rationalization for unnecessary restrictions. In the PRPC, however, refugees do move, and this reality is reinforced almost daily by the receipt of call slips for final medical or resettlement appointments.

The PRPC was only five or six hours away from Manila by public transportation. The price, about four U.S. dollars for a round trip, was easily affordable for a refugee receiving money from relatives in third countries. The proximity to Manila made many things possible inside the

camp, it was also, however, a potentially disastrous place to lose a refugee. From the refugee's point of view this restriction was onerous even if they had no intention, or the resources, to leave the camp. From the administrator's point of view, the potential problems of tracking down missing refugees and answering to the agencies who wanted to know where they were outweighed the negative feelings engendered in the refugees. In Palawan, the first ayuyan camp in the Philippines, the refugees could go freely in and out of the camp. Palawan was, however, an island, and the refugees could not go far.

Attempting to apply liminality to refugees is problematic. one of the most important problems is that refugees as liminal beings introduces another label that contributes to the depreesion of refugees as 'lost' and helpless. This is especially true with the concept of liminal beings as defined by Fortland because modifications had to be made to Turner's original concept to fit the circumstances of refugees. Some discussion of this approach is necessary here exactly as an illustration of the danger of trying to lift pieces of a concept out of the context of the social phenomena it was intended to explain. Further it is important to avoid arousing the suspicion among those who work with refugees that anthropologists will degrade the integrity of our own theoretical concepts in order to save

then yield explanations acceptable to those with whom we primarily communicate.

Tollison's A Political Economy Perspective

Tollison began by pointing out, "Refugees are not permitted to leave the confines of the processing centers without written permission," and that "for the vast majority, the perimeter fences, for six months or more, define the boundaries of their lives." He then described the opportunity afforded center "officials" by this restriction.

Therefore, in the closed and isolated world of the processing centers, officials have an extraordinary opportunity to regulate people's activities. The aim of this regulation is to reproduce by reinforcing attitudes, values, and behaviors taught in camp. As we shall see, the effect also is to increase the risk to the refugees' physical and emotional well being.

Like the camps, regulations affecting daily life in camp are intended to prepare the refugees for living in the United States. The system of regulation has the stated purpose of transforming each resident from a "displaced person" to an "individual well equipped for life in his country of final destination." (Tollison, 1981:127-128)

Tollison's support for this statement is a reference to the stated goals of the Community Action and Social Services Development Group (CASSSDG). CASSSDG was the group under the PRPC administration that was responsible for the administration and the provision of social services to the refugees during the time Tollison was in the PRPC. The stated goals of CASSSDG were its own and reflected the

perceptions of the Filipino camp administration, not the Overseas Refugee Training Program (ORTP) or the U.S. State Department. CHASECO's stated goals were implemented in the Community Based Structure (CBS), the refugee neighborhood councils and committees, and, with less effectiveness, the work credit system. The sanctions for violating camp rules and regulations, most of which would be cited here in another context, were to ensure the orderly operation of the camp and to make it possible for 24,000 plus people to live and work together in a difficult environment. Nevertheless, Tolstedson stated:

To bring about this transformation in the relatively short period the refugees are in camp, the officials have developed a detailed and pervasive system of regulation and sanctions affecting most aspects of daily life, including housing and sleeping arrangements, food preparation and consumption, work, sanitation, health, and personal hygiene. Its three main mechanisms are a complex array of refugee committees, a work credit system, and a system of penalties for violating camp rules. (Tolstedson, 1981:122)

There were no regulations or sanctions affecting food preparation and consumption or personal hygiene, nor, in the body of Tolstedson's chapter, does he refer to any.

Tolstedson described the refugee committee system this way.

The declared aim of the committee system is to develop the refugees' sense of social responsibility. The assumption is that involving many refugees in the day-to-day operation of the camp will generate a greater commitment to community. "On a general level, community organization is used to assist the refugee in reviving his sense of community through participation

in the Center's activities" (Philippine Refugee Processing Center, pg 5)

Though hundreds of refugees are involved in these committees, the authority of the committees is limited primarily to distributing supplies and informing the camp population of changes in official policies. The officials can unload food for up to 18,000 people per day at the central supplies depot and then rely upon neighborhood and building representatives to divide and transport the supplies throughout the camp. The officials can also assure that directions are posted in native languages in every billet in camp within hours after they are issued. Occasionally, sociocultural events such as concerts and dance demonstrations are arranged by the neighborhood committees. (Tollison, 1990:129)

Tollison sets up an opposition where he describes the stated aim of the refugee committee system as "building a renewed commitment to community" and gives examples of the committees involved in distributing supplies and information, and only "occasionally" engaged in activities that might be considered community building. In actuality the refugee committees were involved in far more than the distribution of supplies and information. In a later chapter (chapter six on the structure of the PRPC) the refugee committees, the CAC, is described in more detail. Briefly, however, the neighborhood councils handled not just food and information distribution but also, security, neighborhood businesses, neighborhood sanitation, and sociocultural events as well as playing a role in settling neighborhood disputes. Does involvement in these activities revive a sense of community? The sense is largely irrelevant. The PRPC could not function without the cooperation and participation of the refugees. Refugees

largely self-administered themselves; they worked in almost every office in the camp in a whole range of capacities, with refugees' average stay in the camp being 7-8 months, much of that time taken up with class and work, and the future holding a general nationwide dispersal where they might never see their HRC neighbors again, community building was not an easy task. Nor was it the real reason for the existence of the C&S. The real reason for the C&S was to enlist the refugees' participation and cooperation in the running of the camp. One further note: In the two years I spent living in a billet in the HRC no official directive was ever posted in our billet, nor did I see in all the billets I visited any posted official directive.

Tuller's discussion of the work credit system is his closest approximation to what I saw while living with refugees in the HRC.

Distributing food and kerosene is one way to fulfill the requirement of the "work credit system." CAMBOD's mechanism for involving all refugees in camp operations. Other ways to fulfill the requirement include cutting grass to keep poisonous snakes away from residential areas, fumigating buildings with liquid malathion and other chemicals, washing latrines and sidewalks, clearing/drainage ditches, translating and typing documents, maintaining records, and assisting teachers in classes. Organized by CAMBOD, the system requires that all refugees work directly under work area supervisors (usually Filipino staff members employed by CAMBOD or one of the voluntary agencies) throughout their stay in camp. At the central office of the work credit system, records for every individual over the age of fifteen ensure that anyone who fails to complete two hours of work, six days a week, is not permitted to leave for the United States.

In official statements, the purpose of the work credit system is declared to be educational: to help the refugees become productive in the camp, and thereby to develop habits that will make them productive in the United States. (Tollstuen, 1949:122).

Tollstuen then referenced Knudsen (see Knudsen on the work credit system discussed previously) on the refugee's perceptions of the work credit system. He noted, I think partially correctly, that the work credit system had "the unstated function of providing free labor for the operation of the camp" (Tollstuen, 1949:129). Tollstuen then summed up his perceptions of what lay behind the work credit system.

Like the educational program, the work credit system assumes that the refugees must be taught to be productive, that they will not feel responsible for their necessities unless earned, and that they do not already possess productive, participative competencies. That is, it assumes that their cultural background does not give them a basis for productive work. This assumption is implicit in CHSICOG's written statement which declares that the system is intended "to encourage [the refugees] to become a productive, participative individuals," and in the statement of ISRC policies given to refugees upon arrival: "Soon you will be going to the U.S.. One trait you will need to develop there is self-sufficiency. We encourage you to begin practicing it here at WERC by ensuring that rules are respected." (Tollstuen, 1949:130)

This statement presented a somewhat distorted view of CHSICOG for two reasons. First, the assumption that CHSICOG was working under was not that the "cultural background" did not give the refugees a basis for productive work or the need to be encouraged to participate, but that the previous experience of becoming a refugee and the time

spent in first asylum camps in other Southeast Asian countries as a "displaced person" had. Some examples from CAMBOD and PRPC documents reveal their actual intentions (see Figure 4.1).

There is nowhere in any of these characterizations of the refugee clientele by CAMBOD or PRPCoCS, the PRPC agency that replaced CAMBOD in a subsequent reorganization, any indication that it was felt that the "cultural background" was lacking in productive, participative competencies.

The second of Talliaferro's misapprehensions was in the reference to the ICRC policy statement. ICRC had nothing to do with the administration of the work credit system, either then supplying positions for refugees. In some ways ICRC's use of refugees in its program actually undermined the work credit system. This is an issue that will be addressed later in this dissertation. In any case the policies and the implementation of the work credit system was entirely under the PRPC administration, not ICRC.

Serious in the camp was the most topic Talliaferro addressed. Most of Talliaferro's discussion concerned "coexistence camps." For a variety of reasons refugees were put on administrative hold, which meant they could not depart the PRPC for their resettlement country until the hold was lifted. Most of these reasons had nothing to do with the rules and regulations of the PRPC administration. For example, if a refugee missed more than three days of

ICRC class without a proper excuse they were re-cycled, which meant they had to attend class with the following cycles until they had made up the missed class time. This was a rule imposed by the State Department and implemented by ICRC, not the PRPC administration. Tollerance also mentioned the various medical holds that could be imposed, also as a result of U.S. immigration regulations, not the PRPC administration. Tollerance's example was the hold imposed for mental health reasons. If a refugee was found to be mentally ill, they were automatically held for one year. Their subsequent resettlement was dependent on two factors. One was an evaluation by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) officials in Thailand at the end of the year. The other was an assurance, secured by either the agency aiding the refugee's resettlement or members of the refugees' family, by a mental health provider that the refugee would receive treatment once they reached their resettlement site in the U.S. Tollerance spent a considerable amount of time on this subject and included it in his discussion on sanctions, yet this was not a sanction imposed by PRPC officials. In fact, they found these restrictions very troublesome. The PRPC did not have the facilities to care for mentally ill refugees. Nor did they appreciate the burden this restriction placed upon them to deal with mentally ill refugees, some of whom could be violent, when it was the U.S. that had initially accepted

them. The only positive aspect to this restriction was that the REPC acted like a one-way valve in that refugees could enter the REPC from first asylum camps or directly from Vietnam through the CBF, and they could get held up in the REPC, but they could not go back. The only way out was resettlement. For the family members of the refugees who were held up for medical reasons, and who wanted to resettle in third countries, difficult as the hold up might be, they could be assured that they would not be sent back to first asylum camps or Vietnam. Whereas if a medical problem was discovered in the first asylum camp or Vietnam, the refugees might never be resettled.

Tollefson's intention in his discussion of administrative and medical holds was to use them as an example of how the camp administrators sought to control the refugees.

Administrative and medical holds are two of the most serious sanctions used to regulate and control life in the processing centers. (Tollefson, 1989:194)

Tollefson then discussed the sanctions imposed by the REPC administration.

Another is imprisonment in the camp jail, called the "monkey house." (During many months in the processing centers, I never heard the terms "jail" or "prison.") Operated by the military units that provide camp security, the jails have the authority to hold refugees indefinitely without charges or hearings. As many as 60 people may be held at a time, accused of crimes, political subversion, or violations of petty camp rules. (Tollefson, 1989:194)

Tallgren is here referring to a period before I began living in the PRPO. Consequently, his statement regarding the policy of detaining refugees indefinitely without charges or hearings may be accurate; however, he did not supply any documentation for this statement. At that time the camp was under a military administration when I began conducting research the camp administration had changed to a civilian administration. Regarding the sanctioning process and penalties for violations, I refer the reader to chapter six in this dissertation for a complete discussion. I spent a considerable amount of time interviewing refugees detained in the camp detention center, or the Social Rehabilitation Center as it was later called. I also spent time talking to a Catholic sister who worked for CACR and had taken on the responsibility of visiting prisoners in the jail, and had been doing so for several years. A couple of points, however. Tallgren refers to refugees being sanctioned for violations of "petty camp rules."

Yet most refugees who are imprisoned are held for suspected violations of minor camp rules. Anyone alleged to be caught drinking alcohol (which is forbidden to refugees but not staff members) can be imprisoned for up to three months; assaults usually result in longer prison terms. The specific length of confinement depends upon decisions by camp officials. In 1981, for instance, the penalty for drinking was only seven days. (Tallgren, 1989:232-233)

The consumption of alcohol was against camp rules and the largest number of detentions during the early period of my research, was for this offense, so it was possible that the

same was true during Tollefson's time in the DPFC as well; Tollefson also presented data from Rouleau (1980) on the imprisonment of suspected communists and refugees who refused to follow the bureaucratic resettlement requirements (Tollefson, 1989:132-133). During the time the camp had a military administration this was very possible. During the time I conducted research in the DPFC and over the time period for which I could obtain detention records, no one was detained for either of these reasons. Tollefson does not mention, however, that refugees were also detained for serious offenses such as robbery, mail theft and fraud, attempted murder, and extortion. Unfortunately, the records for the period that Tollefson was in the DPFC were unavailable. For an idea of the kind of offenses and characteristics of the offenders I refer the reader to Chapter 7 in this dissertation. Tollefson also said and reiterated that no trials or hearings were held when a refugee was detained.

When refugees are imprisoned, no trials or other hearings are held, and prisoners do not have the right to confront their accusers or to demand proof of the alleged violations. As a result, some staff members threaten to report poor classroom attendance, work-credit violations, or other punishable offenses as a way of extorting money, goods and personal or sexual favors. The promise is sufficiently serious that fully one-quarter of the 1980 policy statement given to arriving refugees consists of warnings about such extortions. (Tollefson, 1989:133)

The sanctioning process that led to detentions is described fully in Chapter six. I cannot say that the conditions at

Tollenaar described this did not exist at the time he was in the camp. I was also aware of staff members who would threaten refugees with detention for some personal offense. No refugees were detained for these reasons, however, while I was there. Refugees would also threaten each other with detention for the same kinds of provocations and would allude to some connection with a neighborhood leader (again I refer the reader to the section on the auctioning process) who could get the offender detained. This did not work either. The main problem I have with Tollenaar's statement above is the support he presents for this contention. The percentage of space devoted to an issue in ICRC's policy statements (see quote above) to refugees is not, to me, an acceptable indicator of how serious a problem staff extortion was. It would be an indicator of an issue to pursue, but not a definitive piece of data.

In addition to suffering extortion of belongings and personal items refugees imprisoned in the jail reportedly have been beaten and robbed. Many women, representing as particularly feared, due to reports of sexual abuse of female prisoners. Family members who visit prisoners are also at risk. Because the jail does not provide food for prisoners, family and friends must bring it every day. Guards have reportedly extorted cigarettes, money and sexual favors for the right to deliver food to hungry prisoners. (Tollenaar, 1995:132)

There were problems at the camp jail. It should be mentioned that the camp jail was under the supervision of the Philippine Constabulary not the internal security forces, the Philippine Navy, at the time Tollenaar was in the camp.

Changes took place in the management and supervision of the camp jail. (for a detailed presentation see chapter 4). At the time I left the PRPC, the camp jail was under the supervision of PRCAF, the group under the civilian PRPC administration responsible for administration and social services to the refugees. Many other changes took place between the time Tollefson was in the PRPC and the time I conducted my research beginning in 1988. Food, for example, was provided directly to the prisoners at the jail; no one had to take their food. Many of these points could be left to later chapters, obviating the necessity of discussing them here, were it not for Tollefson's later contention that nothing had changed in the PRPC since he was there.

At times, the system of work-credit requirements, administrative and medical needs, and imprisonment in the camp jail became a source of conflict. In 1985, for instance, a group of several dozen angry Cambodians gathered at the central administration building because they believed that one of their members had been unjustly placed on administrative hold due to an inadequate attendance record. Troops armed loaded weapons at the angry crowd, until two Cambodian leaders apologized in Tagalog to the ranking Philippine military officer and demonstrated supplication by touching the officer's hand to their foreheads in the traditional Philippine act of subservience. Satisfied that he was in control, the military officer ordered the troops to lower their weapons and allow the refugees to leave peacefully. In other instances, troops have reportedly fired warning shots and sprayed hoses to disperse crowds. (Tollefson, 1987:121-124)

Later in this dissertation I discuss refugee protests in detail. I accept Tollefson's account of this point given

above and present Tollenaar's view as a reference to the following discussion where Tollenaar asserts that conditions remained the same in the HRC in 1990 as they were in 1988, the last year Tollenaar was in the HRC.

In the same chapter Tollenaar presents a sub-heading entitled "Living without Power." Under this sub-heading Tollenaar sums up the reasons he thought the refugees had a sense of powerlessness.

Other aspects of regulated camp life contribute to the refugees' sense of powerlessness. Housing presents some of the most serious problems. The housing units are simple, with each building holding ten billets designed for up to ten people each. Each billet has a large wooden platform used as a bed, a table with two benches, and a shelf for the cookstove. The structure is made of single-walled hardware sheetrock with wooden skirting, but no windows. There is no insulation, though there is an electric light. (Electricity to the refugees' billets, but not to staff housing, is cut off at curfew.) A sleeping loft is attached near the ceiling to accommodate people who cannot find space on the bed or the floor at night. When full the billets provide less than 30 square feet of living space per person. Residents are not permitted to leave their billets after 9:00 pm, nor to sleep anywhere but in their assigned spaces.

Housing assignments are made so that family members stay together in a single billet. Unrelated refugees who were together during their flight from home or in first asylum camps are usually broken up when housing assignments are made. Because most refugees are cautious about forming new friendships in camp, the effect is to further isolate those who are not accompanied by immediate family members. (Tollenaar, 1989, 138)

Tollenaar's description of the housing is essentially correct, though it applies directly to the housing in Phase I. The housing in Phase II was modified with a separate walled-off area as a kitchen with a sink, but the

modification was not that different. When I lived in a billet, the curfew time was 8:30 pm and not strictly enforced. In addition, and more importantly, housing assignments were largely based on the desires of the refugees. I refer the reader to the discussion of arrival processing in chapter seven. Tollefson is correct in saying that refugees were cautious about forming new friendships while in the PRFC. Part of the reason for this were the strong bonds that were already formed with other refugees during the flight from Vietnam and in the first asylum camps, bonds that refugees sought to maintain, most often successfully, in the PRFC.

Tollefson continued with aspects of the camp he thought represented "living without power."

Each billet is expected to be a cooking team, with food, cooking pots and cooking oil distributed to the residents as a group. Individuals are given chapsticks, mosquito nets, antismarial tablets, three sleeping mats, and blankets. Refugees cannot leave the camp until they return these items or pay for them. In some cases, arriving refugees may sign for more items than they receive, or not receive anything at all after signing forms they do not understand. In some instances teachers have paid for items so that refugees could leave for the United States. (Tollefson, 1989:126)

It is possible that when Tollefson was in the PRFC each billet was expected to be a cooking team. This may, however, come from Knudsen (1994:8) who visited the camp in 1988, since Tollefson does not give any example or description of what he means. When I lived in a billet, we were not expected to be a "cooking team." Each refugee

signed for cooking supplies themselves and not as a group. The refugees did have to return the supplies that they borrowed from the warehouse. When I was in the camp the refugees went to the warehouse sometime in the first few days when they had time and were informed about what they were to do by other refugees. I never knew or heard of anyone being held in the camp for failure to return borrowed supplies. The one list of refugees on administrative hold that I obtained access to contained only refugees who were being held because of pending criminal investigations or for medical reasons. At the time I was in the camp, refugees who had too many absences from the ICRC program were just not certified to ICRC, who did not book them on a departure flight until they received releases from ICRC. The RUCR administration had nothing to do with these cases.

Tellefson continued,

Sanitation around the housing areas is inadequate due to the design of the latrines. Each neighborhood contains a common latrine building, with separate stalls assigned to each billet. The waste falls into open channels in the floor, with no water for washing it away. During the rainy season ground water often floods the buildings, spreading the waste throughout the area, even into the billets. The only facility for bathing and laundry is a few faucets outside the latrine building. Because the taps are in full view of the billets and nearby roads, refugees bathe with their clothes on in order to avoid public embarrassment. Without a drainage system, water from the faucets runs between the buildings, creating large muddy areas around the latrines. These areas also serve as breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Up to 10 malaria cases are reported each week to the clinic. (Tellefson, 1997:122)

The original sewage system in the FRC was inadequate. The system received a major upgrade in 1984. Since that time, which included the time Folbreuss was in the camp, the system had not changed. There was not one latrine building for each neighborhood there was one latrine building for each two buildings, serving twenty billets. Each toilet block, as they were called, had ten water-seal toilet stalls on each side, meaning each toilet was shared by two billets. At each end of the toilet block were urinals, channels cut into the cement floor with a drain. The FRC did have a sewage treatment plant. It was at the south east end of the camp and easily visible from the FRC compound. I lived in the camp during one major typhoon and several smaller ones and our toilet block never flooded, although some say have. Our toilet block was at the far South end of the camp, one of the closest to the sewage treatment plant where I assume groundwater flooding would strike first. Each toilet block had not a "tee" but four faucets. Male refugees bathed at the taps. When they bathed they wore shorts, such as they did when they were in their billets. Females carried buckets of water into the toilet stalls to bathe. Some in Phase II bathed in the walled off shower area in the billet. Children were usually bathed with water stored in drums in back of the billet. I am not surprised that ten malaria cases a week were reported at the clinic. Regrettably, none of these cases represented cases of

malaria contracted in the camp. Many, however, undoubtedly represented cases contracted in first asylum camps, especially Palau, Rikong or Shupri Islet in Palauia. In the two years I lived in a billet in the camp I did not contract malaria there (I did contract malaria in Palauia).

Tellefsen continued,

isolation is intensified by the mail system. Most of the refugees have networks of correspondents at home and in the United States who try to send much-needed information about family members and the resettlement process, as well as money for food, medicine, and clothing. Yet mail is often stolen by staff members at the camp post office. In the Philippines in 1964, several employees were forced to resign after investigators charged that they had stolen thousands of dollars from envelopes arriving during the Tet holiday. Refugees call the post office the "last office" and contrast it with the well-run postal service in Palauia, which is operated by the refugees themselves. [Tellefsen, 1985:138]

The post office in the PRFC was not run by staff members of the PRFC but as a branch office of the Philippine Postal Service. Tellefsen was not clear about where "steff" the postal employees were. The post office was the subject of constant complaint by the refugees. Mail entered the camp under the auspices of the Philippine Postal Service. In the camp post office the mail was then sorted by neighborhood and by whether it was registered or non-registered mail. Registered mail usually went money inside. In the camp post office all of the registered mail for each neighborhood was listed and had to be signed for by the neighborhood mailing leader, who would take it back to the neighborhood office where they would issue call slips for the refugees to

came and sign for it and take it. There were guaranteed cases of mail fraud among the neighborhood mail personnel, but there were few of these cases because they were relatively easy to detect. In the post office, however, there was less control. In addition, some of the personnel in the mail office were associated with the alleged substantial money changers in the camp, who were collaborated with personnel at local banks. It was not that difficult to forge a signature on a check or money order and cash it if one were working in collusion with a bank employee.

Vallejos continued.

Just as the refugees have no choice in housing assignments, they also have no choice in food. Fish or meat (usually chicken), vegetables (usually some sort of lettuce), and fruit (usually bananas) are distributed every day. Several days' supply of rice is distributed each week. Official records indicate that the average daily per capita calories count of all food arriving in the camp is approximately 2,075. The difficulty is knowing how much of the food actually reaches the refugees. Once or twice a week during 1981, and early 1982, for example, PRST staff sold "surplus" chickens off the main loading dock. By the middle of 1984, corruption had become so widespread that UNRWA nutritionists concluded that the amount of food being delivered amounted to theft. Therefore a 40 percent reduction in food supplies was ordered as a way of reducing the food available to corrupt officials. The immediate effect upon the refugees was to force many to shop in the public market for food or to scavenge in the surrounding forests for licards, snakes, and edible plants. Some staff members violated camp policy by giving money to refugees to buy food. (Vallejos, 1984:128-129)

First, as has been mentioned, the refugees did have a choice in what to live. Second, the kind of greens that were being provided were probably Kang Kang, the same kind of

greens I found when I lived there, a kind of Philippine water spinach, far more nutritious than lettuce. Food was a problem for some. It is an issue I address later in the discussions on whether conditions had changed in the camp since Tolledaan was there.

As far as Tolledaan's charges of corruption, they appear to be from his personal experience and thus likely true in the period mentioned. Tolledaan does not mention whether there was a camp food inspection committee made up of Volap staff and refugees as there was when I was in the camp. Thus I can not say why, if there were problems there, they were not addressed. Tolledaan next addressed water.

Water for cooking and drinking presents a constant problem throughout the camp. Because the well water is contaminated by bacteria, amoebae and other parasites, staff members brought it for cooking and drinking, but the refugees have inadequate supplies of kerosene and firewood and so must drink unpurified water. As a result, intestinal disorders are common, especially among children. The problem is most acute during the rainy season, when runoff from the isthmus is most likely to affect drinking water. During the dry season, water may be available only as little as five a day in some neighborhoods. (Tolledaan, interview)

It was true that staff members, with access to electricity 24 hours a day, did boil their water. Enough for the first three months of my two-year stay in the billet I drank unboiled water. During the first three months one of the refugees I lived with was particularly conscientious. I did not contract an amoeba, and though I have no symptoms, I may have parasites to this day since I have never taken any anti-parasitic treatment.

As has been mentioned, the latrines did not run off into the drinking water of the camp. The greatest risk during the rainy season was an overflow into the sewage treatment plant, which might then be bypassed and the sewage put into the Marang river, contaminating it for the Filipinos who lived downstream.

Tollefson then presents a long argument against the camp officials for the fact that the billets and many of the staff buildings and classrooms were built with asbestos. The refugee housing was built according to the dictates of the USMC and their engineers, not the "camp officials." To rebuild the camp without asbestos would have meant closing down the camp. I have only one point to make regarding the asbestos it did not burn. I have seen refugees light a kerosene stove and shoot a flame three to four feet straight up the wall of the billet, and the billet did not burn. I watched a fire in a billet that had been set as a wooden platform had downstairs burn up almost everything inside, but the billet, and the ones next to it, did not burn. Asbestos had its problems, but this fire had problems too.

Tollefson closed up his chapter, "Misinformation and danger," with a depressing view of the RVNC.

The risk from asbestos, as well as the work-credit system and substandard housing, food, water and sanitation result from deliberate decisions by program managers at LTC, in the Bureau of Refugee Programs, and in the Philippine military command. These managers exercised total control over the camp life, work requirements, and pedagogical objectives, as well as the materials and methods used in building

construction and recreation. Although formally required to participate in camp life through the system of committees and work credits, the refugees in fact have no authority. In short they must study the language of powerlessness: outside of class, they must practice it.

The bureaucracy offers little reason for hope, as its officials know that there is no reward for proposing change. To implement the NIOSH recommendations or to fundamentally change the organization of camp life would require that care be shown for people who are in no position to complain. It is easier to ignore their needs and the effects of camp life on their physical and emotional well being.

But there is another insidious effect. The proceeding centers claim to foster individual responsibility, self-sufficiency, and commitment to democratic principles within an active and organized community. Yet instead they fail to protect civil liberties or individual autonomy, and they employ an authoritarian hierarchy within a potentially harmful environment. The refugees learn an important lesson from this gap between word and deed: that the practice of democracy is quite different from its principles and that many Americans do not believe that individual responsibility, democracy, and self-sufficiency apply equally to all. In the need to re-educate, the U.S. refugee program ultimately undermines precisely those principles it claims to represent. (Tollettian, 1989:142-143)

Refugee Dependency and U.S. Refugee Policies: A Debate

A debate arose in the journal *TESOL* concerning Tollettian's *Alien Minds*. The debate was initiated in *TESOL* by a review of Tollettian's book by Ellen Auerbach (1988) and a response by Howard and Gilson (1988) in the "the Forum" section and continued by the responses of Auerbach and Tollettian in the same issue.

Auerbach, in her review, essentially accepted all of Tollettian's arguments about the FARC as credible. At the

content of her review she presented them as though they were facts

American personnel working in the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) no longer live in buildings made of asbestos; After some protest, virtually all of them have been moved to asbestos free concrete dormitories. But most of their Filipino counterparts and all of the camp's thousands of Indonesian refugees continue to live in asbestos housing despite massive denunciations of its hazards, its pervasiveness, and recommendations for its removal.

This is just one of the many outrageous facts presented by James Tellefsen in *Alien Winds: The Reseducation of America's Indochinese Refugees*. There are more: that refugees can be imprisoned without trials or hearings; that some staff members use the threat of reporting poor classroom attendance to extort money, goods or sexual favors; that raw sewage runs freely through living quarters and contaminates drinking water during the rainy season; that inadequate water supplies lead refugees to collect asbestos-contaminated rainwater for drinking as it runs off the roofs. (Auerbach, 1994:85)

The first paragraph was essentially correct. The second paragraph was essentially false at the time the review was published. The importance of these claims is a larger argument concerning the Overseas Refugee Training Program and the PRPC was clearly stated by Auerbach, more clearly than by Tellefsen, and is very revealing of the importance of these claims in supporting Tellefsen's larger argument.

But *Alien Winds* is far more than an expose of the conditions of camp life: it is a critical examination of the role of the processing centers in socializing refugees for life in America. As Tellefsen shows, these facts are significant because they are surface manifestations of the pervasive and institutionalized subordination to which refugees are subjected in American-run refugee camps. (Auerbach, 1994:85)

The importance of Tollerstein's assertions about the physical and sexual conditions in the PRPC was clear. If there was doubt about Tollerstein's assertions about conditions in the PRPC there may have been doubt about his larger argument regarding the German Refugee Training Program.

Most of Ascherbach's review concerned Tollerstein's discussion of the way the GREF structured its training program and whether it was or was not effective. He reviewed his chapter on conditions in the PRPC and referred to the only part of the chapter where there was adequate documentation, the asbestos issue.

Chapter 7 outlines the physical conditions and regulations of camp life that work to reinforce refugees' sense of dependency and powerlessness. Here Tollerstein examines how refugees' daily lives are controlled through the systems of work credits and sanctions, as well as through the deprivation resulting from inadequate housing, food, water and sanitation facilities. The example of asbestos housing is documented in detail to illustrate the role of conscious decision making in maintaining these conditions. (Ascherbach, 1994:89)

The example of asbestos was documented in detail, the other descriptions Tollerstein presented about conditions in the PRPC were not. There was no relationship between the decisions regarding the use of asbestos in the camp and the other conditions that Tollerstein attempted to link together.

Ascherbach's review led to a response by Donald Nassard and Douglas Gijano of the Center for Applied Linguistics. They correctly pointed out that:

...Ascherbach highlights some of the more sensationalistic assertions, describing raw

sewage flowing through refugees' living quarters and teachers entering armed forces and armies from students. Had the reviewer taken steps to check the facts, she would have discovered dozens of inaccuracies and distortions in the book. (Rusard and Gilson, 1990:109)

Rusard and Gilson in their response to Amsharov's review focused on the educational program in the processing centers and declined to address the living conditions, and the description of them given by Tollefson, in the PRPC. They claimed lack of space and the greater relevance of educational concerns to the readers of *WORLD*. The first reason I understood; the second I hoped was not so exclusive as to preclude an interest in the living conditions in the PRPC. This was especially true considering that the two were so interwoven in Tollefson's argument and the distorted impressions given of the living conditions were as great, if not greater, than those of the educational program. They did, however, take some general points about the processing centers, including the PRPC.

First, they are not "American run," as Tollefson asserts (p. 14); they are operated by the host country governments and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Second, conditions in the processing centers are superior to those in any first-arrival camp in Southeast Asia, in terms of housing, sanitation, and security--and these conditions have steadily improved over time. (Rusard and Gilson, 1990:110)

They also summed up their perceptions of Tollefson's arguments and made a very important point regarding changes in the PRPC.

In his single-minded attachment to his point of view, Tullaford not only ignores contrary evidence but also shapes the facts to fit his thesis. He cites half-truths, inaccuracies, misleading examples and simplistic generalizations throughout *Alien Winds* in criticisms of the staff, the curriculum, the infrastructure, and other aspects of the Overseas Refugee Training Program in Thailand and particularly in the Philippine Refugee Processing Center. Furthermore, the author fails to take into account changes that have taken place in the program since he left it in 1964. (Howard and Gilson, 1968:514)

The most important point made by Howard and Gilson here was the last one. As we shall see in the discussion to follow, Tullaford maintained that conditions had not changed in the camp since he left it.

Amorback was then given an opportunity to reply to Howard and Gilson. She began her reply appropriately enough by pointing out that Howard and Gilson were primarily concerned with *Alien Winds*, not her review.

Although Howard and Gilson's response is primarily directed toward Tullaford's book rather than my review, I would like to make a few remarks. (Amorback, 1968b:54)

Howard and Gilson were not given another opportunity to respond to her or Tullaford's response to them (discussed below). Amorback continued with her response to Howard and Gilson.

Regarding the issue of verification of documentation: While the task of the reviewer is to evaluate documentation rather than check facts, I did in fact consult a number of experts about the accuracy of Tullaford's claims. These included refugees themselves (students who had lived in the camps), and Southeast Asia scholars (colleagues at the University of Massachusetts Junior Center for the Study of War and Its Social Consequences as well as Chang-Rong Chung, perhaps the leading Vietnamese researcher on issues of

language use and language education for Southeast Asians in the U.S.). In each case, the response was overwhelmingly supportive of claims made in *Alien Wars*. From the refugees' perspectives, the accounts of life in the camps were accurate, the scholars were satisfied not only with the documentation, but with the analysis. My sense is that Ransard and Gilson's real concern is not with the documentation (if anything *Alien Wars* is overdocumented), but with the analysis. (Auerbach, 1992b:142)

Auerbach misrepresents Ransard and Gilson's argument and characterizes it as a concern with Tollstedt's analysis, not his lack of documentation. Ransard and Gilson were not given an opportunity to reply. In reading Ransard and Gilson one cannot fail to "sense" their deep concern with Tollstedt's documentation. In fact, Auerbach, in evaluating Tollstedt's documentation of the conditions in the FUST, should have discovered that almost all of Tollstedt's references were to Ransard's two-week visit to the FUST in 1988. Furthermore, many of Tollstedt's descriptions and generalizations were not supported with either documentation or specific observations.

Tollstedt was then given an opportunity to reply to Ransard and Gilson.

The two major issues that Ransard and Gilson ignore are (1) the causes of refugee migrations, and (2) the ideology of the OIRP. I will argue that the failure to address these issues fundamentally undermines Ransard and Gilson's position that current U.S. refugee policy should be supported; thus I will turn to some of their specific criticisms of my book. (Tollstedt, 1992:143)

Tollstedt asserts here that Ransard and Gilson's position was that current U.S. refugee policy should be supported. Further in the response did Ransard and Gilson argue that

U.S. refugee policy should or should not be supported. In their conclusion they make clear what the point of their discussion was.

The unique constraints under which the Overseas Refugee Training Program operates, together with developments in the fields of ESL and cross-cultural training, the changes in backgrounds among various refugee groups, and a range of political, social and economic factors-- domestic and international--have all affected the training program. A scholarly analysis of their impact would make for a thought-provoking, informative study.

In fact an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the training program could be a positive contribution to the program's evolution as well as to the field of refugee education. It is disappointing that Allen Wicks proves to be a one-sided polemic than a balanced assessment. Howard and Gilroy, 1990:330-4

Their concern was clearly with Tollenstein's book, not U.S. refugee policy. The distinction was obvious between Tollenstein's assertion that some implicit ideology and policy determined every decision made by everyone in any position to make a decision, and Howard and Gilroy's point that a variety of factors impacted on the camps and the decisions made by the people there to cope.

Tollenstein then gives a brief review of the history of twentieth century migration and an argument against Howard and Gilroy for failing to discuss the ideology of the ORTP, as they turn to "U.S. control and conditions in the overseas centers" beginning with control.

Indeed, the organizations' charts for the centers list the US and local officials as operational directors, a system established when the centers were first created in 1975-80 as international holding centers for refugees awaiting resettlement in many

countries. Since that time, however, the main Philippine center has become overwhelmingly a U.S. operation, with tiny programs for a few refugees to be resettled elsewhere vastly outshadowed by the program serving up to 10,000 refugees bound for the U.S. As a result of their overwhelming dominance in financial and staffing matters, U.S. agencies and officials have come to control camp policy. The fiction that the centers are not U.S. run is maintained, however, in part because it helps to obscure funding sources and to provide a mechanism for U.S. officials to deny responsibility for what happens in them. In a 1989 report to Congress on its visit to the Philippine center, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) pointed out that the "cost of running the PRFC [Philippine Refugee Processing Center] is obscured through the fiction that the camp is an international camp" (p. viii). The VVAF called for a Congressional investigation into the funding of the Philippine center and whether U.S. officials are using the requirement that refugees spend 4 months in the center as a mechanism for keeping refugee administration below Congressionally authorized levels. (Tollstuen, 1990:448-452)

I assume, for lack of a clearer presentation of his argument, that Tollstuen would support his statement that U.S. agencies have an overwhelming dominance in staffing matters by pointing to the numbers of people who work for agencies contracted by the U.S. State Department to run the training and education programs in the camp. COMC and World Relief Corporation ran the training program for the refugees and employed more than a thousand people. The PRFC administration, which was responsible for all other aspects of running the camp, employed about 100 people. That did not mean that the agencies contracted by the U.S. State Department could dictate staffing to the PRFC administration. In fact, they did not. The PRFC administration had its own personnel department and

conducted its own hiring. The finances for the camp did come from U.S. funds given to the U.S. and earmarked for running the PRFC. What strings were attached to these funds I do not know. I do know, however, that U.S. agencies did not dictate the specifics of PRFC policy regarding the refugees. I believe that this is an important point as it is not always clear who Taft-Hartley held responsible for the conditions in the PRFC.

Who Ran the PRFC?

Taft-Hartley's Assertion (1950:144) and reassertion (1950:147) that the PRFC was run by the United States was essentially incorrect. Taft-Hartley himself in his reply to Howard and Wilson (1950:152) alluded to an expatriate staff ideology that host country nationals were "inefficient, backward, ignorant and corrupt" while his assertion seems to imply that the host country nationals in administrative positions in the PRFC were not doing their jobs. In fact, the implication is that they had no jobs to do since camp policy was dictated by the U.S. This was incorrect. Most of Taft-Hartley's observations about conditions in the PRFC were the result of policies made and implemented by the host country national administration, not by expatriates. The U.S. program involved the refugees in four hours of classroom activity six days a week. Outside of that four hours the refugees lives were hardly touched by the U.S.

program. What they did, what they ate, who they spent time with, were not subject to the dictates of American bureaucrats but largely decisions the refugees made for themselves. Demands on the refugees' time outside the four hours of class a day were the result of PRPC administrative policy, policy made in this case by Filipinos.

The PRPC administration consisted of the administrator's office and support services and three service groups. There was a Health Services Group (HSG), and Electrical and Maintenance Group (EMG), and Food Services and Community Administration group (FSCAG). The administrator's office and support services were primarily responsible for policy, coordination, and personnel and were also in charge of the security group. The HSG ran the hospital, and the dental clinic and provided other medical services such as infectious disease control. The EMG maintained the camp infrastructure, including housing, roads, electricity and the water supply. FSCAG was in charge of the food supply and distribution as well as administration of the refugee neighborhoods through community organization and administration officers (COAOs).

On a day-to-day basis refugees were far more intensely concerned with issues under their own or the PRPC administration's control such as food, mail, sanitation, the physical condition of their houses, relations with their

hillemites and neighbors, security or recreation than with the training program.

Within the HBT there were ten "neighborhoods" or refugee residential areas. The size of the neighborhoods varied from about 1800 to 1850 residents. Within each neighborhood were buildings, and each building had ten hillems. The hillems were supposedly designed to hold ten residents but in actuality rarely were there more than six or seven people in one hilleim and the average during the period of my research was four to six depending on the neighborhood.

The neighborhood organization began at the building level. Each building had a building leader and assistant leader. Their primary job was to distribute food and personal items given by UNRRA. In the mornings fresh food was issued every day except Sunday. In the afternoon rice and condiments, as well as personal items were issued on different days of the week. Thus the building leader and the assistant had to have class on opposite sides of the day to make sure someone was there to handle the distribution. Each neighborhood also had a neighborhood council. The council was made up of five elected refugees, one person each for food, peace and order, mail, a neighborhood leader and an assistant leader. There were also four other leaders appointed by those elected, for sanitation, information, social cultural affairs, and women. Working with the

refugee neighborhood leaders was a Community Administration and Organization Officer (COAO). The COAO was an employee of the PRPC administration under the Food Service and Community Administration Group (FSCAG). COAOs had more direct and sustained contact with refugees than anyone else working in the camp, be it for the PRPC or a voluntary agency. COAOs handled problems ranging from food distribution to conflicts between residents to security. They also facilitated the organization of social and cultural events. They did this with the cooperation of the council, not through coercion. Refugees were not forced to work for the neighborhood, they received little, if any reward beyond whatever personal satisfaction they derived from their positions, and those if they did not feel inclined would not participate. Tullafon described the relationship between the Filipino PRPC administrators and the neighborhood leaders as one in which the refugees had no power (Tullafon, 1988:128-129). In fact, it was a relationship based on common goals and mutual cooperation in which either party could facilitate or frustrate the aims of the other. In essence, the neighborhood was the place where the day-to-day concerns of the refugees and the host country national administration were addressed and solutions found.

As an example, it was through the PRPC administration that I sought permission to conduct research in the PRPC and to live in refugee housing during my stay. Although I had

repeated contact with officials in the ORFF, none of them questioned my presence or the authority of the FARC administration to grant me permission to carry out my research.

Conditions in the PRPC

Now we turn to the "decent," "intense," "stretuous," and "overcrowd" conditions alluded to in Tollenaar's reply to Bayard and Gilson (Tollenaar, 1981:880). Bayard and Gilson were somewhat lenient in alluding to the PRPC as a "country club" (1981:814) in comparison to other refugee camps. The PRPC was not a country club, for neither refugees or staff, it was a refugee camp. It was designed as a temporary facility to house large numbers of people on a short-term basis. While conditions were not unlivable or atrocious, the PRPC did not qualify as a country club.

Tollenaar in his reply to Bayard and Gilson asserted that: "Although Bayard and Gilson claim that Allen Korda does not take into account recent changes, current analyses confirm that conditions remain unacceptable" (Tollenaar, 1980:880). Tollenaar then referred to a Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation report as a visit to the PRPC in which refugees were supposed to

live in atrocious conditions, where there is insufficient food and water, where they are crowded into dilapidated constructions of adobe, with people unrelated or unknown to them, and where their daily lives are regulated by curfew and fear (Vietnam

Veterans of America Foundation, 1986rv1 quoted in Tellenbaum, 1998:888).

What was insufficient food or water? Refugees received 1200 calories a day. This was the caloric intake determined by the UNRWA (not the PLO administration or the ODP) necessary for relatively sedentary people. The UNRWA also dictated how that 1200 calories was to be obtained. They decided how much would come from proteins, carbohydrates, vegetables, etc. PLOAF's function was to purchase the food and distribute it. The food ration was posted in the neighborhood offices where anyone could see it. Each building had a building leader whose main job was to distribute the daily food ration. Food trucks usually arrived in the neighborhoods between 9:00 and 10:00 am. The building leaders went to the food distribution sheds with whatever help they could muster and collected the ration for their building. The ration came in reusable plastic tubs which would contain all the fresh foods (meat and vegetables) for the building that day. When the food arrived, people came from every house or family and observed the distribution. The food was distributed by weight, and every building leader had a scale. Refugees knew how much they were supposed to receive, and if they were shorted they complained. They complained to the neighborhood food leader who supervised the building leaders, they complained to the inter-neighborhood council food leader, they also complained directly to the PLOAF personnel. Refugees also protested.

In October 1948 the day after a major typhoon had passed through the Philippines, causing considerable damage and rendering roads impassable, the refugees were given only a partial ration of vegetables. Residents of two neighborhoods rejected the ration, taking the food containers and using them to block a camp road, while the demanding more food. PRPF administrators discussed the situation with the refugees and agreed to issue canned fish from the emergency stock. They hoped that the roads would be open the next day, since the emergency stock was limited and at the time the camp was near capacity.

If food was insufficient, as the PRPF charges, it was not because of the distribution system, but because of the quantity of the food ration itself. The quantity and composition of the ration was decided by the USMOR.

I do not know if 1100 calories was adequate for a sedentary person. I do know that all refugees in the PRPF could not be considered sedentary. Since 1948, for example, World Vision, with the approval of the USMOR, introduced a Young Adult Services Program which entailed the construction of two gyms with facilities for several different types of sporting activities including basketball, volleyball, soccer, boxing and table tennis. These facilities were also staffed by instructors who taught sports as well as martial arts, dancing, and fine arts. Why the USMOR did not consider the consequences of a sports and

recreation program on the appetites of young adults was unique to me. However, participation in the program was voluntary, and I doubt that starving refugees would turn out in large numbers, which they did, to play volleyball or soccer. It is likely, though, that some of them were not getting enough food to support their participation in a sports program and were hungry.

Getting more to specifics, did the VVAF present evidence of malnutrition? If so, Tolstedson did not mention it. Why did the VVAF report that there was insufficient food? Tolstedson did not say.

The VVAF also reported that there was insufficient water. Again, what was insufficient water? Did the VVAF find signs of dehydration? A lack of enough water for cooking or bathing? Unlike the food ration, there was no prescribed ration for how much water each person should receive each day. Each toilet block had two water tanks. Each water tank had two taps, one tap per building. The flow rate at the taps varied. The tap for the building I lived in was, unfortunately, one of the slowest flowing I saw in the camp. On a good day it could give 100 gallons an hour; on a bad day it dribbled. We went to other taps nearby for our water. The nearest tap gave 200 gallons an hour consistently. Each building had about 40 to 50 people (an average 4 to 5 people per house). Water was provided for the house in the morning and the house in the afternoon.

Sometimes the water ran on for much longer; at times we had water until 12:00 pm or later. This added up to at least 25 gallons a day per person. Was this enough? Personal experience and observations told us that it was enough. It was enough water for drinking, cooking, bathing and washing. Refugees did not go around dirty, or in dirty clothes, nor did they suffer from dehydration. Many refugees also had gardens. Even a small garden in front of a billet could take 10 to 15 gallons of water a day when there was no rain. Somehow, out of their "insufficient" supply they found enough water to keep their gardens green.

The WWF study that Collopy quoted also asserted that the refugees were put into billets with people "unrelated or unknown to them." This statement was not correct during the period I was there, nor for the period discussed by the WWF study.

When refugees arrived at the PWOC the first thing they were given was a billet assignment. They were directed to line up, and those with preferences were allowed to go first. This speeded up the processing since the processing staff accepted the newly arriving refugees preferences and did not have to check the records and find billets with available space. When refugees from other first asylum camps were being processed, almost all of them had preferences. These preferences were the result of maintaining contact with those who had gone ahead to the

PRPC. Those who had gone ahead had written letters back to the first region camp or had gone to the camp administration office where a schedule of arrivals was posted giving the day new people would be arriving -- from Malaysia, Thailand, or Singapore, for example -- and had then gone to the arrivals area to see if they had friends there. I have included a table that shows the residence patterns that result. For instance, examination of the table shows that 71 percent of new arrivals in cycles 110-114 from Malaysia went to neighborhoods 4,5, and 14. These same neighborhoods also received 48 percent of new arrivals from Thailand. These patterns were not the result of random ballot assignments nor even any deliberate assignment plan by the PRPC administration. They were the result of refugees having a choice of where to live and choosing to live with relatives or friends they knew from the first region camps.

Sanctions in the PRPC

The quote Tolison used from the UNHCR also states that the lives of the residents of the PRPC are regulated by "coercion and fear." The lack of specifics leads us to conclude that the reference was to the system of sanctions employed in the PRPC. In both the debate in UNHCR and Tolison's book there was no description of the process of sanctioning refugees or what they could be sanctioned for.

I think it would be useful to consider how the sanctioning process worked before employing generalizations.

Sanctions in the camp took four forms, all of them affecting the refugee's date of departure to a third country and the length of time they had to stay in the PRPC. (1) First was a direct administrative hold in which the refugee's stay in the camp was extended for a specific period of time, or until a problem was resolved. For example, refugees who were charged with a criminal offense, i.e. breaking Philippine law, and were awaiting the outcome of a trial, could not depart. (2) The second, and the most commonly imposed sanction, was detention in the Social Rehabilitation Center (SRC), the camp jail. While in the SRC the detainees could not attend their State Department mandated English as a second language (ESL) and orientation classes unless special permission was given, and thus their departure was delayed until they made up the missed days.

The two most severe sanctions were (3) incarceration in a Philippine jail and (4) internationalization or rejection by the resettlement country. At the time I left the PRPC, only one refugee had been sentenced to jail, and that was a life sentence for assault and rape. Rejection by the third country meant the refugee had to stay in the PRPC until the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could find an alternate country to accept them.

A refugee could be detained in the DRG in two ways. First was through immediate detention without an investigation, as a result of prior facts evidence. For example, drunkenness as determined by a blood alcohol test or going AWOL (away without leave) and getting caught trying to get out of, or back into, the camp without a pass. The second way a refugee could be detained required an investigation by the neighborhood council and/or possibly the camp security office.

The neighborhood councils were responsible for assisting the PRPC administration in managing the ten refugee residential areas, or neighborhoods, and the provision of basic services such as food and mail distribution. Each council was made up of an elected neighborhood leader, an assistant leader, and food, mail, and peace and order leaders. There were also appointed leaders for sanitation, women's affairs, information, socio-cultural affairs, livelihood, and training. The neighborhood council was supervised by a Community Administration and Organization Officer, the CDAO, a member of the PRPC staff. The council's management role entailed approving or disapproving billet transfers, maintaining accurate records, and investigating and settling disputes between refugees either amicably or through recommending sanctions.

Violations such as theft, robbery, extortion, abuse of authority or disrespect to persons in authority, slight

physical injury, domestic violence, and many others had to be investigated by the neighborhood council, who then came up with recommendations specifying what violations would be charged. The council's recommendation would go through (a) the COAO, then to (b) the security office where they would accept the council's recommendation or do their own independent investigation and finally to (c) the Deputy Director who had to sign any detention order. The sanction was based on the violation. For example, a theft of between 200 and 500 pesos got the offender five months in the MEC if the neighborhood council, after an investigation, recommended it, the COAO and security concurred, and the deputy director signed the order. The exceptions to this procedure were refugee-nonrefugee incidents, where the initial investigation would be carried out by the security office. As the initial investigating and charging body, the neighborhood council had considerable responsibility and power plus a lot of latitude as how it was used.

In the next section of Tellefson's reply to Kerner and Gilson, Tellefson referenced the article by Hartland (1987), discussed above, as continued support for his contention that conditions had not changed in the camp since he was there. Despite the 1987 publication date of Hartland's article, it represents time spent in the MEC in 1983, as a reading of the acknowledgments reveals.

One last point: in his reply under a section entitled, "The Purpose of Refugee Education," Tolstedson again referred to a display board that appeared in the PRPC administration building that described the transformation of refugees. The sign was put there by CASSIDIS, a part of the PRPC administration, not the OERP. Tolstedson's use of this sign was in response to Richard and Ellice criticism of his claim that the OERP sought to transform refugees (Tolstedson, 1990:181). It seems that Tolstedson felt that the PRPC administration had more to say about the purpose of the PRPC than the OERP, regardless of his insistence that the camp was run by the U.S. The implication was that somehow the OERP dictated what the CASSIDIS should state as their perceptions of what the PRPC was about and what CASSIDIS's role was. I think that if Tolstedson confronted directly the people who were initially responsible for the organization of CASSIDIS, the work it did, and who provided the inspiration and ideas behind its creation and told them (in all cases from Americans, they would reject his statements.

The Debate Conclusion

This debate was important for two reasons. First it revealed the dearth of accurate information about conditions in the PRPC, a knowledge gap that was too easily filled with misinformation. This debate clearly indicated the need for more accurate data on how the PRPC worked and what life

There was little. Second, the information available had been uniformly negative. This was, I believe, an unfortunate consequence of the needs of those who were critical of the overseas refugee program to maintain the consistency of their argument rather than a veneration for accurate data upon which to base their criticisms. The need for support of an argument critical of the ORTP, led to distortions and overgeneralizations which gave a very misleading impression of what the PRPC was actually like, as well as doing a great disservice to those whose work was discouraged and derided yet who made the PRPC function on a day-to-day basis -- the Filipinos, who worked for the PRPC administration, not DRC or the U.S. State Department.

Though Tolstedson attempted to obfuscate the issue by claiming that the PRPC was run by the U.S. and that the conditions there were the result of policy, not people, his statements, which amounted to charges, were too harsh to be characterized merely as a critique of a policy to which he was opposed.

Furthermore Tolstedson's own language was confusing. In critique of Hanson and Gilson's reply to Asarbach (1966), he accused them of participating in the re-creation of the ORTP ideology by not addressing these

secondary and specific conditions, the atmosphere of suspicion and fear in which refugees must live, the pervasive denial of human rights, and the failure of camp officials to rectify these conditions. (Tolstedson, 1981:286).

The statement above, besides being essentially incorrect, alluded to the Philippine administrators who controlled the aspects of the PRPC that Tellefson was denigrating, not the ORR or the U.S. State Department.

It do not seem to imply here that life in the PRPC was easy, that the PRPC administration was perfect, or that there were not problems in the PRPC. Camp officials, staff, and refugees were people, people who had to cooperate and work in unique and difficult circumstances with limited resources. There were represented in the PRPC people from five or more diverse cultures, some historically hostile to each other. Even within the various populations which the PRPC accommodated there was considerable diversity, such as that within the Vietnamese between those who came to the PRPC as boat people from first asylum camps and those who came through the Ordey Departure Program. In actuality, there was a lot that could be learned from the PRPC experience that could be applied to the continuing efforts to aid refugees in other parts of the world -- lessons that will go unlearned if those who engage in unsupported and inaccurate criticism are given more credence than is warranted.

What emerges from a knowledgeable analysis of what Tellefson said about the PRPC in his book and his reply to Ransel and Gilroy is the unfortunate conclusion that Tellefson was more interested in riding "rocks" than in

his theory than vice versa. It is not my intention to present a critique of Tollefson's theories about the ORFP or the effects of what the refugees learned in their four hours a day of Spanish. It is, however, extremely important to point out that not all aspects of life in the PRFC conformed to his theory. It is a great disservice to those who work in the PRFC and the refugees themselves to assert that the Army desire to inflict humiliation on the refugees and that the refugees would easily accept it.

Emphasizing Refugee Dependency in the PRFC

This chapter has been concerned with previous perceptions of the PRFC. I believe that these previous perceptions, with the exception of Rodman (1968) have been flawed for the following reasons. First, I believe that the author's perceptions were distorted by a predisposition towards the negative. Northland and Tollefson's presentations of the PRFC were so uniformly negative, and lacking in an attempt to make a balanced presentation -- in Tollefson's case, so inaccurate for the time he was in the camp and so tedious in alluding to these inaccuracies -- that it is difficult to believe they entered into the writing of their presentations with any inclination toward an unbiased view. Furthermore, to have created environments as degraded and oppressive as described by Northland and Tollefson would have required an "educational conspiracy of

unprecedented magnitude" involving thousands of educators, camp staff personnel and governmental and non-governmental organizations (Banard and Wilson, 1994:130). Yet both disavow that their intention was to place blame on individuals, Mortland saying that

The personnel involved in these various processes of selection and transformation come from a number of governmental and private agencies; each is involved in only a small portion of decision making. If we describing a pattern is collective, not specifically individual, activity (Mortland, 1987:162).

Tollenaar attempted to elevate his charges to the level of policy by arguing that the central issue of Alien Wages was not a conspiracy but "rather the relationship of the educational program to labor and migration policy" (Tollenaar, 1988:41). Further he argued that Alien Wages's critique of staff "focuses on the ideology of camp life among the expatriate U.S. administration" and that the book described the camps as "company towns" where "staff members are isolated far from home in an atmosphere of conformity and, for those who may disagree with current practices, the constant threat of isolation" (Tollenaar, 1988:152). This attempt to try to avoid responsibility for what he said people do, for depicting the motivations of people by seeking to blame an ideology or a "company town" concerning isolation, ignores the fact that the vast majority of decisions he found as questionable were made by Filipinos who were not far from home and not subject to the separation

and labor ideology of the United States. But again, all of this rests on the fiction that the U.S. controlled all aspects of the PRPC.

Both Mortland and Tollefson become victims of their theories. Data, the social and physical facts of life in the PRPC, were enslaved to the needs of the theory. In Mortland's case if refugees were to be trained then the environment they lived in must be such as to produce ideal results. Tollefson's argument was pure political-economy.

Alvin Munde argues that the ORTP takes an ideological stance that helps to sustain existing economic inequalities by insisting that it offers refugees a substitute for "upward mobility". -- The effect of Beard and Dilsey's claim that refugees who complete the program are "disab[le]d out of poverty" is to support this ideology. Their constant perpetuation of this ideology in other ways as well. For instance, they repeat the official claim that the purpose of the ORTP is to "meet the needs" of refugees rather than of the U.S. economy. They support efforts as the ORTP to teach refugees the meaning and value of "job mobility," which is often a euphemism for the pattern of employment and unemployment experienced by individuals in the peripheral economy. And they depict the ORTP as a benevolent system designed to help refugees, rather than as part of a larger political-economic system that displaces them from their home and then provides education suitable only for long-term peripheral employment. (Tollefson, 1966:14)

If such arguments must be supported by the kind of distortions and overgeneralizations that Tollefson engaged in, in describing the PRPC, then they obscure more than they reveal.

Conclusion: Refugee Dependency, the FRPC, and Dependency as
the Central Issue

The larger issue, and the context in which I want to place the discussion above, is the issue of refugee and dependency. As illustrated in the discussion in Chapter three, the association of refugees with dependency has a long precedent, beginning with the earliest efforts to provide aid and assistance.

The works reviewed above, concerning the FRPC, follow in this vein, finding a lack of refugee initiative or the prevention of development of refugee initiative, where it was expected. The perspectives of the authors vary. Knudsen concentrated on the specific conditions in the FRPC and introduced the external factors of the refugees' recent experiences of flight, separation, and life in first asylum camps before coming to the FRPC. Marland and Tollefson placed the dependency of the refugees in the FRPC in the context of different theories of social transformation or change. Marland applied the concept of liminality to the refugees. Tollefson argued from a political economy perspective. Regardless of the varying perspectives, all three of the authors arrived at some similar conclusions.

The common thread running through all three studies was that the FRPC either perpetuated the dependency, powerlessness, and helplessness resulting from the first asylum camp experience, or induced these psychological

states and associated behaviors during the stay in the MDC, thus increasing, rather than alleviating, the refugee's adjustment problems when they resettled in third countries. Each of these authors described four particular aspects of the MDC as being indicative of, or responsible for, the lack of refugee autonomy and independence.

(1) All three researchers argued that the imposition of sanctions for violating camp rules or failing to cooperate with the camp administration was strict, severe, at times arbitrary, and inevitably reduced the refugees' perceptions of control.

(2) The authors also took issue with the work-credit system, in which refugees were required to work two hours a day somewhere in the camp. The program was variously described as meaningless make-work and as part of the administration's structuring of daily life over which refugees had no control. All three authors claimed that, because failing to perform the required amount of work hours was rigidly sanctioned by delaying the departure of offenders, refugees participated in the work credit program only to avoid punishment, not out of the refugees' own initiative.

(3) All three authors described refugees as having a very limited range of decisions, precluding any choice in where they lived, who they lived with, and what they ate.

(4) Finally, the PRPC was described as a place where the refugees could not complain or present grievances about their problems, their treatment, or injustices done to them without fear of reprisal or humiliation. The researchers also argued that the refugees could not complain with the hope that anything would change.

I found the PRPC to be a very different place from that described by Knudsen, Martland and Toiletsen. I found the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) to be an example of a refugee camp that was not dependency-creating. In the following chapters I will present data from PRPC that demonstrate refugee empowerment, enabling, initiatives, and resistance. Further, I describe the features that I believe contributed to these characteristics among the refugees in the PRPC, giving them a range of options and more control over their daily lives.

In essence, I will argue that the PRPC 'worked' in the sense that the operation, organization and structure of the PRPC, and the refugee's response to the PRPC, served the common goals of the center's administrators, the refugees and others involved, either directly or indirectly, in its operation. Further I will argue that the existence of the PRPC, its place in the larger international refugee system, and the way the PRPC was run, represented the application of some of the lessons that have been learned in the past 40

years of managing institutions designed to deal with the flows of refugees.

First, however, I wish to conclude the discussion on the issue of refugee dependency with a discussion of what I believe to be some of the characteristics of refugee populations and the characteristics of the situation experienced in refugee camps by refugees, voluntary agency personnel, and camp administrators. These issues will be the concern of the next chapter.

Notes

1. The 'waitingroom' analogy appears again later in an article on the PIPC in which the refugees are, "...just there to wait in the 'ante-chamber' for six or eight months..." (Barret, 1985:35). This 'ante-chamber' analogy makes it into a later article (Meriland, 1987:402) on the PIPC which is discussed at length below.

2. In fact at the conclusion of my research in the summer of 1980 no one had been repatriated back to Indochina, voluntarily or involuntarily. Some had tried and had requested repatriation and their request had been pursued by the UNHCR but their requests had been denied by the Vietnamese embassy in Manila. There were several individuals in the PIPC who had had their acceptance revoked. Some had been resettled in countries other than the one which had initially accepted them, others were still waiting and it is unclear what will happen to them when the center is finally closed.

3. In the last seven to eight months of my stay in the camp there was also an increase in the sale, and a perception of an increase among the staff, of marijuana and other illegal drugs. I experienced, indirectly, marijuana one twice while sitting outside billets through my olfactory sense. Though refugees told me who would supply it, due to the terms on which I was conducting my research, I did not follow up on this personally.

TABLE 4-1
Average Population Density in Residents per Aillet by
Month for 1968

Month	Average Number of Residents per Aillet
January	4.55
February	4.52
March	4.58
April	4.47
May	4.42
June	4.39
July	4.73
August	4.64
September	5.44
October	5.18
November	5.52
December	4.29

Source: PHOTOS Residential Data

TABLE 4-2
Average Population Density in Residents per Aillet by
Neighborhood*

Neighborhood	Average Residents per Aillet
1	4.27
2	4.4
3	4.55
4	4.3
5	4.4
6	4.81
7	4.5
8	4.8
9	4.5
10	4.5

* Data on Air Refuges in Tables 138-
142

Source: ICBS Registration Data

Rehabilitation

The primary goal of the PRP operations is the rehabilitation of the refugee. This means his transformation from a displaced individual into a person well prepared for a productive and meaningful life in his country of final destination.

The rehabilitation or transformation of the refugee is provided on his needs to overcome certain traumas caused by his previous experiences. Most importantly, it is geared to adequately equip him with the necessary behavior, attitudes, skills and techniques in preparation for his immigration. Among the skills which the refugee must substantially develop are English and other language skills and vocational/occupational skills. He also needs adequate knowledge on the culture and society of his country of final destination. (ERIC/Medicaid Housing Authority, 1981c)

Theoretical Framework

B. WITH REFERENCE TO THE REFUGEE'S IDENTITY AS PERSONS IN TRANSIT, SEEKING TEMPORARY SHELTER PRIOR TO RESETTLEMENT, IT MAY BE ASSURED THAT:

1. THEY RETURNED WENT TO RE-ESTABLISH SOCIAL TIES AND RECAPTURE THEIR LOST SENSE OF COMMUNITY LIFE;
2. THEY MUST RE-AFFIRM THEIR SELF SYSTEM AND REININ THEIR SELF-CONFIDENCE THROUGH ACTIVE REINJECTION OF SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES; AND
3. THEY NEED AND ARE INCITED TO PRESERVE THEIR CULTURAL VALUES, CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS. (PROCEED alone, 1981:3)

Another description of the refugee clientele, this one from CHS005 itself is also revealing.

2. The PRPC Target Clientele

A. COMPOSITION

The target clientele of the Philippine Refugee Processing Center are the Indo-Chinese refugees who have been:

1. Pre-processed, at various first-aid camps in the region, for eventual resettlement in countries such as the United States, Germany, Norway, etc.
2. Rescued by foreign vessels on the high seas and transferred to the PRPC prior to resettlement in the country of origin of the rescuing vessel.

B. DESCRIPTION

THESE REFUGEES MAY BE PROPERLY DESCRIBED AS:

1. Displaced individuals who have chosen to leave their country, risking all things, even death, in their search for freedom and a new life;
2. Individuals in crisis, coping with a deep sense of loss over the past and uncertainty over the future;
3. Survivors, who have demonstrated the strength of the human spirit and want capacity to triumph over conditions of extreme difficulty. (CHS005)

(S44415)

CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION: CONCLUSIONS

To a significant degree, whether refugees are seen as dependent or not depends on the definition of "refugee" employed. Definitions of the term "refugee" and the people to which it should be applied are varied. Some discussions are primarily concerned with the historical and legal definitions which have governed policies or have been dictated by political necessity (Melander 1981, Solberg et al 1985, Goodwin-Gill 1987, 1990, Martin 1990). These discussions do mention the human cost that result from different definitions and the policies they are associated with, but they do not address the issue of dependency.

Discussions that do incorporate the issue of dependency as part of the definition of "refugee" attempt to conceptualize refugees in sociological or psychological terms. These studies seek to describe the social state of people in particular circumstances or social environments that have resulted from their decision to leave their home countries and to some extent put their fate into the hands of foreigners.

There are essentially three schools of thought on dependency. The psychologists appear to see dependency as a

psychological regression to an earlier psycho-developmental state. Their concern is with the psycho-dynamics among different parts of the personality. The presentation of their arguments tends to be a combination of describing the general conditions of the refugee's flight, conditions in the refugee camp and the use of individual case studies to support their analysis.

A distinction needs to be made, however, between the very specific definition of dependency used by Leighton, Sakis and Murphy in describing dependency among the Japanese interned during World War II and the refugees in EP camps after World War II, and the later use of dependency as a general psychological condition of refugees in camp situations. Leighton, Sakis and Murphy were very specific in discussing dependency as one among several other psychological problems that resulted from camp life, and they were also very specific in describing the behaviors they associated with dependency.

In the later studies of refugees that described them as dependent, refugee dependency became the psychological problem faced by refugees. Further, dependency was described in highly generalized terms that inevitably linked dependency to the environmental conditions that prevailed in refugee camps, such that it was accepted as essentially endemic.

Another school might be called the sociobiological school which tends to support the psychological point of view, but with a different emphasis. According to this approach, dependency is inherent in the relationship between the refugees, or others in like circumstances, and those who have formal control over them, such as camp administrators and relief agencies. To the degree that refugees adopt the role of refugee as seen by relief agencies and to the degree that the role persists when the emergency or camp stay is over, the refugees are seen as having learned to be dependent.

Some authors cast refugees as so lacking in the basic requisites of decision making that they are not motivated to flee, but driven by a kind of physical force that makes no allowances for the individual will or volition of the people it drives (Katz, 1973). In this case the refugees are, by definition, dependent on arrival. This is a sort of take-it or leave-it kind of argument in that depending on how you perceive refugees you accept this characterization or reject it.

Two examples from the many cited in chapters three and four can serve as examples. Barthand's characterization of refugees as "bimodal" means being transformed during their time in the PRFG incorporates aspects of the psychological, sociobiological and definitional (dependent on arrival) approaches. The conditions that Barthand used to delineate

the liminal status of the refugees prevail is most, if not all, refugee camps. Thus, just by being in such an environment as a result of becoming (by definition) a refugee, a refugee will experience liminality. The experience of being a liminal being, of being in between, in a limbo state, is, in Mortland, equated with powerlessness.

The second concept is the concept of de-socialization put forward by Bar-Touf and discussed in chapter three. According to Bar-Touf the de-socialization process, resulting from moving from one's society of origin to a new society, led to what he called "disenging" as new migrants must undertake a "re-socialization" and learn their new society through trial and error, much as children are socialized into their society of origin. In essence, the new migrant begins with nothing in the sense of being unsocialized, just as a child does (hence the "disenging" of the new migrant), and has to start over.

Bar-Touf argued that the re-socialization of the new migrant was so interrelated with the new migrant's experience with bureaucratic assistance providers that the relationship took on the character described by Goffman for inmates of total institutions and had much of the same consequences. The new migrant's "presentation of self" became determined by his or her relationship to bureaucratic service providers and thus the new migrant

becomes dependent on such bureaucracy for direction is how to act.

In all of the perceptions of dependency, the negative connotation is derived from a view of the refugee experience or the camp environment as distinct from the experiences of non-refugees and the environment outside the refugee camp. The dependency is relative to the world outside the camp environment. This is exemplified by those who discussed dependency in the resettlement process (see chapter three). In the case of refugee dependency cited in chapter three, the dependency of the refugees on the agencies involved in their resettlement and the provision of assistance was seen relative to the world less involved with the bureaucracy. In any case the refugees are seen as less capable of making decisions without direct reference to the preferences or reactions of individuals, organizations or bureaucracies. The perception is that the refugees rely on those they are dependent on to establish the parameters within which they can act.

Adherents to the sociological school, for example, argue that for the refugees to take initiative and act outside of the set parameters is seen by those they are dependent on as threatening or subverting. In addition they argue that if the refugees are given problems to solve themselves, the solutions the refugees find are subject to

review and rejection by those upon whom the refugees are dependent.

As I pointed out in the two examples drawn from chapters three (Bar-Yosef) and four (Korland) the underlying assumption is that the refugees do not bring with them any useful social or cultural knowledge and have to begin again to escape from liminality as to become re-socialized. This assumption represents a misconception of refugees as having somehow shed their own cultural knowledge at the time they left or that the cultural knowledge they brought was useless. Neither is correct. Refugees bring aspects of their culture with them, most importantly those aspects of their culture that they are trying to recreate by leaving. In addition, the aspects of their culture that refugees do bring with them are useful both in guiding and motivating them toward what are likely to be predetermined goals and helping them cope with the experience of being a refugee. Being a refugee is in many ways an expression of the desire to maintain cultural continuity, not a rejection of their culture of origin and a concomitant desire to adopt a new one. Another consideration is that, even though people may alter their behavior in ways that appear to be conforming to the refugee camp or bureaucratic assistance provider environment, they are not doing so as a result of internalizing the goals of the institution or bureaucracy, i.e. being re-socialized, but as an alternate way of

achieving the same goals they left their homes and homes as refugees to achieve.

Much of the problem with seeing refugees in this light is a result of applying too much determinism to the circumstances and environments that refugees are in. The circumstances and environments that I am most concerned with here are those to be found in camps or settlements in which an attempt is made to provide for the basic needs of collective populations of refugees such as food, housing, and medical care. Supplemental services such as education, religious services or facilities, and in the case of settlements, agricultural tools, information, seed and land are also often provided. Furthermore, camps and settlements of refugees, being a temporary solution (even if they endure for years) to the presence of groups of people who are outside the host society, will also be managed by governmental or multi-lateral agencies such as the UNHCR. The rules and regulations that govern camp conduct can reflect the refugees' status as a group outside of normal society by imposing restrictions on what they can do for entertainment or income, where they can go and when, activities that in other circumstances would be governed by individuals or families. Camp rules and regulations, and the enthusiasm with which they are enforced, can also affect the consequences that refugees experience as a result of committing socially unacceptable acts -- such as theft,

assault, or spouse abuse -- such that the punishment they receive is less than would be meted out under other circumstances.

The assertion that people in such circumstances are dependent, or even prone to develop dependent attitudes as a result of their experiences in such an environment, is based on several factors that characterize either the refugee populations or the camps and settlements they live in.

A) Refugee Characteristics

1. Loss. The refugees have suffered the loss of all that is familiar and most dear to them. Consequently, it can be expected that they may be in a state resembling mourning and be more preoccupied with the past and what they have lost than they are with the pressing needs of their present circumstances.
2. Disorientation. The refugees have crossed not just national borders, but cultural boundaries as well. Ways of doing things and ways of communicating are different at a time when communicating and getting things done is extremely important. If refugees fail to retain a sense of efficacy through their own initial efforts they are more likely to become passive and let those with power decide what needs to be done and how it will be accomplished.
3. Incapacitated. Refugees arrive with a minimal amount of what are considered to be the basic material necessities of life. Thus, they must be cared for.
4. Disorganized. With some exceptions, refugees do not live as socially intact groups. Thus, in addition to the provision of a material infrastructure, hosts and service providers to refugee populations often find it is necessary to organize the refugee's social structure as well.

B) Camp Administration Characteristics

3. Present and future perspective. Camp administrators and service providers faced with the necessity of coping with large numbers of people for whom the basics of life must be provided as soon as possible will be intensely present oriented as they concentrate on the tasks that must be accomplished on a day-to-day basis. Beyond the immediate provision for the welfare of the refugees host governments and the multi- or bi-lateral agencies that aid them must also consider what solutions might be implemented in the future to what may be perceived as an economic, a security, or a political problem.
4. Organized. The provision of services to large numbers of people will necessitate organizing the refugee population into some kind of order that facilitates the delivery of services. Organizing labor pools, grouping the population into smaller manageable groups of service recipients and ensuring that services are provided equally to all who need them requires the establishment of a leadership structure accessible to camp administrators.

C) Camp Characteristics

7. Segregating. Refugee camps in general are created to segregate the refugees from the general population. The purposes of segregating the refugees are to facilitate the provision of services, to keep the refugees grouped until some solution is made and implemented as to their future end, not uncommonly, to avoid the adverse political consequences of large numbers of, often destitute, foreigners in the general population.
8. As, supposedly, temporary institutions constructed for housing large numbers of people, often on short notice, there is a uniformity to the housing, food, services provided, and expectations of behavior.

These factors are used in four ways to assert or explain refugee dependence.

- (1) The process of becoming a refugee involves a psychological regression, and the condition of being a refugee, "witness to nature" induces such a degree of uncertainty that initiative and decision making are fairly impossible.
- (2) In conjunction with each other. Here it is posited that the needs of the refugees operate in conjunction with the desire and ability of those who seek to aid them to create conditions necessary and sufficient for refugees to become dependent on those who help them.
- (3) By analogy to other situations characterized by similar features such as prisons and mental hospitals or.
- (4) With theories that attempt to explain human behavior as a result of experiences with similar characteristics, to assert that refugees in general, or behaviors that indicate a lack of initiative on the part of refugees, are the result of a dependent mental state.

Formations of Dependency: The Camp

The characteristics of refugees, camp administrators and the camps themselves are commonly described as having two general outcomes: 1) the actions of those who are trying to aid refugees induce dependence, and 2) the refugees who surrender control of their lives to institutions, to the individuals who work in them, or to fate, luck or whatever, because of the refugees' failure to adequately cope with the changes in their lives as a result of their decision to flee.

Descriptions of dependency as a result of the first outcome largely come from those who purport to analyze refugee camps or refugee resettlement programs. The second

factor figures were in the psychological analysis of refugees. In some instances both appear. Regardless of the specific focus of individual studies, the range of analysis in which the case point of view is expressed, as seen in the last two chapters, includes anthropology, sociology, psychology, and education. The studies specific to the PRFC come from anthropology (Krudum and Karlstad) and education (Tollenaar).

Situational and Definitional Depositions of Dependency

There appears to be a linear relationship between people in certain situations and the ascription of dependency to them, a kind of dependency that is inappropriate to their expected status as autonomous adult individuals. Defining the situation inclusively is difficult and demands the inclusion of both material and ideological characteristics. For example, refugees in camps, not as settlements or self-settled receive food, housing, and (at least minimal) medical care. Their days are organized to a greater or lesser extent by camp administrators who set the schedule for the provision of services such as food deliveries, medical clinics and instructional hours, and the dates and times of interviews that can determine the refugee's future. The same can be said, however, of military recruits, boarding school students, even college athletes on scholarship (if, as I

would argue, practice and competition performance can be comparable to an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) interview. In these cases there is also the added imposition of conformity in dress, i.e. uniforms; of deference to authority, all having clearly defined hierarchies in either rank or seniority; and no common goals, being organized into competing squads, platoons or classes. Yet there is a minimal amount of concern that these individuals become dependent as a result of these experiences and must be re-socialized when they are over. Thus it is not purely the provision of people's material needs or the structuring of their lives that causes dependence on them. What else is necessary?

The necessary and sufficient condition for ascribing dependency to refugees in refugee camps is the perception that the refugee camp is an institution on the order of Goffman's total institution. The refugee camp must be seen as a totalizing, totalizing institution in that as many aspects of the refugees' lives are determined by the needs of the institution that the refugees subsume their own needs and will under that of the institution. Further, the debilitated state of the refugees as a result of their flight, makes the domination of the institution, if not easy, at least possible.

Refugees in the DPFC were not dependent in the ways described in the preceding chapters. Yet was the DPFC a

dependency crossing institution. I will argue in the succeeding chapters that the characteristics of the refugees did not render them susceptible to a dependent state of mind. I will also argue that the PRPC was not a moralistic, totalizing institution.

In the next chapters I will explore the history and structure of the PRPC. I will attempt to describe what life was like for the refugees, and for myself during the two years I lived with refugees. I will also explore incidences of refugee initiatives and the conditions that either encouraged or allowed refugee initiative in terms of the way the PRPC actually worked. Essentially, I will seek to address the larger question of whether the refugees, the camp administration, and the camp environment can be adequately described by the characteristics listed above. Further, I will attempt to answer the questions to the degree that the PRPC, the PRPC administration and the refugees can be described by the characteristics above; were the refugees dependent, and did the PRPC constitute a dependency crossing or maintaining environment? The specific questions I seek to address are:

1. What was the PRPC? What did it do, how did it work, and why?
2. What was the response of the Vietnamese Refugee population to the PRPC? What did they do, how did they do what they did, and why?
3. What do answers to the above two questions contribute to our understanding of people experiencing dramatic changes in how they live their lives?

CHAPTER XIX
THE PRPC: HISTORY AND STRUCTURE

Introduction

This chapter provides a historical context in which to see the creation of the PRPC, the use the facility was put to and the changes that have taken place within the PRPC as an institution. This chapter also describes the PRPC during the time I conducted research there, the way it worked, and the organizational structure.

The Philippine Refugee Processing Center was created in 1975 as a response to the flow of Vietnamese refugees fleeing Vietnam on boats to destinations throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia found themselves playing unwilling hosts to thousands of Vietnamese arriving on their shores in rickety unseaworthy boats with nowhere else to go. As the number of refugees continued to increase, boats were turned and tossed away from shore, refugee boats on the open sea were passed by, and basic humanitarian efforts for ships and boats in distress at sea were ignored. People died. The solutions were not difficult to see. The Vietnamese had to be prevented from leaving Vietnam, and the Vietnamese that were already in first asylum camps throughout the region had

to go somewhere else. The creation of the PRPC was part of moving the Vietnamese somewhere else.

The original rationale for the PRPC was to relieve the refugee population pressure in first asylum countries by taking those who had been accepted for resettlement in third countries and sending them to an alternate site for the final processing required before they departed for their resettlement sites. Initially the processing concerned medical exams and clearances and identifying or finding sponsors for the refugees.

The Program

The PRPC was established in 1979 through an agreement between the UNHCR and the government of the Philippines. Construction of the first of what became three phases was completed early in 1980 and the first refugees arrived from Malaysia on January 30, 1980. The specific stated purpose of the PRPC as contained in the agreement between the UNHCR and the Philippines was as follows:

Besides care and maintenance of the refugees the PRPC will allow the following activities:

- (1) Processing of travel papers and related resettlement documents
- (2) Orientation of the refugees in relation to their resettlement in another country.

According to the UNHCR the physical facilities consisted of:

refugee accommodations in barracks, living quarters for staff, schools, dispensaries, a sewage treatment plant, a water and power supply system, stores, market facilities and other infrastructure (UNHCR 1979).

Phase I involved the construction of the initial refugee and staff accommodation and was designed to house 10,000 refugees. Phase II, which consisted of more refugee housing and schoolrooms, was designed to hold another 7,000 refugees and was completed in 1961. The initial construction cost of the PRPC was approximately 10 million dollars (UNHCR, 1979:123). The construction and operation of the PRPC was the responsibility of the Philippine government which created a special task force that was headed by the Minister for Home Settlements, Inside Marcos.

Construction of the PRPC began in December 1959, and the first group of refugees arrived in late January 1960. They were transferred from a transit camp on Tern Island in the Philippines. By the end of 1960 the second phase of construction was completed, and the PRPC could accommodate 17,000 refugees.

From the beginning, as described in the agreement between the UNHCR and the Philippine Government, the PRPC was to be a multi-purpose institution. Within the first year of operation the International Catholic Migration Commission had reestablished a three month language training program for U.S. bound refugees. This program was later expanded to four and then six months and included training

in language, cultural orientation, and employment skills as part of the processing.

Changes in the Role of the PRPC

Over time, the role of the PRPC as a training center over time has become as important as its role as a processing center. In 1981 the PRPC began processing Orderly Departure Program (ODP) cases from Vietnam. ODP cases were essentially migrants; they left Vietnam with visas to the U.S. To be accepted, ODP migrants had to complete almost all of their processing in Vietnam or in the ODP transit center in Bangkok, Thailand. Most importantly they had to have sponsors to be accepted. Finding and securing sponsors was one of the most important and time consuming aspects of processing refugees and the major reason they had to spend so much time in refugee camps after they had been accepted by a third country. Until the passage of the American Homecoming Act in 1987, when American ODP cases were accepted, all ODP migrants had to have sponsors in the U.S. before they could be accepted. In 1988 the PRPC's role was changed to accommodate the processing of American ODP immigrants, and in 1988 to serve as a camp of second asylum for Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong awaiting acceptance for resettlement. More recently, in 1991, the PRPC was being considered as an interim site

and evacuees from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo seeking resettlement.

Changes in the use made of the PRPC led to changes in the population the PRPC served. Initially the PRPC accommodated refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Within these groups there was also a great deal of variety. Among the refugees from Vietnam were ethnic-Vietnamese, Chinese-Vietnamese, and refugees from the hill tribes in Vietnam such as the Montagnards. Among the Lao were Highland, primarily Hmong, and lowland Lao. Among the Khmer were refugees from Cambodia itself and Khmer-atom from Southern Vietnam, who still considered themselves ethnically Khmer.

Throughout the 1980s changes took place in the policies of some first asylum countries and the resettlement countries concerning who would be considered a refugee and could be considered and/or accepted for resettlement. These changes affected who would come to the PRPC. The result was a decline in the diversity of the population such that by late 1988 the camp accommodated only Vietnamese.

As the role of the camp changed from that of essentially a holding transit camp for the overflow from first asylum camps to a training center for refugees bound for the U.S., the role of the voluntary agencies within the camp changed as well. The investment in the U.S. bound refugees increased as the size and importance of the

voluntary agencies that carried out the training increased. Consequently, the role they played in the camp increased as well.

The PRPC was also affected by changes in the Philippines, most notably the 1986 overthrow of the Marcos regime. With the removal of Marcos the military lost some of its power and influence. As a result the PRPC experienced internal changes in management, moving from a military to a civilian administration. The fall of Marcos also put an end to the Nukon nuclear power plant, the only other major employer in the area. The Philippines has also been in a long term economic decline. This factor coupled with the closing of the nuclear power plant has affected the camp through an increase in the informal economy that operated on the periphery of the camp.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRPC

The structure of the PRPC was both formal and informal. The formal structure consisted of the activities and organization of PRPC administration, the village operating within the center and the formal organized activities among the refugees. Informally, the center supported an active informal economy that operated outside the purview of, but with the acquiescence of, the center's administration.

The formal organizational structure of the PRPC was a result of a division of labor and responsibility in

fulfilling the various missions of the center. As the implementing agency under the Philippine government, the PRPC administration was responsible for the provision of basic services such as food, housing, water, medical services, community organization and security. Resettlement and medical processing, education, training, recreation and mental health services were the responsibility of various voluntary agencies (volags) operating in the camp (see Figure 1). While the PRPC administration was technically in charge of the center and responsible for overseeing the volags, its power was actually somewhat limited. The fact that the PRPC administration had to rely on the UNHCR for funding while the volags were either governmental or self-funded, often at higher levels, restricted the options of the administration and at the same time gave the volags some independence.

The PRPC administration

The PRPC administration was organized in groups under the Deputy Administrator's Office. The Deputy Administrator was the full time administrator of the camp. The administrator was responsible for both the PRPC and the Philippine Refugee Transit Center in Manila, and spent as much time in Manila as in the PRPC. When the camp first opened there were seven groups. This number was reduced to four when the camp management became civilian during 1980-

1948. There was the Health Services Group (HSG), the Electrical and Maintenance Group (EMG), the Food Services Group (FSG) and the Processing and Community Organization and Social Services Group (PSCOSS). In 1948 the FSG and PSCOSS were merged under one director into the Food Services and Community Administration Group (FSCAG).

The HSG was responsible for the running of the hospital and clinics throughout the camp. The EMG was responsible for the physical infrastructure including the electrical and water distribution systems, the physical maintenance of the buildings, sanitation, roads, maintenance of vehicles, etc... The FSG was responsible for the acquisition and distribution of food. Within the PSCOSS there were two divisions, one in charge of processing the refugees into and out of the camp and maintaining records. The other division was responsible for the refugee living areas, the neighborhoods.

PSCOSS. PSCOSS, as the division of the PRPC administration that supervised the refugee living areas, was the division most intensely involved with the refugees. The refugee living areas were divided into two neighborhoods. There were six neighborhoods in Phase I and four in Phase II. The two Phases were separated by the Administrative core and by the staff living area.

Within PSCOSS there were two divisions. One was responsible for processing the refugees into and out of the

PRPC and maintaining records. The other was responsible for community organization and social services (COSS). Within the COSS division there was an assistant director, a Community Organization and Administration Officer (COAO) supervisor, ten COAOs, and separate officers to coordinate social/cultural affairs and livelihood projects on a camp-wide basis. Each neighborhood had a Community Administration and Organization Officer (CAOO) assigned to it. The CAOOs worked with the elected neighborhood council to coordinate the activities within the neighborhood and handle the administrative details required for the care and maintenance of up to 1400 people.

The organization of the refugee neighborhoods was based on, and similar to, the way local government was organized throughout the Philippines. Municipalities in the Philippines are organized into barangays. Each barangay has a leader and a council. The organization is duplicated at the level of the municipality with a mayor and a council. The councilmen had general responsibilities when functioning as a council, but they also had specific individual duties such as consultation or peace and order. Within the PRPC the ten refugee neighborhoods were like ten barangays within the municipality of the PRPC. Each neighborhood had an elected council consisting of a leader, an assistant leader and leaders for milling, peace and order, food and sanitation. In addition there were appointed leaders for

information, training, women's affairs, socio-cultural, livelihood and a councillor. There was also an Inter-Neighborhood Council (INC) made up of elected ethnic chairmen (e.g. Vietnamese, Lao, Khmer) three deputy chairmen and three appointed leaders (for peace and order, health and food), three training coordinators, and three information coordinators.

The organization of the refugees into an inter-neighborhood council and neighborhood councils was known as the Community Based Structure (CBS). The logic behind the CBS as described by the BEPC administration is given below.

The refugee community is viewed as potential participants and consequently partners of the BEPC administration and the village in providing programs and services to refugees. Rather than passive beneficiaries, they are viewed as an active group that will contribute to the actual development and management of programs for refugees. (BEPC Information and Materials Production Section, 1988)

This view of the refugees for the most part reflected reality. The CBS operated primarily as a partner in the cooperative operation of the BEPC. Though the CBS had some supervisory role over the neighborhood councils, primarily in dealing with administrative details, they carried out their duties by eliciting the cooperation of the refugee leaders. The refugee leaders in turn had a considerable degree of independence and responsibility in their decision making.

The main functions of the C&S were the provision of basic services to the refugees such as mail, food distribution, security, sanitation, and organizing socio-cultural activities and programs. Mail distribution, for example, was one of the most important activities in the camp from the refugee point of view. Mail meant more than money; it also meant money.

There were two kinds of mail, regular mail and registered. The registered letters almost always contained money that had been sent to the refugees from relatives or friends who were already in third countries. The regular mail was delivered to the neighborhood offices for distribution. The registered letters had to be posted up at the center's post office by the neighborhood mailing leaders. They had to check each piece against a list that was prepared at the post office to make sure it was all there. They kept a duplicate of this list to take back to the neighborhood office where they made up a list to post and call slips to tell people to come to the neighborhood office to pick up their registered letters. When people came to pick up their letters they had to sign for them and show I.D. to prove they were who they said they were. The possibilities for fraud or theft existed at all points along the line. Once the mail was released from inside the camp post office, however, it was the refugees who were responsible for delivery. They even had to pay their own

transportation costs to the post office to pick up the registered letters.

One of the major complaints of the mailing leaders in the neighborhoods in Phase I was the cost of going to and from the post office to pick up the registered mail. They would not walk for fear of theft and for the same reason, plus the desire for a witness to their journey, they would take an assistant. The cost for the mailing leader and an assistant to and from the post office was four pesos. They had to make the trip twice a week, making the cost of doing their jobs eight pesos a week (about 40 cents U.S. in 1949), not an excessive amount of money but enough to irritate them. By 1951, however, the transportation price had doubled to two pesos per person one way. The mailing leaders still had to pay.

This is just one example of the independence and initiative that the refugees demonstrated in carrying out their duties and fulfilling their responsibilities as neighborhood leaders. There are many others, some of which will be discussed later.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

The UNHCR was, according to the agreement between the Czech and the Philippine government, a Czech institution. In fact the way the camp was organized and the way it ran on a day to day basis had very little to do with the UNHCR.

There were long periods during the time I conducted research in the PRPC when there was no UNHCR representative assigned to, or present in, the camp. This was largely because there was little for the UNHCR to do. The UNHCR's main purpose is to secure protection for refugees and ensure that they are provided with the basic necessities of life. The residents of the PRPC, having been granted both refugee status and acceptance for resettlement, had relatively secure status. The UNHCR did determine, according to the agreement with the Philippine government, whether the refugees' "care and maintenance" were adequate. The UNHCR decided what the food rations would be both in total calories and in composition, i.e. the proportion made up of meat, carbohydrates, and vegetables. (Reyesco, 1981). The UNHCR also monitored the physical infrastructure of the camp, the quality of housing, water supply, and sanitation. For the most part, however, the UNHCR maintained a hands-off approach to the PRPC.

The voluntary agencies

The voluntary agencies (volags) operating in the camp provided services ranging from supplemental nutrition, medical and health care, and social services to education and training. The tasks and responsibilities of the volags are given below.

International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC).

The ICMC was responsible for English as a Second Language

(EIL) instruction, cultural orientation (CO) to the U.S., and Work Orientation (WO) to the American workplace. IOWC was the largest wing, actually the largest agency, in the camp, employing well over a thousand people. Every refugee between the ages of 11 1/2 and 18 passed through the IOWC program. Refugees went through the program in cycles that began every two to three weeks. The cycles began with EIL and CO. Students had EIL four days a week and CO for two days a week, for four hours a day. EIL and CO lasted for 18 weeks and WO, the last part of the IOWC curriculum, for six weeks. If refugees did not attend the IOWC classes they could not go to the U.S. More than three unexcused absences had to be made up in the following cycle. Refugees who missed too many classes were "recycled" back to the next cycle and their departure to the U.S. was delayed. After they made up the missed classes they could be cleared for departure. Refugees were grouped according to age and EIL ability levels. Beginning with level A, illiterate in native language and knowing no English, there were five levels. The highest was level X and XT, indicating fluency in English as well as their native language. IOWC utilized refugees in its program who were fluent in their native language and English as Assistant Teachers (ATs) to interpret for some classes. All IOWC classes were in English. The age grouping was based on what the refugees would need to know in the U.S. Refugees aged 11 1/2 to 18

were in the Preparation for American Secondary Schools (PASS) program. The PASS program was designed to introduce refugee adolescents to American secondary schools, which they would be attending in the U.S., as well as being an IIR program. The next group was the Young Adults, then adults and older people; these were in received instruction in the program run by the Bureau.

Relative to the size of the other agencies in the camp, IOMC was large. They occupied more office space than any other agency and more living space than any other group except for the refugees themselves. They also had more vehicles than any agency, the PRPC administration included. In essence, IOMC was the best funded agency in the camp. IOMC had a contract with the U.S. State Department to carry out its activities and the State Department was interested in the refugees learning English before they came to the U.S. Because of its size, the impact of the IOMC program on the camp was significant. However, the impact was limited to the instructional reports of the refugee lives and to the economic contribution its employees made to the local economy. IOMC, for all of its size and funding did not run the camp. This is an important point to make at this time, as I continue to present the structure of the PRPC, and it will be equally important later when I discuss the refugees' responses to the PRPC and present some alternative views of the PRPC by other researchers.

World Relief Corporation (WRC). WRC was another State Department funded agency involved in instruction. WRC was responsible for the Preparing Refugees for Elementary Program (PREP). Refugee children aged 4-11 went to the PREP program for ESL and academic instruction. WRC also staffed eight neighborhood clinics, a dispensary, and provided pre- and post-natal health care classes.

Advocate Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). ADRA provided nutritional supplemental feeding to malnourished children and an eight-week nutrition class to all new refugee mothers. They also conducted a child nutrition monitoring program weighing all children between the ages of 4 and 11 bi-monthly.

Center for Assistance to Displaced Persons (CADP). CADP provided material assistance to impoverished refugees, especially those who had very few clothes at the time of their departure. CADP also ran the only licensed money changing office in the camp, though there were several illegal money changers who operated door-to-door or in the markets. In 1983 CADP took over the child-care program for children two to three years old, and the nurseries for babies while their mothers attended classes, from CARITAS, a Catholic charity based in the Philippines. They also had a tracing and mailing program that was very useful for finding people in other first asylum camps, especially Palawan, the

first refugee camp in the Philippines, where they ran several programs.

Community Family Services International (CFSI). CFSI, formerly Community Mental Health Services (CMHS) was the psychological counseling wing. CFSI employed psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as training refugees to be para-professionals in crisis intervention. They were responsible for counseling and treating any refugees with mental health problems. Sometime in 1980 they also took on the responsibility of evaluating psychiatric cases for the State Department. Of all of the wings in the camp the role of CFSI was the most undefined. The activities they were involved in ranged from checking psychotic refugees around the camp, to making decisions about whether parents and children should go to the U.S. together and to the same place, to intervening on behalf of several refugees who had been charged with crimes and needed legal as well as mental-health guidance. Their funding also made them largely independent since it came primarily from the Norwegian government.

Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV). The Japanese gave a lot of money for the construction of a drain on one side of the camp that kept the valley below from flooding. They also provided funds for hospital equipment and for a training program run by the camp for a short time. As a result of the money they gave for the training program

the PRPC administration had two large houses. Every year the Japanese also sent a couple of volunteers to work in the hospital.

Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA). JVA was the organization that represented the U.S.-based resettlement agencies. When the refugee flows first began, each U.S. resettlement agency had their own representatives in the various first asylum camps. It did not take them long to realize that this was an expensive duplication of effort, and the JVA was born. JVA was the agency that interviewed refugees in the first asylum camps and prepared their cases for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which had to approve all refugee admissions. In the PRPC the JVA was the link between the refugees and the resettlement agencies in the U.S. They followed the refugee cases from the first asylum camps to the PRPC and handled any problems that arose that applied to the refugees' resettlement. When the refugees arrived in the PRPC they notified the Refugee Information Center in New York, which distributed the refugee cases to the various U.S. resettlement agencies. If the refugees had relatives already in the U.S. who were willing to sponsor them, those relatives were contacted and sponsorship agreements were secured. If the refugees had no relatives or anyone else who was willing to sponsor them, then sponsors were found by the agencies. Because JVA personnel were among the first to interview the refugees in the first asylum camps, and then

the first people the refugees met who were interested specifically in helping the refugees resettle, the status of JVA was rather exalted. The refugees assumed that JVA could do anything they wanted for the refugees.

International Commission for European Migration (ICEM). This agency was formerly the International Commission for European Migration (ICEM) which became ICE when they dropped the European limitation. Why they switched from a commission to an organization I do not know. ICE was responsible for moving the refugees. They moved them to the east from the first refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, etc., and the ICE migrants to the Philippines from Vietnam. They were also responsible for the medical processing of the refugees, which meant ensuring that the refugees met the medical requirements for entrance into their resettlement country. This meant giving vaccinations and checking for infectious-communicable diseases, primarily Tuberculosis.

Women Christian Services (WCS). WCS was responsible for ECE and orientation training for refugees over 18 years old. They also had special classes for handicapped refugees. All the workers were women.

Philippine Baptist Refugee Ministries (PBRM). The Baptists ran a program that gave refugees training in home making, auto mechanics, driving, typing and house construction. The Baptists also ran the two Evangelical-Christian churches. The Baptists operated entirely

independently, receiving no funding from any governments or agencies. The man who ran the Baptist program was a Vietnam veteran who spoke excellent Vietnamese and was probably the most knowledgeable uncommitted person in the camp.

Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). The PNRC ran some neighborhood clinics, a sewing and mending service, gave anti-malaria prophylaxis, post-partum classes, carried out home visits, and gave first aid classes.

Norwegian Government Refugee Agency (NGRA). NGRA ran a language and cultural orientation program for Norwegian bound refugees. They were the only other government besides the U.S. to run such a program in the camp. The program had about 40-100 refugees at a time.

These were the volags. The volag's operations were nominally under the supervision of the PRPC administration. Because their funding sources were independent of the PRPC and the UNHCR and they were accountable not just to the PRPC and the UNHCR but to their own administrative superiors in the U.S. or Europe, the volags operated semi-autonomously. The result was a relationship between the PRPC administration, the UNHCR, and the volags that was more cooperative than hierarchical.

Administrative Friction and Conflict

There were problems that arose between the volags, the administration and the UNHCR. These problems, however,

occurred when the lines between the tasks of the administration, the village and the UNHCR were not clearly defined. The areas in which there was the most friction were in providing social services to the refugees and factors that caused delays in the refugee's departure.

The administration and the UNHCR

By the time the refugees got to the PRRC the role of the UNHCR in their lives had diminished. The refugees belonged to the country that had accepted them for resettlement and to the PRRC for the time they were there. The UNHCR's main role was to monitor the running of the camp according to the agreement with the Philippine government. In essence, this meant ensuring the provision of basic services. The UNHCR, however, was still responsible for protecting the refugees. In a sense the refugees were still charges of the UNHCR. Since security within the camp was the responsibility of the PRRC and security around the perimeter of the camp was the responsibility of the Philippine Constabulary the only time the UNHCR might become involved in a protection issue was when a refugee had a problem with the camp administration. In this area the UNHCR was noticeably lax. This laxity was largely due to the lack of a UNHCR field officer in the camp during most of my stay. It was also due to the presence of the village as alternative intercessionaries.

In some cases, where refugees were charged with criminal offenses, legal counsel was required. The UNHCR secured legal assistance through the Philippine Ministry of Justice, obtaining a public defender for the refugees. In one instance I followed a case, actually cases, from the time the incident occurred through the trials of most of the refugees involved to the conclusion.

The case involved refugees charged with a range of crimes that resulted from a riot that took place in the camp in November 1985. At the time of the riot the UNHCR was represented in the camp by an acting field officer who was actually working for an agency subcontracted by the UNHCR, and he spent half of his time doing computer work for that agency; when the administration brought charges against some of the refugees, he organized a meeting with the refugees and a public defender from the nearest provincial capital in Bulacan. He also tele. he informed us, against the instructions of the UNHCR office in Manila. The UNHCR had instructed him to interview the refugees charged, write a report and take no further action. Once the UNHCR office in Manila found out about what he had done, they recalled him to Manila and subsequently removed him, leaving the UNHCR office in the PRPC without any staff.

In this case the UNHCR opted out of any involvement with the refugees charged with crimes by the camp administration. The mental health volap, Community Family

Services International (CPSI), agreed to act as the intermediary between the refugees, the lawyer, and the administration and to coordinate the meetings with the lawyer and the refugees. This arrangement seemed to be to everyone's satisfaction. The UNHCR office remained without staff for several months after this.

The JVA, REFUGES, the Administration and the UNHCR

According to the agreement between the Philippines and the UNHCR, the Philippines would not grant resettlement to the refugees. The Philippines would offer asylum and a visa for processing refugees who would be resettling elsewhere only. Refugees who came to the PRPC had to have been accepted for resettlement by a third country, primarily the U.S. While the refugees were in the PRPC, however, they were still technically refugees and thus the responsibility of the UNHCR. If a refugee committed a crime or violated enough rules the resettlement country could still reject them in the PRPC. When this happened the refugee became the UNHCR's problem. The UNHCR had to try to find another country that would accept the refugee for resettlement. These refugees were known as "internationalized" persons, once again belonging nowhere. These people stayed in the PRPC and they were not transferred to the Philippine First Asylum Camp (PFAC) in Palawan.

The internationalization of accepted refugees was an issue of contention between the U.S. resettlement agencies (JVS, SERCOMAS, the IAC), the UNHCR and the camp administration. Because of the possibility of refugees being internationalized, the camp administration rarely opted for prosecuting refugees for criminal offenses. The case of the refugees allegedly involved in the riot was unique because the camp administration wanted to charge as many refugees as possible with criminal offenses. The riot case was unique in another way in that most of the refugees charged were American GDF cases. American GDFs were not refugees but immigrants. They left Vietnam with visas to the U.S.. There was a serious question as to whether an American GDF could be internationalized. If an American's visa was revoked the options appeared to be repatriation back to Vietnam or acceptance by the UNHCR as a refugee who would then have to find a new resettlement country. It was through investigating the aftermath of the riot and the consequences for the refugees that I discovered where general policies failed to address the exceptional cases. It was in areas where the policy was not clear or applicable, or where policies conflicted, such as maintaining order in the camp versus moving the refugees on to third countries, that issues arose between the various agencies working in the camp.

Mental Health and Counseling Services

There were four agencies operating in the camp, exclusive of religious agencies, that had forced programs providing psychological or family counseling or that were involved in some way in resolving conflicts between refugees. The neighborhood committees considered themselves capable counselors, and being on the front line working in the refugee neighborhoods, were often the first non-refugees confronted with the problems of refugee conflicts. Their involvement was either direct, by taking action themselves or indirect, by advising the neighborhood leaders. There was a mental health unit, CMH, whose specific mission in the camp was psychological or psychiatric treatment. ICRC had a program to assist young adults, 18-25 years old, and they also had guidance counselors for students in the Preparation for American Secondary School (PASS) program. In 1980 World Vision gave a large sum of money to initiate the Young Adult Services Program (YASP). This was a continuation recreation program and social services program. They built two large gymnasium-type buildings with facilities for basketball, volleyball, weight training, dancing, martial arts, etc... They also provided a whole range of activities for the general young adult population including taking problem individuals referred to them from ICRC or CMH for special treatment.

Readiness to say there was some overlap, some territoriality, and some conflict as to what agency was supposed to do what and who should be consulted when decisions were made. For example, CPFI often received referrals from JVA when individuals had problems with their families and wanted to split their case, i.e. go to the U.S. separately from their family. Before JVA would consider splitting a case they wanted an evaluation from CPFI. CPFI then became involved in family-level interventions. The CPFI case workers often wanted to separate the conflicting family members by transferring someone to a new billet. All billet transfers had to go through PROCORD to the neighborhood COACE involved. CPFI would request the transfers but was hesitant about not explaining the reason for the request, citing client confidentiality. The COACs felt that this was usurping their authority, were somewhat resentful that they were not treated by CPFI, and often not cooperative. Sometimes the transfers were approved; sometimes they were not. This situation was further exacerbated by the way CPFI worked in contrast to the way the COACs worked. The CPFI case-workers always worked out of their offices, they did not make neighborhood visits, the COACs were in the neighborhoods, dealing with the refugees on their own and the Tzafana's Territory. It was their responsibility to know what was going on in their neighborhoods, and they did not appreciate what they

considered to be meddling by people who never went to the neighborhoods.

Territoriality went beyond the neighborhoods. The YAPF was originally conceived as a joint program involving World Vision as the funding agency, World Relief Corporation (WRC) as the on-site funding manager, ICRC, and PROCCSS. The director of the YAPF was originally paid by both World Vision through WRC and by ICRC, each agency paying half of his salary. PROCCSS was also originally supposed to participate in the management of the YAPF, but conflicts arose over how decisions would be made. PROCCSS finally abandoned a role in the YAPF and, initially, any support and cooperation in the neighborhoods. The YAPF director got around this initial barrier to the neighborhoods by staging a martial arts demonstration in cooperation with the refugee ISC in which many of the martial arts participants/demonstrators were DRC or neighborhood leaders.

Another factor that contributed to the overlap in providing refugee social services was the disparity in resources available to the various agencies involved. YAPF had the best physical facilities for recreational programs. Both CPFI and ICRC had bilingual personnel. Vietnamese-Americans, working as counselors or case-workers. ICRC had bilingual case-workers in its Young Adult Services Unit (YASU) and at DRC. PROCCSS had no bilingual personnel on their staff. The only bilingual personnel PROCCSS had

access to were bilingual refugees who served as translators. Even here PROCORD got last pick of the bilingual refugees after both OPHI and IOM had recruited from the new arrivals.

The Local Community

The local Filipino community interacted with the camp at several different levels. Some of these levels were formal, and some were informal.

The Formal Sector

At the formal level the camp provided employment to local people in several ways. First there were employment opportunities with the administration and the village. Most of the administrative, management, and instructional positions were filled by Filipinos or expatriates who were not local people. This was partly due to the fact that the headquarters of the administration and most of the village was in Manila, and interviews and hiring of skilled people took place there. It was also due to the level of skills or education required to fill these positions. Local Filipinos filled most of the unskilled and clerical positions. There were even policies that gave hiring preference to local residents in certain job categories. I encountered one long-time Marikina resident who had been replaced in a clerical position by someone who, according to my informant, had not resided in Marikina the required two years to be

eligible for the position. This man was pursuing his case with the volog and eventually got a position with another agency.

There were also policies that discriminated against hiring local people. For instance, in instruction, owing to the higher salaries paid by the vologs over what a local teacher could make in the Philippine public school system, the vologs would not hire local teachers to prevent a drain on the local schools.

Outside of forced employment with one of the agencies in the camp there were other opportunities in the forced sector for employment. There were two markets in the camp in which local people rested stable or spare. The size of the camp and the distance from the local town of Marung also made a taxi service, in the form of motorcycles with sidecars-motorcycles and jeepneys, economically viable. This service also provided income to local people. Another, though indirect, source of income for the local community was the renting of housing in Marung to employees of the camp. For some people living in Marung was preferable to living in the dormitory-style housing provided in the camp. For others with families, there was not enough family-style housing in the camp to accommodate them, and they had to rent houses in Marung.

The Informal Sector. The informal sector was dominated by economic relations between the refugees and local

Filipinos. On the periphery of the camp were squatter settlements. People had set up residence on land ostensibly owned and controlled by the camp. These people ran businesses on the periphery as well as selling goods door to door within the camp. The mainstay of this informal economy, while I was in the camp, was the buying and selling of alcohol. According to the center's regulations refugees were prohibited from drinking alcohol. This regulation provided the basis for an illicit trade between the refugees and the local community. This was possible because there was no fence around the camp and access to the camp was not controlled. There were rules and regulations governing who could be admitted to the camp, who could be given visitors passes, and how long they could stay. In reality, however, these regulations were largely irrelevant. The only place that there even exhibited the appearance of controlled access was the front gate. There was only one road leading into the camp. At the border of the camp on this road was a guard post with a bar across the road which could be lifted to admit vehicles. Throughout the rest of the perimeter of the camp anyone could walk in or out of the camp unimpeded. Even at the front gate control over access was more appearance than reality. There was too much traffic to and from the agencies, the markets, and the staff living in the camp for anyone to have some sort of pass. Every morning jeeps were loaded with produce, vendors, and their various

family members would enter the camp bound for the markets. The raising of the gate was more a formality determining when the market vendors could start work than a formal boundary to be crossed.

Thus the local liquor vendors had both a market and access to the market. The supply was also available through the businesses on the camp periphery. In Neighborhood Eleven, the colloquial term for the squatter settlement on the south east end of the camp, there was a combination video-beer hall and warehouse. It was a large wooden structure with a thatch roof. Half of the structure was a large covered area, without walls, with rows of benches and a large television at one end. The other half of the building was an enclosed room filled almost to the roof with cases of beer. In the evenings and on weekends refugees could take a short walk to Neighborhood Eleven and watch videos and drink beer. From where I lived at the end of Neighborhood Nine once a week I could see the San Miguel or the Asis Beer delivery trucks making deliveries there on their way into the camp to make deliveries to the camp canteen and quatermen. The trade, though against the camp rules, was no secret. There was a major beer distribution point next to the food distribution building in neighborhood nine. Filipinos would carry in beer purchased in shoulder bags to this point and from there would take orders from refugees and make deliveries to individual billets. One of

the interesting ironies of the delivery system was that the Filipinos would make their deliveries of one or two quart bottles of beer carrying them in small PEEP school bags that had been supplied to the refugees by WHF. During some periods when the enforcement of the liquor ban rule was particularly lax, Filipinos would go through the neighborhoods carrying the little PEEP school bags calling out "Beer, Beer!" At infrequent intervals the camp security would stage a raid on the distribution point in neighborhood nine and round up the beer sellers and confiscate their supplies. The confiscation of their liquor was the only penalty, since selling beer was not a criminal offense in the Philippines, and the liquor vendors would be taken out of the camp. After witnessing one of these raids I went home and watched the very people who had just had their stock confiscated and been deposited outside of the gate once took into the camp via Neighborhood Eleven, not more than thirty minutes later and head right back to their distribution point and begin business again. While confiscating the liquor supply was not a deterrent, it did have a cost to the Filipinos. The beer sellers took the beer as merchandise and paid for it with the profits of the sale to the refugees. They could buy a quart bottle of beer for around twelve pesos and sell it for fifteen pesos. A profit of three pesos was not a lot, about fifteen cents U.S. "Wine," as the refugees called rum and whiskey, cost

were. When their supplies were confiscated the beer sellers were still liable for the beer that had been confiscated and had to pay their supplier.

Beer and liquor were not the only goods that were sold informally to the refugees. Filipinos would travel through the neighborhoods selling everything from vegetables, to cooking or lighting oil, to giant lizards, to snake (pretty good with a nice hot sauce!). The currency in these transactions was not always money either. Rice was one of the mainstays of the economic transactions between the refugees and the Filipino vendors. The oil vendors on their rounds would call out "re-hoy, tangpa rice." "re-hoy" was their approximation of the Vietnamese word for oil. They would trade 750 ml. of oil for either seven pesos or a kilo of rice.

The selling of beer and liquor was not the only open illicit activity that took place between the local Filipinos and the refugees. There was a group of ambulant money changers who would travel through the neighborhoods or hang out at the markets or port office and change money illegally. This activity flourished not because of any camp regulations but because of the policy of the only legal money-changing agency, CACF, in the camp. CACF had a license from the Central Bank to change money in the PRPC. They had a policy, however, that they would not change money in the form of checks or money orders for any refugees whose

cycle would end, and thus their departure from the camp, was within three months. This meant that a refugee whose stay in the camp was usually about seven to eight months could only change money in the form of checks or money orders through the CACF for the first five months of their stay. Most of the money that came to the refugees from overseas came in the form of checks or money orders. Cash was always acceptable but rarely made it through the mail to the camp, and in fact was rarely sent. The exilant money changers, because they were operating through a local bank, were willing to change checks and money orders past the point that CACF would, for a few extra points on the exchange rate. The exilant changers were also available at times when CACF was closed. They were also more convenient geographically. At times when there was a lot of registered mail and the refugees received a lot of money there might be a long line outside the CACF money-changing offices. CACF was also closed on Saturdays and Sundays and in the evenings. The money changers were, unlike the bear sellers, committing a criminal offense. As it was explained to me, however, their offense was against the Central Bank and the law could only be enforced by officials from the Central Bank, not the camp security office or local law enforcement officers.

The interdependence between the refugees and the rilligence operating internally was not always based on the

Filipino's ability to supply what the refugees could not get. One of the incentives for the Filipinos to live near the camp was what the camp could supply to them. Every morning Filipinos from the surrounding communities would go through the camp selling "Cau-bee," which was Vietnamese for "porridge." They would go behind the billets looking for leftover food that the refugees would often leave out behind their billets. The Filipinos would collect the leftover food and feed it to their pigs and chickens. By recycling the leftover food from the refugees the Filipinos could raise their pigs and chickens essentially for free. A live chicken sold in the camp market could bring 10 to 15 pesos and a cut-up chicken could bring 15 pesos. One of the people I knew living in Neighborhood Eleven who would collect the leftover refugee food to feed his pigs told me that when the pigs were full grown he could sell them to one of the vendors in the market for 400 pesos.

Besides rice, now and then, the refugees traded fish to the local Filipinos. The type of fish issued to the refugees, called bangus, caused an allergic reaction -- or was thought to cause an allergic reaction -- in Vietnamese. Many of the Vietnamese could not eat the bangus but would sell it to Filipinos who would show up around the billets at food distribution time on the days that it was issued.

The refugees also contributed directly to the local community by giving to beggars. When I first began living

in a billet, in 1988, there were five beggars who would come by about once a week. One was an old man and the other a blind woman accompanied by her daughter. By the time I finished my research, in 1990, and left the billet there were times when one or two beggars would come by the billet every day. Contributions by the refugees I lived with varied. One man I lived with would give a cup of rice to any beggar who came by. Other people would give some rice sometimes; some would never give anything.

In all of these interactions between the refugees and local community from the illicit trade in alcohol and money-changing to the informal sale door-to-door of a whole range of goods to the refugees sale of their limited food supplies and giving to beggars, the camp's presence provided an opportunity, not control. The interactions between the refugees and local community were interpersonal, not institutional. The basis for these interactions were the individual decisions of the refugees and Filipinos involving their own assessment of the benefits and costs of any transaction. Fate of these transactions was a matter of life and death, at least not for the refugees who were in any respects better off than any of the rural Filipinos, or the result of coercion by the camp administration or the village. Many of the refugees who had little or no money lived adequately on what the camp supplied, they were not forced into trade with the local community because of unmet

basic needs. They chose to do so, providing an opportunity to the local community.

Conclusion

The PRPC was not a typical institution. There was no single purpose, no simple set of insulate rules or policies rigidly enforced. As an artificial community, producing nothing and self-sufficient in nothing, the PRPC depended on external sources of support. From the refugees to the most well endowed village, everyone depended to some degree on support from outside the PRPC. All of these sources of external support were independent of each other, thus granting a measure of independence to the agencies operating within the camp, the PRPC administration and the UNHCR included.

There was no clear hierarchy in the PRPC. The agency with the most power -- technically -- the PRPC administration, was the most impoverished. The two agencies that the refugees had the most respect for, JVA and the UNHCR, had the smallest full-time staffs of all the agencies. JVA had one full-time officer in the camp. The UNHCR alternated from having one full-time officer to having a part-time subcontracted employee to having no one at all. Even the refugees could not be said to form the bottom of some hierarchy. They had what many of the Filipino employees of the camp coveted, a place reserved in America.

They also had better living conditions than the Filipinos who lived on or near the camp periphery. The local Filipinos, however, had the freedom to come and go into and out of the camp while the refugees did not.

The primary purpose of the FRC was to provide for the basic needs of the refugees while they learned English, had their medical processing done, and waited for their resettlement processing to be completed. As essential as these purposes were, they did not go unchallenged by competing purposes at both the individual and institutional levels. Maintaining peace and order meant imposing punitive measures that almost invariably worked against the refugees completing their processing and learning English. The refugees' desires to run businesses competed with the demands of ESL classes and/or studying as well as the work credit requirement. The implicit desire for the camp to benefit the local population extended to allowing local people to sell beer and liquor to refugees who would get drunk, fight, be put in the detention center, and have their departure from the camp delayed.

The next chapter presents a more detailed look at life in the FRC through the "FRC cycle" or the refugees' transition and processing through the camp from arrival to departure and the "daily cycle" of everyday life in the camp.

CHAPTER SEVEN THIS REFUGEE LIFE

"This refugee life," as a refugee friend of mine called it, began for me in September 1948. I had arrived in the PRPC in August and began seeking permission to conduct anthropological research. One of the desires I expressed was to live in a refugee billet with refugees. Permission was granted in September and my three-year-old daughter and I moved into 8033. I remained there, except for brief periods to take trips to see camps in Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore, until July 1950. As a participant observer I was able to see what life was like for the refugees firsthand. I was able to see how they organized their day how they organized their billets, and how they lived within and got around the constraints of the PRPC as an institution. This chapter provides a context in which to place the refugees in the PRPC. This chapter is an introduction to what the camp cycle and daily life was like for the refugees. The first section outlines the camp cycle from arrival in the PRPC to departure. The second section provides a glimpse of what daily life was like.

The PRPC Life Cycle

Refugees arrived at the PRPC, they were processed and they left within seven to eight months. The events from arrival to departure constitute what could be seen as the life cycle of the refugees within the PRPC. There was also a daily cycle of events that refugees experienced. With a few exceptions, all the refugees passed through the same series of steps and experiences. The first section of this chapter details that series of events that marked a refugee's passage through the PRPC. The second chapter takes the refugees through daily life.

Arrival. Refugees arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila. They spent one night in Manila at the Philippine Refugee Transit Center in Manila (PRPC). The stay in Manila was necessary because the PRPC was a four to five hour bus ride from Manila and the flights arrived too late for the refugees to go that day to the PRPC. In the early days of the PRPC the refugees boarded buses at the airport and went directly to the PRPC. When this took place they would arrive at the PRPC and have to be processed into the camp very late at night, increasing their disorientation, causing disruptions within the billet areas when they went to their new homes and making it even more difficult for the processing personnel.

After one night in Manila the refugees boarded buses chartered by ICR and were taken to the PRPC. The bus ride

was four to five hours long through parts of Manila, open flat rice paddy, small towns, a winding mountain road passing next to the Bataan nuclear power plant, and beaches lapped by the South China Sea. They passed through the small town of Marikina on roads barely wide enough for the buses and turned onto the road to the camp. Near the end of the climbing road they could see glimpses of the sprawling camp. At the front gate was a small guard house manned by a兵 guard and some soldiers of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), the police arm of the Philippine Army. The兵 guards were under the control of the civilian administration of the RPRC, and responsible for internal security. The PC were responsible for security around the RPRC. There was also a boat, small and black, that had landed on Marikina beach bringing refugees from Vietnam.

The buses carried the refugees through the camp to the arrival/departure area between Neighborhoods One and Two. The arrival building was small, with benches and cotted sides. When the buses pulled into the parking lot they were often greeted by a large crowd of other refugees who had been waiting with friends for their departure. Departing refugees would leave on the same buses that brought new arrivals. When the new arrival buses parked, the crowd would move across the road to see who had come. Sometimes the crowd was so thick that the兵 guards had to clear a path for the new arrivals from the door of the bus to the

arrival building. A few members of the crowd were actually waiting for the new arrivals. They knew from letters that their relatives or friends were coming and were waiting to greet them. Most of the new arrivals went into the arrival building while a few of the men formed a line and unloaded the baggage. Inside the arrival building people gathered in small groups and sat on the benches or the floor. Their IDH¹ cards were gathered and taken across the road to the processing building. The cards were checked against the passenger manifest from IOB to make sure that the PRPO received everyone that IOB said was there.

While the new arrivals waited in the arrival building, camp residents would go to the sides of the building and talk with them through the spaces in the slatted wall. Much of the communication involved telling the new arrivals which house to request. If their friends or relatives lived in houses with space they would invite them to come live with them. If their house was full they would advise them to request a nearby house that the camp resident knew had room. Many of the new arrivals also had letters with the addresses of those they already knew in the PRPO. In some cases they did not know anyone there at the time but knew people who

¹ The IDH card was a card issued by the International Commission on Migration, the agency that was responsible for the movement of all of the refugees. The card had a picture of the refugee, their identification number, a label on the card identifying their country of first asylum, some other numbers, and after arrival processing, their billet number. While they were in the PRPO it was their basic identification.

had passed through and told them which neighborhoods were preferable for a variety of reasons.

After the IDB cards were finished the processing personnel called for the primary applicants² to go to the processing building for re-processing. The processing staff asked the new arrivals to line up, with those having billet requests to go first. Billet assignments were made according to the preferences of the new arrivals. For those who had no preferences (fewer than 10 percent of the new arrivals I observed being processed), the processing personnel consulted the strength report and assigned them a billet. The strength report contained a daily list of all occupied billets and the number of adults and children occupying each billet.

Following their billet assignments the new arrivals were given appointments for their initial medical screening and a three-day supply of food. The three-day supply of food assured that the new arrivals would have enough food to last until they were added to the strength report, which was also used for food distribution. The new arrivals were then able to pick up their luggage and go to their new homes.

² The primary applicant was the individual who had been granted refugee or immigrant status and accepted for resettlement. In the case of refugees it could be the father or mother and the family would be accepted with them. In the case of Aussiedlers, the Aussiedler was the primary applicant and was technically an immigrant not a refugee.

Occasionally, new arrivals were assigned to billets that were too full to accommodate them. This happened both in cases when the new arrivals had requested their billet and when they had been assigned by the processing staff. In the first case the information the new arrival had been given was wrong. Either the people they knew had left or other people had been assigned to the billet since the new arrival had contact with their friend or relative there. In the second case the usual reason was either poor recording of transfers at the neighborhood level or illegal occupants in the billet. The strength report itself was almost always accurate since any discrepancy resulted in problems with food distribution, which was quickly reported. Sometimes the occupancy problem was resolved at the neighborhood level. Usually one of the family members went back to the arrival area and received a new assignment from the processing personnel.

Settling in. The responses of new arrivals to their new homes varied greatly. During the two years I lived in a billet I had 33 different billetees. Seven of them had arrived in the PRPC before I did; the rest came to my billet as new arrivals. When I began living in VINC there were five single males already living there. Four of them came from the first asylum camp in Malaysia and one from Thailand. As they left, two other people transferred into my billet who were also from Malaysia. The initial new

arrivals to my billet were all first asylum refugees from Malaysia or Thailand who knew the refugees I had lived with when I began staying in 1968. My billetmates had written them in the first asylum camp and told them to come to my house. They were all also single males.

The first new arrivals to my billet who did not know anyone already living there were also from Malaysia and had friends already in the camp, but their friends could not accommodate them. When they arrived they were tired and surprised to find my daughter and I living in the same billet to which they had been assigned. They had few problems settling in since most of the other refugees living around us were also from Malaysia. About two days after they arrived they had a small party and invited the other occupants of the billet, a young male from Thailand and me, as well as the next door neighbors. It was a kind of get-acquainted party as well as a way to establish relationships with certain people.

Processing: The day after arrival the new residents went to the central warehouse to receive their basic household items. These included pots and pans, utensils, charcoal stoves, mosquito nets, bedding, and buckets. The refugees were responsible for these items and had to return them or pay for them before departure.

Two or three days after arrival new residents had an orientation to the JRC provided by JRC005. There was also

an orientation given by the neighborhood information leader on the workings of the neighborhood and rules and regulations of the PRPC. During the PRPC orientation the new residents were given an overview of the entire camp, where things were and which agencies carried out what tasks. During the orientation there was also a presentation by CPRI, the mental health wing, where they recruited refugees for their training programs to be peer counselors and translators. Within one or two days after arrival the new residents received call slips to go to the IDMC testing center to be tested on their language ability, both in their native language and English.

All refugees between 18 and 98 years old were tested on the written and oral language ability in both their native language and in English. The test was to place the refugees according to their language ability in classes with others of similar ability. Testing was also to identify refugees with enough English ability to serve as Assistant Teachers (ATs). ATs served as translators in some of the IDMC classes for refugees whose English language ability was too low for them to benefit from the instruction program that was in English. There were five levels in the IDMC program: Level A meant that the individual had oral, but no written ability in their native language and no English ability. Level B meant the refugee had oral and written ability in their native language but no English ability. Levels C

through 8 meant the refugees had increasing English ability, beginning with some English at Level C to relative proficiency at level B. Not all refugees who tested high in English language proficiency became AAs. ICRC recruited AAs with incentives. AAs got trips to Mexico; they had their own program with advanced classes, a library, movies, GED, SAT and computer classes; and being an AA was their work credit assignment as well.

Approximately one week after arrival the refugees had an interview with JVA. The purpose of the initial interview in the PRPC was to make sure the data the JVA had on the refugee was accurate and complete. The process of securing sponsorships for the refugees took place, for the most part, while the refugees were in the PRPC. If the refugee had relatives, friends or organizations who were willing to sponsor them in the U.S. the existence, whereabouts, and ability of relatives to sponsor them had to be confirmed. Refugees who had no sponsors were known as "free cases" and sponsors were found for them. The initial JVA interview was to determine if there were to be any changes in the case that would affect the refugee's sponsorship, and who was on the case case and would be going together to the case sponsor.

Around the same time, day 6, 7, and 8, the new residents had their medical and dental screenings. The purpose was to detect any medical problems that required

attention and that would impede resettlement. This processing was conducted by the Health Services Group of the PRPC and ICR. The most important problems that could impede resettlement were infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis (TB). If a refugee tested positive for TB they had to take medicine daily for six months. If the refugee had not completed the TB medicine regimen by the time their departure was scheduled they could not depart.

On day 11, 12 or 13 the new residents had an interview with the work credit office. During the interview the refugees were evaluated according to their previous work experience, both in Vietnam and, if applicable, in the first refugee camp, and according to their ESL level. There were a whole range of jobs filled by refugees through the work-credit program, from working in the food distribution system, janitorial and grounds keeping, day care workers, classroom translators and assistants, neighborhood council assistants (such as with the food leader and the security leader), office assistants, and others. Following the work-credit interview, the refugees were given assignments and were expected to work at least two hours a day five days a week.

By the time of the work credit interview those who tested at the higher ESL levels had already been given the opportunity to choose whether they wanted to be LAs or not. In addition OFSI had recruited anyone who wanted to work

with them as peer counselors, a position that also required a high level of English language ability. Thus by the time the PRPC had access to the refugees to assign them work credit, those with the highest English language ability had already had the opportunity to choose to work with IDMC or CRTI. Most of the work credit positions did not require a high level of English, but some did. The PRPC administrators needed translators as much as the village did in such places as the hospital to facilitate communication between refugees and doctors, with the security group as translators between security personnel and refugees when incidents had to be investigated or even in court cases, and on the neighborhood councils where communication between the council and the PRPC administrators was important to resolve disputes and to ensure that communication between the refugees and service providers was accurate.

Unless there were problems that had to be cleared up by further individual or JVA interviews the processing into the PRPC was over. The refugees were given class assignments in the IDMC program and, two to three weeks after arrival, the refugees would begin attending classes in the IDMC program.

Training, working and living in the PRPC. In the IDMC program refugees would attend class four hours a day. They began in a combination of EIL and Cultural Orientation (CO) classes. Four days a week they would attend EIL and two

days a week they would attend CO. They attended these classes for 16 weeks and then attended a Work Orientation (WO) class for six more weeks. More than three assumed absences from class meant being recycled and having to attend classes in a following cycle to make up the absences before the refugees could depart.

Refugees also had to perform their work-credit assignment hours each week. According to the HHS administration policy they could have their departure delayed if they had not worked the required hours. In actuality, however, few refugees were held because they had not fulfilled their work-credit requirement.

Outside of the training program and the work-credit requirements the refugees had only to take care of themselves and their families, stay healthy, not break any rules or regulations (at least not get caught), and at the end of six months they could depart for their final destination, their resettlement country. For most refugees that was what happened. Difficult as the camp environment might have been, they survived it, at times even enjoyed it. They learned at least some English, many learning a lot. They stayed out of trouble and stayed healthy and departed when they were supposed to.

Departing. Toward the end or after completion of the WO class the refugee would receive a slip of paper with their departure date and flight number, or the name of the

refugee would appear on the departure list posted on the wall of the PRPC administration building. The departure list gave the date the refugee would depart from the Philippines, and departure from the PRPC would be one day before that. The refugee would also receive call slips for their final JVA interview and their final ICE medical check. For refugees who were "free cases" the final JVA interview might be the first time they knew where they were going to be resettled in the U.S. and who their sponsor was going to be.

There was almost a ritual built around the departure. I say almost because much of what people did and could do depended on their financial resources remaining at the end of their stay in the PRPC. Departure began when the refugee would see their name on a list or a slip of paper that meant they would soon be going to the U.S. The sight of someone who saw their name for the first time on the departure list or who received their departure slip at the neighborhood office was impressive. Some of the most stoic, self-controlled people I knew would literally jump and dance for joy and excitement at the reality of finally going to the U.S. Refugees with money left at the end of their time in the PRPC would often have parties for their friends and acquaintances to celebrate the occasion. People in the same cycle as those who were departing but did not have a departure date themselves and did not know why, got

progressively more depressed with each day that passed. They would go to the temple or church, even if they did not go regularly before, and pray for their departure.

After receiving their departure list the refugees had to go to the work-credit office nearest their neighborhood, in Phase I or II, and receive their work-credit clearance and have it signed by their work-credit supervisor, who documented that they had fulfilled their work-credit requirement. One day before their departure from the PRM the refugees returned whatever household items they had borrowed.

On the day of departure the refugees had to go to the departure area with their baggage and documents. After de-processing, where their documents were checked and the processing staff recorded their departure from the camp and turned them over to DCM, they waited to board the buses that would take them to the PRTC in Manila. After one night in the PRTC in Manila they were taken to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport to board planes for the U.S.

Going to the PRM departure area to see off friends and relatives was a part of the departure ritual everyone could participate in and most did. On days that one hundred refugees departed there could be four hundred or more refugees there to see them off. Not having someone there to see you off was considered one of the saddest things that could happen to you.

The Daily Cycle

The day began early for refugees. Between 5:30 and 6:00 as the camp was transformed from a quiet stillness broken only by the occasional call of a rooster to the busy bustling of a small town. While it was still dark, the sun not yet rising above the mountains to the southeast, some refugees were already up and busy. The first activities of the day concerned the basic necessities -- water, food, and the bathroom. The creaking of back doors opening, revealing figures silhouetted by candle or oil lamp light exiting the morning sun to the toilet block, the clanking of metal buckets as people tried to get their water buckets first in line at the water tap, the banging of pots and the smell of charcoaled fires as people began to prepare their breakfast of noodles -- these were the first sights, smells and sounds of the day.

As the day dawned the clasp, slap, and heavy breathing of sweater clad joggers signaled the real beginning of activity. Many refugees, embracing the jarring regimen of jogging, exercised according to an older tradition. Silently, in the first light of the rising sun, with flowing movements of the arms, legs, and torso, they moved and stretched. The first splashes of water into the waiting buckets brought people to the water taps to begin carrying water back to the fifty-five gallon water drums that stood behind each toilet block as water storage. Others

headed for the water tap carrying big tin pails filled with laundry. Such the quarter sounds were lost in the raucous clanking of buckets and the continuous rush and splashing of water. A few radios and tape players would come on with the sounds of music or English language tapes. People began to come out of their billets to sit on the porch, some eating noodles, some the leftovers of the previous night's dinner. Local Filipinos began circulating through the neighborhoods crying, "Can hee, can hee," Vietnamese for pig rice. (The Filipinos collected the old rice left from dinner the night before for their pigs).

At 6:00 AM an angry beeping filled the air signalling that the camp was open for business as tripepikes carrying local Filipino vendors and their produce to the Phase I and II markets passed through the now open main gate. Along with the market vendors came the "ban mi" jeep dropping off the rowing ban mi sellers. Soon the morning chant of "ban mi, ban mi top" could be heard echoing through the neighborhood as the purveyors of bread and sweet rolls began their rounds. Those in a hurry to get to their morning classes, or with a preference for bread in the morning, signalled the ban mi sellers over to buy -- two ban mi for five pence or the sweet roll for 3.50 pence. Some people opted for the real Vietnamese ban mi that could be bought from stalls set up in the road distribution centers or the market. For five pence you would buy what amounted to a

large hot dog bun filled with pork, pork fat, or liver pate, some pickled papaya, tomatoes, cucumbers and sprinkled with a sauce. Hot, very hot, pepper sauce was optional. Many passed up breakfast or took it with morning coffee at one of the neighborhood coffee shops run by Safagata or in the market.

The time that people had to be in their State Department mandated classes largely determined the tempo of their morning activities. Classes began at 7:00 AM and 1:00 PM. People with class at 7:00 AM had to get moving in the morning. Usually morning activities were restricted to packing up their bedding, dressing, washing their face, brushing teeth, and if they wanted breakfast, grabbing a bun or a slice of pizza on the run to class or the bus stop. Those with class further away had a greater need to hurry and a decision to make. If they had class at the other end of the camp they had three choices: walking, taking a bus, or taking a tricycle. If they walked they had to be gone before 6:00. At the time I began my research, if they wanted to ride the bus it was a gamble, even if they made the bus stop by 6:00, to get to class on time. An average of 400 people rode the bus from the bus stop in Phase II. That was when the busmen ran on time and did not by-pass the stop because the driver decided the bus line was not orderly enough. If the bus line did not appear to be moving fast enough so that people got worried about being late to class, the last option was

to join the crowd (as easy as its people) lining the intersection northeast of the market waiting to catch a tripartite or a jeep going to the Plaza I market.

For those without classes the morning was a more leisurely time but not one without its necessary tasks and time constraints. Those with children took no child care. Refugees with children had their class time split, with one parent going to class in the morning and the other in the afternoon. Children almost always ate breakfast, and were probably the major bread and sweetened consumers in addition to eating noodles or leftover rice. This breakfast had to be prepared or procured for the children in addition to dressing and bathing them. In some cases parents escorted their children to school; most did not.

People who had class in the afternoon were supposed to do their work-credit free work to 10:00 AM. Work-credit was the program stipulating that refugees older than 14 work for two hours in the camp every day. The tasks they were assigned ranged from office assistance, to assisting in the instructional program, to the functions they performed in the neighborhood, to janitorial work. I will discuss the work-credit system at greater length later.

Theoretically, between 8:00 and 10:00 AM all adults should have been occupied with class or work. In actuality this was not the case. For a variety of reasons refugees could be seen loitering around in front, inside, or in back

of their billets. Some had legitimate concerns such as illness or a JVA or ICA appointment, and some were recent arrivals who have not yet been given class and work-related assignments. Some had finished their requirements and were waiting for their departure from the MRPC. Some were just skipping work.

This was not a busy time. Most people simply lounged around. A few sat in the coffee shop. Some used the time to study English from books or tapes. Food distribution began between 9:15 and 10:00 AM with the arrival of the food trucks to the neighborhood food distribution shed. The building leader or assistant leader would go to the distribution shed to collect the fresh food ration (meat, vegetables, and fruit) for their building. The ration was delivered in plastic tubs that they brought back to the building. Food distribution was the big event of the mid-morning. When the building leader returned with the food container, people drifted out of the billets, at least one from each billet, to watch the distribution and collect their billet's ration. The ration of 2100 calories a day was distributed by weight. Each building had a scale. The building leader would weigh the ration to make sure it was correct for the building and then divide it up by billet, family, or individual. Those collecting the ration had to be careful to keep the ration separated when necessary and set aside a portion for those who might have "their name in

the billet," i.e. he officially resided there, but who do not actually live and eat there. Illegal billet transfers were common and in most cases were not a real problem for the refugees. In some cases it was simply a matter of knocking next door to a more accommodating billet, more accommodating in that it might relieve crowding problems or the residents might be more similar. For example, unaccompanied single males might choose to live with other unaccompanied males rather than a family. This could make for a less peaceful and stable billet at times, but it freed them from the customary deference to be paid to elders. People who resided in billets other than those to which they were assigned came by each day to collect their food and any mail slips from the village. They watched the mail lists posted at the neighborhood office and picked up their mail there. Some illegal transfers were the result of disputes within a billet, but these were minimal due to the ease with which these people could obtain legal transfers from the neighborhood leader if they explained their case.

Between 10:30 and 11:00 AM food preparation began. The smell of charcoal fires and fish sauce filled the air. The time it took to prepare the food varied depending on what the FRC supplied and the ability of the cook. For some, preparation consisted of cooking the usual fish or eggs, and occasional chicken or pork, with fish sauce, boiling or frying the vegetables in the same way, and cooking rice.

some people cooked amazing meals in the tiny hilltop kitchens combining the basic HMO fare with spices and sauces.

During the two years I spent in a billet the quality of the food and the cooking varied a great deal. Early in my stay I lived with a group of single males who had been friends in Pulau Bidong, Malaysia. One of them was an excellent cook. Even after he got involved in trying to run a coffee shop and did not do the cooking himself he advised the others, and the food was quite good. Unfortunately, he got into a dispute with the building leader and transferred to another billet. There went our cook and we were back to survival fare. At another point in my stay, the man who was available to cook in the morning had the habit of putting the rice on to cook and falling asleep. Either the water in the rice would boil away, and we would have burnt crunchy rice, or it would cook so long it became an almost solid, glutinous, sticky mess. A good cook could easily spend an hour preparing and cooking lunch. This time could be reduced if the billet had two charcoal stoves or an oil stove in addition to the one issued charcoal stove.

Morning class let out at 12:00 AM. Depending on how long it took people to get home from class, they had lunch between 12:00 and 12:15. The afternoon classes began at 1:00 PM so those who had to get to class had to get in time to get there. Some people had schedules that allowed them to eat together; others did not. When people ate together

they usually set out the food dishes on the cleaned billet floor and set in a circle. The dishes issued by the KARC were tin or plastic. Each person had a bowl and a pair of chopsticks. There was a pot of rice, a dish with the meat or eggs, and one for vegetables. Almost invariably, some rice was eaten first before meat and vegetables were added to the bowl. When the adults ate together mothers usually took the children and fed them outside. During mealtimes, women with bowls and chopsticks could be seen pursuing children around the billets trying to get them to stay still long enough to eat. Older children went outside on their own and sat in the hammocks or on the cots in front of the billets.

After lunch there was another scramble as people cleaned up and got ready to leave for their afternoon classes. Most afternoon work-credit assignments did not begin until 1:00 PM as those who did not have class had more leisure. Those who did not have to go class or work went to sleep. Between 2:00 and 4:00 PM the billet areas were quiet while people took afternoon naps. During the dry hot season, from February through May, some billet areas could look deserted in the afternoons as people stayed inside sleeping.

After 4:00 activity picked up again. People returned from their work-credit assignments. Others got up from their naps. People began thinking about their early evening

tasks. Afternoon class ends at 5:45. Sometime between 5:00 and 5:15 the water runs up again. Water use was most intense in the afternoon when everyone took a bath, all the water storage containers were filled, and gardens were watered.

In the afternoon water related tasks again took priority over other activities. Carrying water was the first priority. The water storage drums had to be filled. Males were the primary water carriers. Most hillside had at least two baskets for carrying water. The unwritten rule was first come first served. Beginning as early as 4:00 PM people began lining up their baskets at the tap. Moving your basket ahead of someone else's without asking was cause for a dispute. People tended to be accommodating, though, and if someone had a pressing engagement they could usually convince others to allow them to move up. Occasionally someone would arrive and butt in line. Sometimes this was tolerated as merely bad manners and only aroused some comments on the offender's impoliteness and low education. At other times it simply would not be tolerated. In the multi-ethnic neighborhoods (where there was a mix of Vietnamese, Lao, and Khmer) certain taps, water tanks, or whole toilet blocks were designated as belonging to a particular ethnic group to prevent disputes. At the time I finished my research, there had been only one documented

murder of a refugee by another, and the incident was apparently precipitated by a dispute over water.

At times the water supply was too limited, during prolonged droughts or major power interruptions (the water has to be pumped from deep wells into a water tower before distribution), neighborhood councils organized a system where each billet in a building took a turn being first, second, third, and so on, at the tap.

The next priority was bathing. Men bathed at the water tap, women bathed in the billet toilet stall. Bathing at the water tap was something akin to taking a birdbath. You filled your bucket and then doused yourself with water, putting your bucket back in the water line as you washed with soap. If you were lucky your bucket's turn at the water tap coincided with your need to rinse off. Throughout most of the year a bath outside with nothing but a pair of shorts on was refreshing. After a hot day, standing half naked on a concrete slab next to a gushing water tap, with the wind coming straight off of the South China Sea felt rather good. During the cool season (December to January) and the rainy season (July to September), however, it could be a bit cool.

After carrying water and bathing came dinner. Preparation of the evening meal was usually simpler than lunch. Meat and fish was always cooked at lunch and recooked for dinner. Vegetables were often done the same

way, though sometimes they were cooked fresh for dinner. It was not unusual for dinner to be just lunch reheated with a fresh pot of rice. Leftovers were stored in their pots in the kitchen, sometimes for a laborer or a late worker and sometimes for breakfast the next day. In my two years of living and eating this way I never once got food poisoning.

The time after dinner was the refugee's own. This was the time for being with one's family, visiting friends or relatives living elsewhere in the camp, studying English, going to church or the temple, a rendezvous with boy or girl friends, writing letters, or just sitting around talking.

There were a lot of evening activities. ICCC had classes for its Assistant Teachers (ATs) who wanted to study for the GRE exam. ICCC also had two libraries that were open in the evening where people could go to study or read. Neighborhood council meetings were held in the evenings. The Catholic church held a mass every night, and on Wednesdays the Baptist church had services. There were literacy classes in both Vietnamese and English.

In 1988 World Vision sponsored the Young Adult Services Program in the camp. This program was designed to provide organized activities for young adults such as sports, dancing, art and martial arts as alternatives to sitting around in their billets. They also had discussion groups for young women and men. Many of these activities were held

in the evenings at one of the two activity centers (one in Phase I and Phase II).

There were also the videos. Every night between 7:00 and 1:00 AM I could sit on my porch and watch groups of people, sometimes single individuals, sometimes whole families drifting down the road and then off onto footpaths that led behind the PASS school to the video house. Sometime after nine, and usually before the 9:30 curfew but not always, people began emerging, waitlike, from the darkness. At first all I could see were the bobbing points of lights from the flashlights. Slowly people emerged from the shadows cast by the streetlight. The flow of people coming back from the video house began with a trickle and became a flood. On a busy night at the videos, 300 people might come up the path and head home.

At five pesos a head the owners of the video house could make 1500 pesos (at the time, about \$75 US) a night. The land on which the video house sat was FGCP land and thus, technically, the refugees were not going back every time they went to the movies. However, it was against some unwritten policy, possibly because they also served alcohol during the videos and sometimes showed pornographic videos. Though I watched night, after night I never saw anyone get arrested while coming back from the movies.

This was only one of the places where refugees could watch videos around the camp. In Phase I there was another

video house on the periphery of the camp. Next to Neighborhood Eight, on the edge of the valley there was a block of apartments belonging to PUPC personnel. Some of the Filipinos living there had VCRs. On most nights these people could accommodate refugees, about six to eight adult or 10 to 12 children depending on what they had to show, to watch videos in their houses. The PUPC administration also occasionally showed videos for free with the projection machine they used for showing videos during new-arrival orientation. On Friday nights the Baptists showed movies on the side of their church in Phase II. At other times, especially during breaks, local Filipinos were allowed to set up VCRs and TVs in the food distribution centers. They strung sheets up around the building and charged admission. If you sat outside you could hear for free but to look you had to pay.

Then there were the coffee shops. Throughout Neighborhood Nine and in Neighborhood Eight there were at least seven refugee-run coffee shops. At one time in Neighborhood Nine alone there were four coffee shops. The busiest times for the coffee shops were in the mornings and evenings. In the evening the coffee shops were the gathering place for friends, those celebrating good news, couples or people who just wanted to get away from their billets.

The coffee shops in the PRC were very similar to those you can see on the streets of Saigon today. The tables were about eighteen inches off of the ground and a foot or a little more square. You sat on even shorter small wooden stools. They served coffee, hot or cold, and soft drinks. With a glass of coffee you would also get a jar of tea. During the hot dry season the coffee shop was a slightly cooler place to sit and talk while the killer cooled off in the evening.

The evening came to an abrupt end at 9:10 when the lights went out and the refugees were supposed to be in their bunks. The effectiveness and enforcement of the 9:10 curfew varied over the time I spent in the PRC. At times it was rigidly enforced, although not until about 1970 PM; at other times it was not. It all depended on whether the blue guards went around or not. Sometime in 1966 the camp administration changed from a military administration -- it had been run by the Philippine Navy -- to a civilian administration. With this change in administration came a change in the camp's internal security. The Philippine Navy patrol was replaced by a contracted private security agency. The employees of the private security agency wore blue uniforms, hence the name "blue guards." The refugees most often referred to them simply as the police.

When the blue guards went around at curfew time with the neighborhood refugee assembly patrol people went inside. They did not necessarily stay there, but they would engage in the pretense of obeying the curfew. When the blue guards did not go around, people stayed outside and watched the refugee patrol go by blowing their whistles and shining their lights. Thus it was not unusual for people to be sitting out in front of the billets sipping tea, chatting, playing guitars, and sleeping until 11:00 or 12:00.

By midnight it was usually quiet -- well, at least semi-quiet. In the stillness every snore, moan, cough, and cry echoed through the building. It was also the time of cats and mice. The walls between the billets did not go all the way to the roof and there were rafters that ran the length of the building. At night these rafters became the main access highway as they crawled from billet to billet and then down the roof beams into the kitchen areas. At night I could listen for the pitter patter of little feet over my head and shine my flashlight up to confront the little paws, noses and eyes of crawling mice. They scurried down into the kitchen and, as often as not, landed on some unstable pots or dishes and a crashing and banging ensued to the accompaniment of high pitched squeaks. If one of the many rats that perused the trash barrels behind the billets was nearby, and could get in the back door, the banging and squeaks could continue until a decisive conclusion had been

reached, usually the demise of the mice. This was exclusively a cat and mouse game; for the refugees it was just something else to sleep through.

Usually the only human activity that took place during the night was due to illness, the need to urinate or sex. Occasionally I could hear the afflicted outside at night relieving themselves of lunch, dinner and, if it was a contributing factor, beer. At intervals the creaking of a back door opening and the soft tapping of little drops on the ground behind the billets signified someone urinating. At night people did not go to the toilet block to urinate. Eileen just stood in the back door and urinated on the ground out back. Freddie had to squat down and urinate into the small ditch that ran behind the building. You could never tell, there might be a robber around or some stranger hiding in the toilet block.

Sex in a place as lacking in privacy as a refugee camp was of necessity a furtive business. The only place where one could find the semblance of privacy was late at night in the dark in the billet, assuming everyone else was asleep. The last was only an assumption, but when an assumption of privacy was all you had, it had to do. Needless to say, it was not always true. You never knew there could be an anthropologist around trying, but failing, to sleep on the hard slat board upper platform with the heat, mice, and mosquitoes. An experienced ex-diplomat through billet

walls, and the quiet sucking sounds (Victrolas do not hiss, they sort of suck), the soft rustling of clothes, and then rhythmic movements and humming, but still hushed, breathing. Though this was not an every-night event, it was not unusual either.

Avoiding these distractions, there was a stillness that settled over the neighborhoods late at night. The stillness seemed all the more profound when I considered that within less than half a mile were thousands of people.

This was the order of ordinary days when refugees had class. Sundays there was no class, and every three to six weeks there were breaks when there would be no class for one, two and at Christmas, three weeks. During the breaks and for a few weeks, like hospital interpreters, on Sunday there would still be work- credits. For most people Sundays and breaks were free time.

Sunday was the day for sleeping late, going to church, going to the market, going to the stores, taking postcards, having parties, and drinking. As much free time as people have on Sundays the day still began the same way, with people using and getting water. After 9:00 AM the market moods begin.

Sunday was the big market day. When I first began going to Sunday markets at the Plaza I asked in September 1988 if was the only time that refugees could set up and sell there. During the rest there was a change in policy

and refugees could sell in both markets every morning. On Sunday there was more to buy than any other day. There was a wider range of meat, seafood, and produce, as well as dry goods. When the camp was more multicultural, and there were large numbers of Khmer and Lao, there were also crafts available. Unfortunately, by the time I began my stay the numbers of Khmer and Lao being processed were small and declining. On Sunday mornings the Phase I market was crisscrossed with refugees buying food to supplement their rations or for the parties that were often held on Sundays. Filipinos and expatriates would also take advantage of the day off to do their marketing for the week. The coffee shops in both the Phase I and Phase II markets were filled with groups of people before and after attending church as well as with those who would gather for a leisurely morning off.

There were two Catholic, two evangelical Protestant churches, and one Korean church in the camp. There were also two Buddhist temples, one primarily Khmer and one Vietnamese, one Lao temple, and a Cao Dai temple. Two bullets in one building in Neighborhood Eight were given to the Hoa Hoi. On Sunday mornings the Protestants and the Catholics dressed up, if possible, and went to church. Dressing up for men meant a white shirt, black trousers and sensible shoes. Dressed up for women meant oil hair, the decorated pants were traditional to Vietnam. The Catholic

church in Phnom Penh it was a large square building designed to accommodate a lot of people, not for ornamentation. Seating was on long benches without backs and semi-segregated by sex. Men tended to sit on one side and women on the other, but not always. At different times there were services in Vietnamese, English, and Tagalog. The Catholic church in Phnom Penh offered services in Khmer and Lao when there was a need. During the Vietnamese services on Sunday morning the church overfilled and people stood outside and listened through windows or over the loudspeakers hung up outside. There were one or two Vietnamese priests and one expatriate priest. Services were traditionally Catholic, with responsive readings, readings from the Bible, some singing, a Eucharist, and a Mass. The same was true for the Protestant churches. They held services such like they do in Baptist churches in the U.S., including an invitation to be "born again" and join the church at the end of the service.

Attendance at the temples was dictated by either the desire for the blessing of a venture, like departure, or praying for departure soon, or the phases of the moon. Buddhists were supposed to attend services on the days of the new and full moon. Some did some did not. Sunday was a day for some people to go to the temple, but not for all Buddhists.

Most of the people who went to the temple on Sundays went for either peace and quiet or for pictures. The temple

in Neighborhood Eight was considered beautiful by the refugees. It was situated on the edge of the valley, looking down into the valley, they could see the Moring River winding past forest and rice fields during the rainy season the fields were brilliantly lush and green. It was a sight that inevitably reminded them of home. In the interviews and discussions I had with refugees the common reply to the question, "What do you like about the PRPC?", was that the environment was like Vietnam, like home.

To Vietnamese, the background or setting for a photograph was as important as the individual being photographed. Consequently, you could look at pictures after pictures taken by refugees or under their direction and not come away with any idea of what a refugee camp looks like. This was true even for the PRPC, where one of the freedoms that refugees enjoyed there, but not in most first asylum camps in Southeast Asia, was taking pictures³. In fact, there was a thriving business run by Filipinos taking pictures and developing them. Having Filipino photographers could be seen around the church, temples, and markets every

³ During 1980-82 I visited camps in Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippine First Asylum Camp in Palawan. In all three of the camps I visited in Thailand (Site B, Ban-Vi-Leng and Phaiat Khlong) picture taking was prohibited without a special permit. In the open camps in Hong Kong, Singapore and Palawan there were no restrictions on photography. Refugees who had come to the PRPC from Palau Island told me that photographing within the camp was a punishable offense.

Sunday, and when people finished their cycles, around the clockwise, and of course at the departure.

I took some of the people I lived with on Sunday picture tours. They dressed up in their best clothes, and we would set off. We would not take pictures around the hills. The first stop was either the temple or the church. At the temple there was a statue of the goddess who protected people at sea. A whole series of pictures was necessary with the goddess. Then pictures against the backdrop of the valley and sometimes pictures with the temple itself. Pictures were permitted inside the Buddhist temples and sometimes people wanted pictures of themselves praying. At the church there was a statue of Mary in a niche that was popular and there were some flowers there when they were blossoming. After the church the tour would move to the central administration area of the camp. There we could find automobiles that, if they were nice enough, made good props for poses. The tours usually concluded at the Plaza, due to time and the end of the roll of film, where there were three refugee boats that had landed at nearby Morong Beach. The boats also made good props.

When I first began living in the MRTC one of the favorite Sunday destinations was the stream in Neighborhood Four. The stream was not actually in Neighborhood Four; it was not even within the boundaries of the camp. Neighborhood Four was a location reference. Refugees used

the layout of the camp and the positions of the neighborhoods as they would disintegrate in Vietnam. Neighborhood Four was the closest common reference point for the location of the stream. The stream was actually in the valley below the camp. From where I lived in Neighborhood Nine it took an hour or more to walk to the stream. The "stream" was actually a bend in the stream where the water was deep enough to swim and where large, smooth rocks or gently sloping grassland formed the banks. There was also a road to the location and a cable bridge (since destroyed in the 1993 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo) that stretched above the stream. People took or had pictures taken on the bridge and the rocky banks. They also swam and washed clothes in the stream. They also drank. The Filipinos who lived in the area set up thatch huts from which they sold soft drinks, beer, and liquor. Most people went to the stream purely for recreation, to swim, to get out of the camp for a short while, or because it reminded them of home. Some, however, went to get drunk.

Drinking was prohibited in the MRPC, according to the rules. Drinking was not, however, against Philippine law, except for minors; the legal age was 21. Neither was it illegal to sell alcohol, except to minors. The stream was a grey area. Technically it was illegal to go there at all, but many people did.

There was also a lack of will to enforce the rule to maintain good relations between the FPIC and the local community relations. Refugees who went to the stream and drank soft drinks or alcohol were spending money, which the local Filipino community was only too glad to accept. Since the offense of being AMOL was not enforced for going to the stream the refugees felt free to drink. The only risk was in going home drunk. If, on the way home, a noticeably drunk refugee encountered a blue guard, there was the possibility of being taken to the hospital for a blood alcohol test and, if the test showed positive, being detained in the Social Rehabilitation Center (SRC), the nong jail, for one week. In most cases, however, those who quietly went home from a drinking bout at the stream had no problem.

The stream was not the only place refugees drank on Sundays. Most of the alcohol consumption I witnessed in the FPIC took place in the refugees' own billets. Vietnamese, especially men, were fond of having what they called "small parties." The term "small party" was a reference to their present circumstance as refugees and was a pointed reminder that, if the party were being held at home in Vietnam, it would have been larger in terms of both numbers of people and what was offered in the way of food and drink. Even a small party would have several dishes such as chicken, pork, Vietnamese curry (very different from an Indian curry) and

but not rice soup, and possibly duck and duck blood soup. If you wanted to have a special party and you had the money, you had duck. If you wanted to have a special drinking party, you had duck and duck blood soup. Duck blood soup was essentially congealed duck blood, with a few bones and skin. It was considered a perfect accompaniment to beer [lots of beer]. The purpose of these parties was conviviality, often drunken conviviality. The most frequent participants in these parties were ARVN vets, their veteran friends, and their girlfriends. Almost always these parties followed the course of eating, drinking, talking, eating, more drinking, more talking, more drinking, more talking, a little more eating, more drinking and then sleeping it off. At a serious drinking party there would be one glass and each person would take turns drinking it down. When people had enough they would just drop out, climb up on the bed and go to sleep. If there was doubt about whether someone could make it home or if they lived too far away, they slept before going home.

Not all drinking parties were so convivial. When there was a mix of people who did not know each other well the situation could be explosive, and often was. When Vietnamese refugees became inebriated, a condition often visible by the bright red color they turned, they could be quick to take offense at the slightest misunderstanding. Verbal disputes could escalate quickly to physical violence.

These Sundays also became known for the "loosies" that took place all too frequently.

Throughout the camp the majority of refugees simply took Sunday off. More people sat in the coffee shops longer. People went visiting, refugees visiting each other and their Filipino teachers as well, and vice versa. More people went to the movies. Many young males organized soccer games in the open spaces around the neighborhood. People stayed home and wrote letters. Sunday was a day of contrasts, of more activity for some and less than usual for others, of too much excitement and too much boredom. In spite of the variety and the contrasts, the day began and ended much like any other day with carrying water, eating, and finally lights out and sleep.

Conclusion

Some authors writing about the PUPC refer to the regimented life of the refugees there (see Chapter Four). In actuality, life was no more regimented than that of people anywhere else and probably far less than it would be for the refugees in the future. Once they were resettled, began work and school, and had a myriad other worries that they did not have in the PUPC, their lives would become far more complicated. The average Americans working nine to five jobs, taking care of children, meeting social commitments, and involving themselves in community or

religious activities lead far more respected existences than the refugees in the PRPC.

Curiously, some authors (some of whom also write about resettlement) refer to the time in the PRPC purely as a time of waiting, "doing time." To an extent this was true. Impending departure and resettlement altered the refugees' perspectives on both the future and the present. The time until they departed stretched before them like a physical space that had to be filled. It was their space, however; they had to fill it, and they did. The classes in ENL, CO and MO were mandated by the U.S. State Department. The refugees had to attend or their resettlement would be delayed. Failure to attend had a consequence, but attendance was still under the control of the refugees themselves. He was woken by their bellies and rapped on their doors to wake them up, drag them from bed, and herd them to class. Some people would not go to class. They were reprimanded, and their departure delayed. It was their choice, such the same choice you could make by not arriving to work, though the consequences for the refugees were less severe; they did not lose their acceptance for resettlement as you might lose your job.

Refugees made the same choices involving the work-credit system, though the consequences were not so rigidly applied, as was carrying water, cooking, washing and all the

other daily chores people accomplished on their own initiative.

Life in the PRPC was regimented, but not more than other people might describe as routine or ordered. Labeling life in the PRPC as regimented is part of a mindset that looks at places like the PRPC only on the surface. Some see the housing as rows of identical brick houses and assume that the life they contain is also identically drab and box-like. They see hundreds of people on the streets and assume they are all going to the same place for the same reason. They read the most hierarchically arranged management plans, the rules and regulations, and assume they understood the true nature of the human interactions expressed. They are too quick to label institutions like the PRPC as controlling and miss the real essence of cooperation without which the PRPC could not function.

The next chapter explores the deeper and more complex nature of the interweaving of the PRPC administration with the village, the refugees and the local community. Through the use of descriptions of actual events, interviews with refugees, camp staff and local people and data collected from structured interviews with refugees, I hope to demonstrate some of the complexity that lay behind the way the PRPC worked.

CHAPTER EIGHT DISPUTED AUTHORITY OF THE PRPC

All of the events described in this chapter really happened. They are part of the data, the events that took place in the PRPC during the time I conducted research there. In some cases descriptions of events are interspersed with descriptions of the processes that brought the events about and/or the use of statistics that seek to demonstrate the generality or specificity of events.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more in depth picture of what life was like in the PRPC through ethnographic description and some statistical data. What this picture attempts to illuminate is twofold. First, that the PRPC was not a totalitarian, total institution where conformity, passivity and dependence was the expected and realized behavior of the refugees. Second, that the PRPC as an institution worked as a result of the cooperation of the various participating groups of people including the PRPC administration, the local community and the refugees. Each of these groups could be further disaggregated into smaller groups based on differences in previous experiences, the kind of involvement they had with the PRPC and the benefits they derived from their involvement with the PRPC. Hopefully, as

the pieces of the picture are filled in and come together, the place of the refugees in the PRPC will be seen as integral to the operation of the PRPC. They were not helpless dependent recipients of assistance nor oppressed passive recipients of a totalitarian organization and order imposed by the camp administration.

The PRPC as a Non-Totalitarian, Non-Total Institution

The PRPC did not function as a single entity, a collective totalitarian institution. The PRPC was more like a collection of relatively cohesive groups whose cohesiveness was underlain by certain cultural and political factors as well as a goal commonly held by all who participated in the activities of the PRPC, saving refugees, or, for refugees, being moved, to the United States. As a result the PRPC did not impact the refugee residents as a totalitarian, oppressive environment to which their only adaptive strategy was a passive, dependent conformity. This non-institutionalization stemmed from the relationships among the camp administration, the village, the PG (responsible for external camp security and initially the camp jail) down to the refugee neighborhoods and surrounding local community. Some of these non-institutional, or informal, aspects of the PRPC have been discussed in chapter 3 and 4. Here I will elaborate on some of these aspects as well as discuss the refugee's response to the PRPC as they found it.

Several incidents took place during my stay in the PRPC that caused me to seriously reconsider whatever preconceptions I had about what a refugee camp was supposed to be like and question the notion that such an environment had a repressive effect on the refugees. Some of these events are recounted below.

Refugees and PRPC staff

The situation between the refugees and the non-security PRPC staff was not one where the PRPC staff had power over the refugees and were treated with a great deal of deference. The way that the staff treated the refugees and the refugees treated the staff varied. Much of the time it was based on the situation and the degree to which they were mutually dependent on each other to achieve a particular task or goal.

Several factors led to individual status and power relations between PRPC staff and the refugee population. One factor enhancing the refugee's status was the fact that the refugees were accepted for resettlement in the U.S., a place that many Filipinos sought to go as well. Another factor enhancing the staff was that their jobs were dependent on the continuing existence of the camp, and therefore, the cooperation of the refugees in maintaining order. In addition, the staff members had to be conscious of the consequences of causing an incident between themselves and the refugees. The example below of the bus

system in the camp in revealing in terms of the distances faced by some staff members when dealing with the refugees.

The CIMO bus system

Sometime in early January 1978, after four months of living in a billet and commuting day and night with Vietnamese refugees I began to slip a little. The whole endeavor for some reason seemed to be too much, too fuzzy around the edges. I began to yearn for some numbers to play with. I collected all of the demographic data I could on the population from the HPPH administration. Once a week I went to the security office to get the week's detention data, but it was not enough. I wanted more numbers. So I started counting the number of refugees getting on and off the buses that ferried them to and from their DMZ clinics. There were three bus stops in the camp, one at each end of the camp and one in the middle. I started going to these stops in the mornings, at the middle of the day and in the evening, and watching people get on and off the buses and counting. Consequently, I have some very good numerical data on how many people rode the buses, from where to where, and when, that I will undoubtedly try to work into a table somewhere. Counting the refugees, however, soon became secondary to just observing. At times I observed in amazement, as refugees literally attacked the bus to get on. I suppose an occasional casual observation would have given the same general impression, but my systematic observation

with numbers led us to witness scenes of chaotic mayhem time and time again, day after day.

The refugees who had class in the morning had to be there by 7:00 AM. If they wanted to ride the bus to class they had to get to the bus stop much earlier. The buses began running between 6:30 and 6:35 in the morning. The lines of refugees waiting to ride the bus began forming by 6:00 AM. By 6:15 there were often 40-60 refugees waiting in line. When the bus came the line would dissolve into a mob pushing and shoving trying to get in the bus door. Some people would go along the sides of the bus looking for open windows to climb in. This usually did not work in the morning since on the first trips the buses made the windows were all still closed, but at noon and in the afternoon people would climb in the windows. Some refugees who were walking toward the bus stop would start running when they saw the bus come and would, ignoring the line, charge to the front and join the mob trying to get in the door. I have a picture I took to document this that shows a young man literally climbing on top of and over the crowd at the bus door. It was not unusual for the bus driver to see the mob beginning to form, and the people running toward the bus stop, as he approached the bus stop and just drive by without stopping. On the first morning I started counting, the first two buses to come drove by and did not stop

because the drivers did not like the disorder they saw in the crowd waiting for the bus.

There was supposed to be a system to facilitate loading the buses. During their orientation to the FEPC the refugees were told how they were supposed to organize for loading the bus. There were supposed to be two lines. One line was for the elderly and women with children. The other line was for everyone else. The system did not work. Sometimes the bus drivers would drive past the line with the women and children and stop in front of the larger, everybody else, line. At other times the bus drivers would stop first at the women and children line but people would defect from the everybody else line and form a mob around the women and children.

The refugees who seemed most of this horror were Vietnamese, primarily young adult (ages 14-24) men and women. There were also Khmer, Lowland Lao and Hmong refugees in the camp. The Khmer refugees did not do this. They would stand in line, and stand in line, and stand in line. There were not enough Lowland Lao refugees to see them as a group, while the Hmong were always placed in neighborhood 2 or 4 and it was arranged that the farthest they had to go to class was neighborhood five, an easy walk.

So, the first question is, was this necessary? Did the refugees really have to fight to get on a bus? No, they did not. A lot of people did ride the bus to and from class

everyday. According to my census about 1800 people took the buses in the morning, the middle and at the end of the day, at about 6000 person-trips a day. At the time there were six buses carrying the refugees around the camp. Each bus had seating capacity for 55 people but they often carried many more, as much as 110. The buses continued to run until all the stops were cleared. It usually took about 20-25 minutes of ferrying refugees from one end of the camp to the other to move everyone. Six buses could move 1800 people with an average of 300 people per trip if each bus made only one trip. The buses made at least two trips during each of the three times changes everyday and often more. In essence, grabbing the bus was not a necessary part of securing a seat in a timely manner. Everyone could have gotten where they needed to be just as quickly by waiting patiently in line, as many refugees did. Consequently, the tolerance the bus drivers showed for the sobbing of their buses was not the result of necessity either.

If grabbing the bus was not empirically necessary in the camp to get where they were going I doubted that it was a behavior acquired purely in the camp. I thought that it was likely that the behavior was derived from the previously learned expectation that if one did not get there first, one might not get where they were going. I asked refugees I knew if the same thing happened in Vietnam. They said that it did not happen in Vietnam because some people would go

and buy all the tickets for the buses and then sell them at a higher price to those who came later. I do not know if this was true, but it does support the idea that in Vietnam there was a shortage of transportation that could be exploited. Aside from the possible perceptions of the refugees as to a lack of space on the buses, the other reason that some of them asked the buses was because they could.

The example above, however, was not given so much to reveal something about the refugees as about the interactions of the refugees and the PRPC staff. Whatever the motivation, the refugees boarded the buses, it was something they did, despite discouragement by the bus drivers, who were Filipino PRPC staff. As mentioned above, sometimes the bus drivers would drive by what appeared to them to be an excessively unruly line. There were, however, almost no other options for them to deal with the situation. If they stopped and people asked the bus there was nothing they could do until the bus was packed and they could drive on with their load. There was no way they could stop the pushing and shoving and climbing in the windows. The bus driver's admonitions were simply ignored. After witnessing several such incidents it was obvious to us that the refugees were not cowed by the drivers nor did they feel threatened by them.

The Work-Credit System

When I first began living in a billet, one of the men I lived with became a primary informant, not just because he understood what I was doing and was interested and willing to answer endless questions, but also because he almost never went to his work-credit assignment. His assignment was to assist in the operation of photostatic copy machines for a while. According to the work-credit requirement he was supposed to work two hours a day, six days a week. Over the three month period I lived with him he went to his assignment about once a week. When he got on the departure list, his work-credit supervisor signed his work-credit card and the certificate all refugees receive upon successful completion of the work-credit program, and he departed as scheduled.

The reality of the work-credit system seemed to be that participation was contingent upon several factors, including: (1) the perceived benefits of participating, (2) how indispensable the refugee felt their presence was, (3) the strictness of the particular supervisor, and (4) the ease or difficulty in getting to the assignment, which was largely based on how far away it was from their billets. For example, refugees tended to go when they were motivated to improve their English and had assignments where English was required. In terms of indispensability, I lived with two refugees who were assigned as interpreters in the

hospital emergency room. If they went to their assignment and found other interpreters already there, they would turn around and come back home.

The third factor, the strictness of particular work-credit supervisors, seemed to vary greatly. One variable was how much help the non-refugee staff actually wanted. Since one justification for the PRPO was to benefit the local community, it was important that refugees assist Filipinos rather than deprive them of employment. It would not have been difficult, for example, to maintain a capable staff of refugee copy-machine operators, but that would have deprived two Filipinos of jobs. Further evidence of the flexibility of the work-credit system was that, when I left the camp, the staff member in charge of the work-credit program told me that there were only three refugees whose departures were being delayed due to slowing work-credit time.

Camp Security, The PC, and The Local Community

My introduction to the fractured nature of some of the agencies participating in the operation of the PRPO came early in my stay in the PRPO. On October 27, less than a month after I began living in PISO, a local Filipino was killed by a blue guard in the neighborhood mine food distribution center. The food distribution center was not far from my house but I did not witness the event. It was described to me by refugees who lived right next to the

place and watched it from their front doors. Apparently the local man was a sort of gambling ring leader who ran games around the neighborhood home food distribution center, a major gathering and beer and wine distribution point for local Filipinos. One of the blue guards had recognized the man as having been banned from the camp for his activities and ordered him to leave the camp. There was an argument and the local man left, only to return a short time later with a knife. He attacked the blue guard who ran, but tripped and fell in one of the drainage ditches that ran along the road and the edge of the neighborhood. The local man jumped on the downed blue guard and stabbed him. The blue guard's partner shot the local man, according to the reports of the refugees, several times. The local man died.

It just happened that that was the night I was supposed to go around with the blue guards for a night to get an idea of what they did and what happened after the 9:00 p.m. curfew. I had made contact with the chief of camp security earlier and he was very supportive of the research I wanted to do. He had agreed to let me see the detention and incident reports they compiled and had also agreed to let me go around with the blue guards and see what they did. Fortunate coincidence or not, this was the night. At 8:15 PM I went to the security office in neighborhood six to begin my night of observing blue guards totally unaware of what had happened in the interim time since the blue guard

had killed the local man. I got into the back of a jeep with two other blue guards while the head blue guard and the assistant head blue guard sat in the front. We drove around Phase I first and then to the PC headquarters (HQ) and picked up two PC men. We then went to the hospital where we left off the two blue guards to bring the number of blue guards at the hospital to three. The blue guard who had been stabbed by the local man was in the camp hospital and they felt that there was a need for extra security as a result. At the hospital we changed into a truck and picked up two Vietnamese O&A security patrol members who were supposed to serve as interpreters for the blue guards. We drove around Phase II zone and then went back to the camp security headquarters and stayed a long time. We then went around Phase I again and by the PC HQ and then to the hospital where we sat a while. There was apparently some concern for the security of the hospital since the body of the local man was there and several Filipinos from Morong were there as well.

I was beginning to think that this was going to be a long slow night, even for the PRRG. From what I had read in the detention and incident reports in the security office, things tended to be more exciting than what I was seeing. While we were at the hospital, however, things changed. A white PC truck arrived at the hospital and the PC men in the truck informed the blue guards that they had arrested the

blue guard who had shot the local man and were holding him in the camp jail. The blue guards were angry. They talked with the Chief of Security on the radio and he ordered them to go to the PC HQ and talk with the PC. We went to the PC HQ. The blue guards talked with the PC. They tried to include the security chief in the discussion but the radio did not work well enough, so we went back to the security office, picked up the chief of security and went back to the PC HQ. The security chief had a long talk with the PC. The discussion took place outside in front of the camp jail office. The security chief stood while the PC sat on chairs they had brought outside from the camp jail office. They were too far away from the truck where I was sitting with the blue guards and the two Vietnamese CMT patrols for me to hear, and they were speaking mostly Tagalog, which I did not know. The blue guards in the truck, however, listened closely for any of the louder snippets of conversation. The discussion lasted about 45 minutes and concluded with the security chief curtly thanking the PC as he turned and walked back to the truck. We left and went back to the security office. He explained to me that the essence of the argument was that the blue guard had been illegally detained since he had not been charged with a crime. If he had been charged with a crime he would have been taken to Marong and booked into the Marong jail. He also told me that in the Philippines someone could be held for only seven hours

unless a complaint was filed against them. In this case a complaint from a relative of the deceased Filipino, at which time they had to be released. He said no complaint had been filed against the blue guard. The PC, according to the security chief, had simply said that they had orders from Supot, the local PC HQ, to hold the blue guard in the PUPC jail, and that was that.

Right after we returned to the security office a car roared up (liberally) from Manila. The men inside were from the CISA agency, the private security agency that had the contract to provide blue guards to the PUPC, to investigate the events of that day. They went inside and had a long talk with the chief of security. I sat around with the CISA patrol for a while until we went around on another patrol. We went around Phase II until we got near the PABS complex where we stopped. The blue guards got out to talk to two PC who had emerged from the surrounding darkness. The PC were wearing raggedy T-shirts, camouflage pants, samp-belts filled with bullets crisscrossed over their chests, bandanas around their heads and big guns. I asked the blue guard who stayed in the back if they were PC and he said yes, very perfunctorily. We saw them again later when we were cruising around Phase II again, this time with all six blue guards from Phase II (two each from neighborhoods 1, 2 and 12) to check out a report that Filipinos were gathering around the Mingo Tree (the jeepney and tricycle pickup point

went to the Phase II market) "to get some blue guards." We went to check it out but no one was there and the blue guards just stood around talking with the VC. I spent the remainder of the night with the blue guards but nothing of great consequence ensued.

These events caused me to wonder about the nature of the FPGC as an institution as well as whether the blue guards would be able to establish any real measure of control over what happened in the neighborhoods. There were 31 blue guards. They rotated on twelve hour shifts. At night there was one blue guard for neighborhoods 1,2,3, and 4 and two blue guards in neighborhoods 7,8,9, and 10. There was one blue guard stationed at the hospital and one that alternated between the security office and patrolling in the truck with the CBS patrol and Vietnamese interpreters and the head blue guards. They worked in 15 day stretches with one day off between stretches. They lived in a refugee billet building that had been converted into a sort of bunk house. Very importantly, the blue guards were contract employees of a private security agency, not from the local area. The agency was based in Manila and the blue guards were recruited there. The blue guards were armed but, as the case above illustrated, there were questions as to what would happen if they used their weapons even in self defense. During the entire time I was in the FPGC no blue guard ever shot a refugee, and I do not know what would have

happened if they did. They did an execution fire wearing masks into the air with questionable effectiveness.

As a result of the incident described above changes were made in the way the blue guards were deployed at night. In Phase II they were stationed in groups of four instead of two. Even in the neighborhood we also noticed that we saw the blue guards only very rarely. When I first began staying in the bullet the blue guards would go around the neighborhood with the UNHCR patrols just after curfew time and chase people inside. Once when I was late getting inside my door a blue guard literally pushed the door closed in my face. After the stabbing of the blue guard and death of the local man, however, the blue guards stopped going around with the UNHCR patrols. The only presence they maintained was a stationary one in the PHOTOS building in Phase II near the market and when they went around in their truck as mobile patrol.

About the time we began to see the blue guards in the neighborhoods again a blue guard was killed in Phase I. On April 8, 1979 about 8:45 at night a blue guard was grabbed by four unidentified Filipinos in neighborhood four and dragged out of the neighborhood and down the side of the hill leading down to the stream. The incident had been reported by a Khmer refugee from neighborhood four and a search was conducted immediately by the camp commandery and the PC. The search continued until 12:45 AM when it was

halted. The search began again at 5:40 AM the next morning and the blue guard's body was found on a trail between neighborhoods three and four. He had been shot in the head and chest.

The blue guards retreated again into the PHOTOS building in Phase II where they would stay at night. They no longer patrolled with the CIM patrol after the curfew time. Once again the only presence they maintained was either stationary in the neighborhood centers or an actual patrol with the use of their truck.

This is not to say that they disappeared completely. The camp security still responded to calls, still investigated incidents and still incarcerated refugees in the camp jail. They just did not maintain a regular nightly presence in the neighborhoods.

The description above is presented as an illustration that major divisions existed between the two organizations responsible for security in the camp about how to deal with the local population. As a result of tensions between the camp security office and the local Filipinos, the refugees often became a secondary concern. In the next chapter where I discuss a riot that took place in the camp, one of the precipitating factors was the inability of the camp security group to deal with local Filipinos as one of the methods for harassing the refugees.

Camp Security and The Refugee

On a Sunday afternoon not long after I moved into 8100 I was sitting in a coffee shop talking with some people when a blue guard passed by the coffee shop on a motorcycle heading up between neighborhoods nine and ten. Very shortly after that we heard a gun shot, my first in the FARC. We got up and went to see what was going on. A large crowd had gathered and was growing in neighborhood ten and around the neighborhood nine and ten food distribution buildings (see Map 2). When I looked over into neighborhood ten I saw two blue guards carrying a tall American man by the shoulders and letting his feet drag. He did not seem to be resisting, just letting himself be dragged along. They put him in the back of the truck where two other men were sitting, and he lay on the floor.

A large crowd had gathered during all of this (I estimated to be 100 or more) on both sides of the road and in the road in front and in back of the truck. One of the blue guards tried to clear the road in front of the truck. People moved slowly out of the way. The blue guard shouted that they were going to take the refugee to the hospital. The crowd continued to pull around, moving slowly. The blue guards started the truck but could not get it to go right. Either it did not run right or the person driving it was not familiar with using a clutch, for the truck moved ahead in little lurches and stalled. While they were trying to clear

the road and got the truck going again, the man in the back jumped out and laid down on the road holding on to the right rear tire. The three guards were on the other side and in front of the truck trying to clear the way, and they did not see the man get out or decided not to get the man and get him back inside. It was unclear if they even knew he had jumped out. A man from the crowd on the neighborhood side side of the road ran up to the man and picked him up over his shoulder and carried him off through the crowd and into neighborhood side. The three guards made no attempt to follow. They got their truck going, the road cleared, and left.

The example above was a demonstration to me that even in direct confrontations between refugees who had violated the camp regulations and the camp security personnel, the outcome was not a foregone conclusion. The security personnel had even been summoned to the neighborhood by the neighborhood refugee leaders. The uncertainty created by the crowd and the apprehended refugee's lack of cooperation, however, rendered the neighborhood leaders and the security personnel relatively helpless.

In most cases, however, such incidents were handled by the camp security group and the neighborhood leaders and led to the sanction or detention in the camp jail or social Rehabilitation Center (SRC). Detention in the SRC required

the involvement of both the camp security group and the neighborhood leaders) .

Security and The Refugee Committee: Refugee Neighborhoods as Non-Communities

For me the realization came rather quickly that though residence areas were called neighborhoods, they did not function in any sense as communities. Within the first two weeks of living in the building a consistently unrelenting and incredibly violent conflict erupted that involved several different billets and people whom I had not even interacting with each other in any great degree. Furthermore, having known the major protagonist if only slightly, I would not have conceived that he was capable of such violence.

The incident began, as I was to discover later, like most of these sorts of things did with loud shouts and bumps and thuds coming from inside a billet where a drinking party was in progress. In this case it was three billets down from my own. The shouting, bumping and thudding went on for a little while, long enough for people in surrounding billets to come out on their porches to see what was going on. The yelling, thudding and crashing eventually burst out the front door of the billet revealing a scene that was, again later to be repeated, one man yelling and gesturing threateningly, another holding a knife, another one holding up his arm in attempts at non-threatening

conversations, sometimes holding a knife. In this case the men getting progressively more threatening was the resident of the billet three doors from mine and the man trying to placate him was the same tall American who had eluded the blue guards (see above) a few days earlier. In this case he seemed to be showing some respect for the wall, and each thinner, man who was yelling and screaming. Both were flushed red, as Vietnamese do, from the alcohol they had drunk.

Once they were outside people moved away from the billets forming a large ring around the drunken men and keeping a good distance away. The main protagonist entered the billet next to mine and beat up a man who had not even been outside watching. The attacker was drunk, but alcohol only removed the inhibitions on the hostility; it did not direct it. I found out later that the man who was beaten had had some minor conflicts with the family he was living with and who were incidentally friends with the attacker who had gotten the idea that he might call the police to report their drinking party so he started on down to inform him that that might not be a good idea, an idea that had actually not occurred to him at all. He then turned his attention to one of my billeteuses who was a partner in a coffee shop where the tall American often drank coffee. I am not sure what the grounds of the hostility were but it

resulted in my billetes departing rapidly while being chased by the man with the knife.

In the middle of this my daughter returned from visiting some refugee friends and came running down the sidewalk in front of the billetes right through the crowd and the drunks. I scooped her up and took her away. I was not worried that anyone would do anything to her but I did not want her initial impressions of her new home to be formed in the midst of a drunken melee.

Several bits of interesting information emerged from this incident, among them that my presence alone did not deter Vietnamese in pursuing violent means. Other aspects were more interesting, however, in that the man who was beaten did not report the incident and actually became friends with his previously hostile co-resident family to the point that they gave him some money when he needed it. Another interesting point that arose in asking my billetes about the incident was that the victim, the man in the next billet, was alone. He was a first asylum camp refugee, but his friends from Malaysia had either gone ahead of him or had not yet been accepted. The likelihood of anyone coming to his aid was apparently nil. This was borne out by the actions of my billetes who said things to the effect that, if the man who was beating people up stopped one foot in our house, he was dead but he could be more or less what he liked next door. Talking with the man who was

Woken up later he was not surprised that others did not come to his aid; he did not expect it. He did not know them.

The other side to this, of course, is that if he had friends they would have become involved--and a small, though nasty, incident would have been much bigger with very severe consequences. Because of the interpersonal nature of the conflicts there are limits as to how widespread they can become. Another interesting aspect was that, regardless of the suspicions of our drunken neighbors, no one called the blue guards. The incident played itself out: the drinks eventually went to sleep; and it was over.

Security and The Local Community

Uncertainty about security existed in the local community as well as within the refugee population. The profit margins within which the local vendors operated were small. The ambient beer vendors obtained their supplies on a consignment basis from distributors. They might make as little as three pesos (about 13 cents) on each quart bottle of beer they sold to the refugees. Much of their business came from their walking rounds through the neighborhoods, but their most important business came from the personal relationships they had with their regular refugee customers. Consequently these relationships were very important to the vendors and if these relationships were threatened it meant

that the basis of their business was threatened as well. The reactions to such threats could be swift and violent.

The death of a journalist

I was drinking beer with Ark when the man was killed. Ark was a Vietnamese refugee who came to the DRPC by way of Japan. Ark spent most of the Vietnam War in close company with U.S. Marines, spoke beautiful, if somewhat salty, English, and knew just about everything going on in neighborhood three. Neighborhood three and the events that were taking place there were of interest to me as an anthropologist trying to understand the dynamics of the relationship between the refugees who lived in the DRPC and the Filipino administrators who ran the DRPC.

Neighborhood three had recently experienced the arrival of a large number of American GIP cases, many of whom came as single young men directly from the streets of Saigon. They were Amerisians, the children of American servicemen and Vietnamese women who had grown up largely on the streets. They had come to the DRPC as a group, essentially as a gang. Not having preferences for any other place to live or with anyone but each other they were placed en masse in neighborhood three which had recently been vacated by the departure of the last batch of those refugees from Thailand. The DRPC was likely to see and who also tended to come and go in groups. Now the GIP Amerisians were more or less

taking control of the neighborhood away from the Filipino administrator.

Josh was unique among the many refugees I got to know in the REPC for several reasons, one of which was the fact that he had friends in the Marines stationed at the Subic Naval Base just across a couple of hills from the camp. He had gotten out of the camp to visit them and I was listening as he talked about it. I was trying to make sense of a world where he sat there as a refugee after years of reeducation camp in Vietnam, a boat escape to Japan, another year in a Japanese refugee camp, only to meet people he fought with in Vietnam almost 20 years ago in the Philippines.

That's when Jackie, a black American, came running into the neighborhood crying and screaming. Josh knew Jackie and we went out to see what was going on. When she stopped screaming and shaking enough to speak a few words she managed to communicate that there was a dead man lying on the ground not too far away. It was not clear whether the dead man was a refugee or a Filipino. We went to see. A crowd had begun to gather. Someone had called the camp security office, and they had also called the Philippine Constabulary, the PC. By the time we walked the fifty or so feet outside of neighborhood three and waded through the crowd that had gathered there and the remaining fifty or so feet to where the dead man lay the PC had arrived and one of the officers came up with a flashlight.

I had never seen a person with his throat slit before. In the dark with only the bright white beam of the flashlight for illumination the brown skin and the small river of blood that had flowed across the bare sandy soil gave a plastic shininess to what I was seeing. I looked up toward neighborhood three. I could see Ash's billet, I could see the bare white walls through the open window from where I was standing. If not for the front wall I could have seen where I was sitting and listening to Ash when the man on the ground died. I had not heard or seen a thing.

Ash recognized the man immediately. He was a Filipino bear seller from whom Ash had regularly bought bear and ice when he came to the door of Ash's billet on his rounds through the neighborhood.

Back in Ash's billet we were discussing what had happened, the reasons, the circumstances, of the event. The only reason that Jackie had discovered the body was because she was coming back from the Filipino movie house in the squatter settlement right outside of the neighborhood. She remembered the man's name and that he sometimes went on his rounds with a small boy (his son?). He also remembered, as did I, that a fight had taken place a few days before in neighborhood four between bearsellers over who could sell where, a kind of territorial dispute. Could that have been the reason? Could the man have died over a dispute about who could sell bear where, a famous business of mine, what

with the blue guards occasionally seizing a seller's whole supply and the reduced business because of the increasing numbers of American GIP cases voting to the PRPC who had no relatives in the U.S. and thus no money through the mail? Sitting there in that place and time, the explanation was perfectly plausible.

Refugee gangs

Studying refugee gangs in the PRPC was not something I pursued. I did not seek out gang members to interview in an attempt to understand the dynamics of gangs. This was a conscious decision based on my own perceptions of the possible consequences regarding my own somewhat marginal status and place in the PRPC. As a participant observer, living in a refugee billet, I acquired a perception of a certain degree of vulnerability. I realized that, when most of the physical barriers that Americans have for constructing and maintaining personal space and regulating access are absent, the strategies that one must employ develop in the interpersonal and with whom, and how, one has contact. In taking into consideration the possible consequences for myself, my billetesmates and, most especially, my three year old daughter who was living with me in the billet, I tended to avoid contacts with refugees who were likely to try to trade on that contact in ways that might be compromising. In a way, I was adapting a strategy

practiced by many refugees of laying low to avoid being noticed and bringing on consequences beyond my control. It was not a strategy I followed exclusively. There were some events that had to be investigated and as part of the process of investigating or following up on events I had to be somewhat visible. In one instance my presence and questions did cause me a problem. In terms of refugee gangs, however, my information came from observation, interviews with refugees and waling personnel, and living with refugees who, for a time, were worried.

The refugees had good reason to be worried. There were gangs in the PRPC. The gangs came to the PRPC from two places, Palau Midong first asylum camp in Malaysia and directly from Vietnam as groups of COFs. Some gangs remained in the PRPC. There was a period of time during which roving gangs would go to people's back doors during the night and knock. If the door was opened they would hold up the residents of the billet with knives. This was what my billetmates were worried about.

I tended to take it all a bit lightly, not having been robbed or even threatened myself. One night in April, 1980, however, I got an idea of what kind of individuals everyone was worried about.

An example of what goes on at night April was serious dry season time in between in the Philippines. Inside the billet with all the doors and windows closed it was stuffy

and hot. I could not sleep. I got up and went to the backdoor and opened it and squatted down. It was a little cooler since there was a slight breeze. Something was going on, however. I heard someone talking loudly and then yelling on the other side of Building 814 (see Map 1). I could also hear someone tossing the tables and stools of the coffee shop around. Someone was smashing up my coffee shop. Not my coffee shop exactly, but the place I work for coffee every morning. Whoever it was, was saying something about people calling his friend this or that. Ah, then I know who it was, as he said his own name in reference to being called friend by people, judged by his present actions, whom he did not believe. The sound of crashing furniture seemed to indicate that he was either disappointed or frustrated, or both, with the actions of those who called his friend. Considering the impression he made on me when I saw him drunk and chasing a hillmate of mine with a knife, I could readily believe that he was addressed as friend by some with less than complete sincerity. I wished he would stop smashing up my coffee shop, and I hoped he did not get too carried away and do something that would endanger my earning coffee money.

Apparently satisfied with what damage he had wrought he wanders off. When those living near the coffee shop were sure he has gone they come out. I could see them going out their back doors to peek around to the front of the building

to make sure he was gone. I could also hear their faint whispers and an occasional, rather louder, murmur. As I peeped in the back door I noticed that, not only did some people come out of back doors, but some others emerged from places where they had been hiding across the road in neighborhood ten. After a lot of whispering that was too faint for me to hear clearly, I saw them move back into hiding places. It appeared that they are going to set an ambush.

Then we waited. The owners of the coffee shop hid in various places around the building and across the street behind a garden in front of building 1814 in neighborhood ten, and I remained in my dark back door. We waited a long time but he did not come back.

Some men came out of 1814 and sat outside. They appeared to be drunk and made a lot of noise, including setting off firecrackers. After a while they went back inside. Finally, the coffee shop wacker returned, this time, however, bearing some kind of grudge against the people inside 1814. He beat on their door and he yelled at them to let him in. They made some kind of muffled replies that I could not hear. They did not let him in. He got angry and yelled and pounded louder. They still did not let him in. There was a period of silence, then came the thump and bang of rocks against the side of the building. Finally he got tired of throwing rocks against 1814 and went away.

The individual responsible for this incident was a reputed gang leader in Phase II. The exact reasons for his hostility towards the owners of the coffee shop and the residents of this were unknown to us. The fact that he could cause such a disturbance that went on well into the night and continued into the early morning without the knowledge of, or any response by, the camp authorities demonstrates how little control existed over the refugee population and in the neighborhoods.

The situation with gangs and incidents similar to the one presented above got so bad that the refugees themselves finally had to take action. The action the refugees finally took, rounding up the gangsters, was sanctioned by the camp administration.

The PRPC and refugee participation and cooperation

The cases presented above illustrate the tensions and occasional violence that existed in the PRPC and the ambiguous, or disputed, nature of authority in coping with the problems. If the PRPC had been a totalitarian or total institution, with clear lines of authority, rigid enforcement of rules and regulations and harboring an oppressed, passive, dependent refugee population, the incidents recounted above could not have taken place.

While the incidents presented in the cases above were characteristic of the PRPC, they were not truly

representative of the camp as a whole. On a day-to-day basis the camp did function and many problems like those presented above were resolved. The process of resolving problems in the PRPC was dependent on the participation and cooperation of the refugees.

The process of sanctioning refugees for violations of the rules, the ability to present grievances to the PRPC administration and bring problems to their attention and finally, to initiate and cooperate with the PRPC administration to solve a major peace and order problem are the examples given below to demonstrate the importance of the refugees' participation and cooperation in making the solution of many problems possible.

sanctions

Sanctions is the camp took four forms, all of them affecting the length of time the refugee had to stay in the PRPC and the date of departure to a third country. The four forms were (1) a direct administrative hold, (2) detention in the PRPC social rehabilitation center, (3) incarceration in a Philippine jail, and (4) internationalization.

A direct administrative hold meant that the refugee could not depart for the resettlement country until the administration lifted the hold. An administrative hold could mean that the refugee's stay in the camp was extended for a specific period of time, or until a problem was

received. For example, refugees who were charged with criminal offenses, i.e., breaking Philippine law, and were awaiting the outcome of a trial, could not depart.

The most commonly imposed sanction was detention in the Social Rehabilitation Center (SRC), which was the camp jail or "monkey house". While in the SRC, the detainees could not attend the State Department mandated English-as-a-second-language (ESL) and orientation classes, unless special permission was given. Thus, departure was delayed until the refugee made up the missed days.

Recreation in a Philippine jail meant that the refugee had been charged with a crime under Philippine law, had received a trial before a Philippine judge, and had been sentenced. When I left the PRPC, only one refugee had been sentenced to jail, and that was a life sentence for assault and rape.

Internationalists noted that the acceptance by the third (resettlement) country had been resisted. Rejection by the refugees' resettlement country meant that the refugees had to stay in the PRPC until the UNHCR could find an alternate country that would agree to accept them.

A refugee could be detained in the SRC, the most common sanction, in two ways. First, immediate detention could occur without an investigation, as a result of prima facie evidence. Prima facie evidence, for example, might be drunkenness as determined by a blood alcohol test, or

leaving the camp without permission (ARPL, or away without leave) and getting caught trying to get out of, or back into, the camp without a pass. The second way a refugee could be detained required an investigation by the neighborhood council and/or possibly the camp security office.

The neighborhood councils were responsible for assisting the FARC administration in managing the ten refugee residential areas, or neighborhoods, and in providing basic services such as food and fuel distribution. Each council consisted of an elected leader, an assistant leader, and food, fuel, and peace and order leaders; leaders were also appointed for sanitation, women's affairs, information, socio-cultural affairs, livelihood, and training. The neighborhood council was supervised by a member of the FARC staff, the Community Administration and Organization Officer (COAO). The council's management role entailed approving or disapproving billet transfers, maintaining accurate records, and investigating and settling disputes between refugees, either directly or through recommending sanctions.

Violations such as theft, robbery, extortion, abuse of authority, disrespect to persons in authority, slight physical injury, domestic violence, and any others had to be investigated by the neighborhood council, which then made recommendations specifying which violations would be

charged. The council's recommendation would go through the COMO, to the security office where they would accept the council's recommendation or do their own independent investigation and, finally, to the deputy director who had to sign any detention order. The sanction was based on the violation. For example, a theft of between 200 and 300 pesos earned the offender two months in the ABC (see Appendix A) if the neighborhood council, after an investigation, recommended it, the COMO and security office concurred, and the deputy director signed the order (see Appendix B). As the initial investigating and charging body, the neighborhood council had considerable responsibility and power, plus a lot of latitude in how it was used. The exceptions to this procedure were incidents between refugees and non-refugees, where the initial investigation would be carried out by the security office.

An example illustrates the dilemma the administration had as a result of the autonomy enjoyed by the neighborhood councils. A mailing leader was caught carrying two letters in front of his billet, he had stolen the letters while distributing mail, but was seen by another council member who dug up the letters and informed the neighborhood leader. The neighborhood leader informed the COMO, and the council met to discuss the case. The guilty mailing leader reconciliated with the council, pleading that he had never done anything like that before and did it only because he

needed money desperately, that he would never do it again, and that, if they sent him to the "monkey house" and delayed his departure, he would commit suicide. The man admitted his guilt; there was a witness; and mail pilferage was a serious offense, but the council decided not to take any action on the case at that time, and never did. The CDAO, though frustrated with her council, could not do anything without an investigation and recommendation from the council, which she never got, so the man went unscathed.

Grievances

Refugees also had the option of making complaints about the way they were treated and seeking redress. Two cases illustrate this point. In one case, some neighborhood leaders organized a protest of about 100 refugees because a refugee with a notorious record for theft, extortion, and assault was taken out of the camp and, instead of being put in jail, was put into the transit center in Manila, where refugees stay for one night when they arrive and depart from the Philippines. The apprehended man was continuing his criminal activities in the Manila transit center, and the neighborhood leaders were especially worried about his seeking retribution against them for their role in having him removed from the camp in the first place. They threatened to stay outside the administrator's office until their grievance was addressed. After only a few hours in

which they were watched, but not threatened, the deputy administrator came out and told them the man would be removed from the center in Manila. Subsequently, the man was detained at Napok, the local Philippine constabulary base.

Another case concerned the chairman of the inter-neighborhood council (INC). The INC had the same structure as the ten neighborhood councils, but dealt with campwide problems, coordinated interneighborhood activities such as the celebration of traditional holidays, and handled disputes involving residents from more than one neighborhood.

One night the INC chairman, whom I shall call Mr. Trang, was working in his billet with his windows open after the 9:00 pm curfew. On this night a camp security guard was accompanying the neighborhood refugee patrol on their rounds. The guard stopped at the billet and told Mr. Trang to close his windows. Mr. Trang explained that he was working on a report for the community administration office, and the windows were open to ventilate the fumes from the oil lamp. The security guard became angry and began to yell, which woke the children, who became afraid and started crying. Mr. Trang thought he smelled liquor on the security guard's breath and accused him of drinking on duty and abusing his power. The security guard decided to take Mr. Trang to the neighborhood office for an investigation,

giving the impression that he was going to charge Mr. Tseng with a curfew violation and submit himself to an alcohol blood test to prove he had not been drinking. Instead, the guard took Mr. Tseng to the hospital and made him take a blood alcohol test, which was negative. Mr. Tseng was then released and taken home, whereupon he wrote a letter of protest to the director of the community organization office, demanding an apology and a statement clarifying whether curfew meant being inside the billet, or inside with windows and doors shut.

The report Mr. Tseng had been writing that night was about the election of new leaders, and the incoming INC chairman refused to take office until Mr. Tseng was satisfied. If the incoming INC chairman refused to move, he would take other INC leaders and probably many, if not all, of the neighborhood leaders as well. The deputy director of the camp issued a written apology to Mr. Tseng, and a statement clarifying that the doors and windows could be open after curfew. The security guard was berated and sent back to Berlin.

In both of these instances the administration was confronted by refugee leaders who felt that their status was undermined by decisions the administration or staff had made, and the refugee leaders protested. The dilemma faced by the administration was whether to reinforce the

perception of its own control or its need for an efficacious refugee self-government.

The roundup

The problem of gangs persisted in the PRPG. There seemed to be nothing the PRPG authority often could do because the refugees were afraid of what would happen if they made any complaint while the perpetrators were still so large and capable of intimidating them or exacting revenge. The solution required not just the cooperation of the refugees, but their full participation as well. The case presented below of the "roundup" is one of the best illustrations of how the refugee participation was indispensable in solving major problems in the PRPG.

Something was happening. It was after curfew but men were slipping out of their billets and walking down the sidewalk in front of my billet and out into the street. I went outside to see what was happening. All along the road men were strung out, standing in little groups, holding wooden poles in their hands. One young man came up to me and told me there was nothing interesting to see and that I should go home. I had no intention of going home; I was there to observe, which is what I told him. He kept at it for about ten more minutes and finally gave up.

I finally moved on looking for someone I might know. I saw a flashlight beam bobbing across the ground leading a group of men into neighborhood ten. I moved closer, but not

two sizes, just close enough to see what was going on. The group of men went up to a billet, some of them yelling for the others to go around to the back. One of them began pounding on the door, calling out a name and demanding that the door be opened. The door opened and the group of men flowed inside, pushing someone out of the way. They filled the billet, looking under the bed, running up the stairs. Some men ran around in back of the billet. They were looking for someone who was not there. There was a lot of shouting, a little talking. I could not hear what they were saying but it was pretty obvious they were asking the billet occupants where the quarry they were seeking had gone or might be.

They started going door to door. Occasionally, there was a false alarm and men would charge to a billet again, pound on the door, yell for others to cover the rear, and go inside and search. But they did not find anyone.

I heard shouts over in neighborhood nine and went to see. On the way I met up with Mr. Short, a friend of one of my ballistics, who was going around with some other men, and went around with them. They were going through the billet blocks in the south end of neighborhood nine. Since all the billet studs had locks that only the billet occupants for that stall could open they had to climb up on top of the stairs and look down into each one. They were empty of gangsters and, fortunately, residents as well.

I went up toward the neighborhood sign office to watch some people going door to door through the middle of neighborhood sign. As men went door to door others stood or squatted in the roads or the major sidewalks through the neighborhoods while others went around the perimeter of the neighborhoods.

In almost every case I was close enough to see, the hillside residents were cooperative about opening up the doors and allowing the men in to search. This level of cooperation seemed to support the contention of the MPPS veterans that people wanted someone to do something. I had recently attended an EAC meeting where the issue of security had come up and been discussed. Some of the neighborhood leaders at the meeting had insisted that people were afraid and wanted something done about the gangs.

I went over to the neighborhood night feed distribution center and sat with a group of men. I should have kept on going with another group that went into the neighborhood. The group I was sitting with did nothing but gossip, sometimes about me. Finally some of them got up and went into the neighborhood office and the rest went north into neighborhood sign. I went north and watched more of the door to door searches. I heard some noise south of the neighborhood sign office and went to see. The leader of a group going house to house was taking a young Australian very kindly to the neighborhood sign office. They took him

inside, sat him down, talked with him a while and then took him to the neighborhood nine office. I followed them. On the way, while I was in the road between neighborhoods eight and nine, I heard yelling to the south again. I turned and saw men in front of a bullet just down from the neighborhood eight office. They brought out a young man, maybe 18 years old, and banged him toward the neighborhood nine office. He was the first captive I saw get hit. He got hit with some police and then poked in the kidneys. For all the hatred directed at him verbally by the men accompanying him, they did not actually do much to him. The leader and another man chastised his attackers and they stopped, but I do not know how much my presence also inhibited them.

I went into the neighborhood nine office to see what would happen to the prisoners. I counted 10; 4-5 were clearly American and the rest looked pure Vietnamese. Col. Banton was there with two of the PRG security investigators, one blue guard and the leader of the Vietnamese Veterans Association. The prisoners sat in chairs against the wall. At first the prisoners looked upset, but as time passed and they did not get hit they started to talk and make jokes. One of the PRG investigators fingerprinted them and Col. Banton took their pictures with a card in front of them with their case number on it, just like a real mug shot. They then had to sign a

statement about the charges against them and then their hands were tied behind their backs.

At one point a man with a mark on his arm came in and identified one of the young Americans as the one who had broken his arm. Another man then hit the accused several times, quite really, in the face, until the other man said enough. I asked Col. Gomez what would happen to the prisoners and he said they would be taken straight to court the next day and be charged. People began drifting home and so did I.

The next day the prisoners were held in the neighborhood vice office, while an announcement was made for anyone who had been robbed or assaulted to come and see if the perpetrators were among those captured. During the day refugees went to the office and some identified the captured refugees as those who had robbed or assaulted them. In this manner charges were elicited from the refugees against the alleged gang members. The original plan was to charge the refugees in the Philippine court with criminal offenses. The refugees who had brought complaints against them, however, were reluctant to pursue the complaints in the Philippine court since it would very likely mean delaying their departure. It was decided to incorporate the rounded up gang members in the nearby Majot PC base jail for one year.

Conclusion

These were the kinds of incidents that characterized the period of my research in the PRPC. The impression I formed of the PRPC as a result of incidents such as those described above was not of a monolithic institution that set a premium on the control of the refugees nor of a cruel, passive and dependent refugee population. Actually, I began to wonder how the place managed to work at all when so little control was exercised.

Some of the incidents related above had long term impacts on the refugees and the way the camp was run. Further, they foreshadowed or were the result of problems that would persist during much of the time I was to remain in the PRPC.

The blue guards, for example, were not really a presence in the neighborhoods again for months as a result of the incidents with the local population. After the first incident when the blue guard was stalked they returned but their presence was once again inhibited, again by some local Filipino, by the murder of a blue guard.

Consequently, for the refugees, the curfew was not a strictly enforced rule. The lights would go out; the candles and oil lamps would come on; the coffee shops would close; many people would go inside and close their doors; the neighborhood OSG patrol, some blue guard escorts, would go around blowing a whistle as they passed through the

neighborhoods; and a lot of people would continue to sit outside and talk, drink tea, even play guitars and sing. Sometimes later in the night the blue guards would go around in their trucks and shine a small spotlight on the hillside and yell at anyone still outside to go inside. This could happen, or not happen, at any time between 10:00 PM and midnight on any given night.

The presence of the blue guards in the neighborhoods was not to create the perception of control or needlessly repeat the refugees, though occasionally the latter took place with varying consequences for refugees and blue guards. There was a real need for security in the neighborhoods. The need came from both the openness of the camp to the much poorer surrounding community and the refugees themselves. Within the refugee community there were some unmanageable individuals and there were gangs as discussed above:

Given the way refugee camps are most often characterized, the kinds of events described above are not supposed to happen. Refugees, not local people, are supposed to be the ones to have reason to fear the dark-camp security personnel are supposed to be the ones with the power and authority to round up gangsters and the camp administration is not supposed to have to rely on refugee vigilantes, however well organized, to deal with their own. Refugees are supposed to be intimidated by camp personnel,

and not the other way around, as the bus drivers in the FRFC were when it appeared their buses were going to be seized. However, if a bus driver were responsible for the injury or death of a refugee they would have to answer for it. Refugees faced no sanction for piling in the bus windows or pushing other, more patient, refugees out of the way.

Most of the literature on refugee camps is of a very dualistic nature where the institution, including the administration and the agencies providing aid, is set up in opposition to the refugees (see Chapter 2). The refugee population is often reflected as a separate entity from the institution and those who work and live in and around the institution, who are stamped into a separate entity themselves. From my experience in the FRFC I doubt that refugee camps actually operate with such clear definition between the refugee population and everyone else.

The examples presented above demonstrate the less than dualistic nature of the structure of the FRFC. Extracting the refugees as a separate population, distinct from the other groups and organisations operating in the FRFC, would give a very limited understanding of the FRFC and the events that took place there.

There was a formal organisational structure to FRFC as seen in chapter 4, but that structure, like a too large wall of stones, hung loosely and allowed a lot of room for maneuver. It allowed room for maneuver by refugees, FRFC

and Veleg staff, and the surrounding community. The PRPC's existence itself was the result of a curious mix of political expediency, economics and humanitarianism. The nature, the way it worked, was an even more curious mix of the best and worse of bureaucratic organization, the economics of arbitrage, the cultural assumptions of several different ethnic groups, the physical environment and the will and volition of many diverse individuals. To understand the way the PRPC worked, all of these factors have to be taken into account. To take these factors into account they have to be observed and described.

The next chapter provides an illustration of the importance of studying the PRPC in terms of the interactions of the various groups participating in the PRPC. The chapter is built around a single event, a riot that took place in the camp on November 12, 1969. The factors precipitating the riot, the responses to the riot by various groups and the aftermath of the riot -- all reveal pieces of the nature of the interactions among the refugees, the velegs, the PRPC administration and the local Pidgeon population.

CHAPTER XXVI
THE RIOT

Introduction

What follows is taken from reports compiled by the FRC security office and RCMP and from interviews I conducted with refugees and market vendors. I also interviewed some of the expatriates involved or knowledgeable. Some of the information also comes from testimony given at the trials of six refugees who were charged as a result of the incident (several of the hearings I witnessed myself).

On Sunday morning November 12, 1985 a riot took place in the FRC. The causes of the riot were both proximate, i.e., an event took place on that day that sparked off the riot, and the result of a build up of tensions between several different groups. An analysis of the riot, the events that led up to it, and the various attributions of blame by various groups that resulted are revealing of the relationships of the various groups that participated, both formally and informally, in the activities of the FRC.

The incident that initiated the riot was a disagreement between a refugee and a vendor in the Phase 1 market. The refugee had gone to the market to buy a set of dominoes or dice. He had selected the dominoes he wanted and then

either paid for them, or attempted to pay for them, when he was accused of trying to steal them and arrested. The charges were: According to the refugee, he paid the cost of the vendor for the dominoes and the men ran out of the market and did not return his money, the owner of the stall, that the refugee had paid. The refugee then picked up the dominoes and began to leave. The vendor accused the refugee of trying to steal the dominoes, took them from his hand and hit him with them. The refugee then ran from the stall but was stopped by some male vendors responding to the shouts of the female vendor, and beat the refugee. He then went to the neighborhood tan office and reported what had happened (JNRC 1809-1).

According to the report of the PNP security office the refugee had attempted to pay for some dice but "the money was in his armpit" (PNP Security Report 11-887-88, 12 November, 1988). I am not sure what "in his armpit" means. By almost all accounts however, both written and verbal, the refugee did pay for the dominoes or dice. For some reason, the Filipino vendor did not know this and could not understand the refugee's explanation rendered in Vietnamese, and accused him of stealing.

I did interview one person who said that the refugee stole the items from the vendor. A Filipino woman whose brother-in-law had a stall in the market, and was there on the morning of the riot, said that she had been told by

other vendors in the market that a teenage Vietnamese had stolen something from a female vendor and the woman's husband had chased him and pounded his head into a concrete pole.

Other vendors came to the original vendor assistance and attacked the refugee. All reports also agree that the refugee did what he was supposed to do by going to the neighborhood two office and reporting the incident to the neighborhood leaders. He did not initiate the subsequent action by his fellow refugees.

This last point is important. The events that followed the incident at the market were, if not spontaneous, at least not incited by any one individual nor were they planned. The events that followed also were not the result of a general refugee uprising. This last point can be better understood after I give a general description of the Phase I market.

The Phase I Market

The Phase I market was the larger of the two markets in the VERC. Partly, this was the result of the Phase I market being the first, and for a long time, the only market in the VERC. The market was located between neighborhoods three and five (see Figure 3.1). The market was in the general shape of an L (see Figure 3.1), but was in part kind of rambling. The main covered part of the market that fronted




FIGURE 5-14 Phase 1 Market

on a parking lot contained the small dry goods stalls and drink shops. The dry goods stalls sold everything from canned food to various toiletries and sometimes to toys. The drink shops sold bottled soft drinks or drinks in glasses with ice and coffee. They were essentially covered areas with some tables and benches. Along the back of the main market area were some "curiosities", or stores selling cooked food. The market more or less trailed back from the main area along the sidewalks where stalls selling more dry goods, hardware and rice could be found. In the very back was the "wet" market where fresh vegetables, meat (principally pork and chicken) and sea food were sold. Off to the side of the main market area was an extension that included stalls selling dresses, radios and tape players, a photo shop, a noodle shop run by Vietnamese and some miscellaneous shops selling items made from shell and intricately cut wooden plaques.

When I first came to the PEPC in the fall of 1988 there were few refugees who sold anything in the market. They would set up along the sidewalk in front of the extension to the main market. The items they sold mostly consisted of ready-to-eat packages of noodles they brought with them from Thailand or Malaysia-- the Vietnamese had a preference for the packaged noodles from Thailand, Cheet, Mameyda, second, and the Philippine varieties last. Other items

included dictionaries and some clothes, as well as some produce grown in gardens around the billets.

With the increase in the number of GGP families coming to the FRC in 1989 the number of refugee vendors increased dramatically. By the fall of 1989, on Sunday morning, the main market day, the area between the main market and the extension was completely filled with refugee vendors. With the increase in the number of vendors came an increase in the range of items they traded in. On Sunday morning there would be one or two semi-permanent noodle stalls, a couple of banana stalls, a quilt seller, a tape and radio-cassette seller, several refugees selling pharmaceuticals (some brought from Vietnam and some acquired in Bangkok). The increase was largely because the GGP had been money, having fewer to no relatives in third countries sending them money; but they did get big trucks to bring with them and they came to the FRC forewarned about needing money and prepared to do business.

On any Sunday morning beginning as early as 8:00 AM the market began to fill up with both Filipino and refugee vendors. By midmorning the market was a bustling place filled with refugees, Filipino camp staff and expatriates all either selling or doing their weekly marketing on the only day that everyone had off. Consequently, when the initial event that started the riot took place it was in a generally busy area filled with both refugees and Filipino-

though the event was witnessed by many refugees who were at the market no general disturbance took place at that time. Undoubtedly, word spread through the nearby neighborhoods about what had happened at the market, but there was no immediate action by the refugees present at the market.

The Riot

Following the refugees' return to neighborhood two and his reporting of the incident to the neighborhood leaders a mob formed in neighborhood two and marched to the market. The mob arrived at the market and began throwing stones at the market. Some of the Filipinos came out of the market carrying sticks and bolos (long knives). The stone throwing continued.

According to one witness who saw the initial stone throwing by the refugees, the major agitator among the refugees was an old woman. This was the same woman who was later taken to CSC by the blueguards and then released.

The blueguards arrived at the market and attempted to insert themselves between the Filipinos and the refugees. According to the report of the security office (JICA Protective and Security Agency, 1980c) the blueguards, being in the middle, were stoned from both Filipinos and refugees. After a while the PC arrived and fired their guns into the air in an attempt to disperse the crowd, but to no avail.

At a point early on in the riot the blueguards caught two of the refugees and put them into their truck. According to one report (DRC, 1989a) one of the refugees, a man, was beaten by the blueguards and several refugees went to their assistance but the blueguards managed to drive away with the two refugees. According to another report (Poderar, 1989[1]) the two refugees, a male and female, were taken unharmed to the PC compound, which also included the camp jail, where he later found them just sitting in the jail office.

The capture of the two refugees, however, inflated the crowd and they remained in front of the market throwing stones and bottles and defying both the blueguards and PC. A Filipino photographer had been present during the riot and the refugees finally noticed him and tried to catch him. Some of the equiptment staff of DRC rescued the Filipino photographer and got him into a car and drove away.

The refugees then forced a group to go to the SMO to get the two refugees that had been taken by the blueguards. Most of the refugees remained in front of the market. A truck with a blueguard and a PC arrived and announced over a megaphone that the two refugees would be released and then drove away. Shortly after that another truck arrived carrying the returned refugees. The refugee asked "where's the jeep and where is?" (DRC, 1989-3). The refugees pulled the returned refugees from the jeep. According to

one witness, one of the refugees was unconscious (ICMC, 14843). An expatriate ICMC employee and a Vietnamese-Swedish expatriate took the refugee to the hospital in the Vietnamese-Swedish's truck.

The group of refugees marching to the IDC caught one Filipino in neighborhood six who had supposedly his Vietnamese living there in the past. The refugees planned to trade the Filipino for the refugees at the IDC. When the refugees got to the IDC they found out that the refugees that had been detained had already been taken back to the market. They then began to walk back to the Phase I market. On the way they were confronted by the camp fire truck. The refugees threw rocks at the firetruck. A fireguard standing on the back of the firetruck threatened the crowd of refugees with his revolver which initiated another volley of stones. The driver of the truck attempted to force his way through the crowd with the truck and turned on the water cannon. This also initiated another round of stone throwing. During the incident with the firetruck, some members of the crowd began to beat the captured Filipino. Some expatriate ICMC staff managed to extricate the Filipino and take him to the hospital. The truck managed to get through the crowd and down the road and the crowd began to move back toward Phase I. As the crowd passed through the Baptist housing area they spread out around the area and down the side of the camp leading down to the ravine. They

damaged some of the Baptist houses and some of the houses of the Philippine staff along the side of the river. They then began marching back up toward the Phase I market.

At the market the crowd had stabilized somewhat. The marchers to the SAC had not yet returned. Then the firetruck arrived. When the firetruck drove into the market area the refugees began throwing stones at it. Two Philippine crewmen on the back of the firetruck began throwing rocks back at the crowd from a pile of rocks atop the firetruck. The crowd responded with more rock throwing and the Philippine jumped down from the firetruck and began to run. One Philippine escaped, but one was caught by some members of the crowd and was beaten until rescued by one of the expatriate staff. The expatriate also took him to the hospital.

Some members of the crowd were becoming restless because they did not know what happened to the two refugees who had been injured earlier and been taken to the hospital. Rumors spread that the two were either dead or dying. An expatriate Vietnamese-American took several members of the crowd to the hospital to see that the two refugees were alright. They returned to the market and spread the news that the refugees were alright. This seemed to calm some members of the crowd.

A small fire started at the right front of the market and the head of the camp security section alerted the

firetruck to spray the water cannon on the fire. The refugees continued to sporadically throw stones at the market, concentrating on the new section of the market and especially the photo shop. One of the expatriate staff members mounted on top of a truck with a megaphone and a Vietnamese refugee to translate and began addressing the crowd.

Several Filipino vendors were still trapped in the market and wished to leave. It was decided to evacuate them. A cordon was formed of neighborhood car patrols and volap staff to allow the Filipinos to pass out of the market and into vehicles which took them away. The evacuation proceeded mostly without incident except for an attempt to attack one particular Filipino vendor when he boarded a SPMC bus. Several refugees managed to get on the bus to attack the Filipino and had to be forcefully ejected from the bus. Filipinos continued to leave the market without incident until one man from the photo shop left and was kicked by some of the refugees. An older woman and child who left after the photo shop man was actually cheered by the crowd.

By 4:45 PM the Filipino vendors were all out of the market. After the Filipinos were evacuated from the market some SPMC buses were brought in to take away some of the refugee crowd. The captain of the PC detachment suggested that the expatriate volap staff was the major attraction and that they should also leave the market.

By 6:00 a few refugees still remained at the market. Some of the neighborhood leaders were taken to the market with megaphones to disperse the remaining crowd and to go through the neighborhoods and announce that a 6:30 PM curfew had been imposed and that people should stay in their billets.

According to the news from the PRM administration, six refugees, four MRC staff and at least four Filipino market vendors were injured in the riot. The injuries, however, were called minor (PRM, 1989:154-155). Some of the market buildings, some MRC vehicles, including the firetruck, were damaged. Furthermore, the news was read over the camp loudspeaker system and informed the refugees that the incident would be investigated and those responsible punished.

The market was supposed to have been closed for a week, but was barely closed three days. The riot was investigated and some of the refugees were charged, some even spending time in jail.

Immediate Responses and Analysis

One important aspect of the outcome of the riot was a heightened "ethnic awareness" by various groups in the camp.

In the responses to the riot and the interviews I conducted with people having different perspectives, several bi-polar ethnic distinctions and tensions were cited. These included

Vietnamese-Filipino, Filipino-American, Christian Filipino-Muslim Filipino, American-Filipino and American-Vietnamese.

The initial incident that sparked off the riot was between an American and a Muslim Filipino vendor. While they did not make the distinction that the Filipino market vendor had been Muslim, Filipinos did. The fact that the refugee involved in the initial incident was an American was mentioned by all those interviewed as well as in the reports. According to the reports and those interviewed, especially in the security group, the majority of the refugees involved in throwing rocks and bottles at the market were American. There are several possible explanations for prevalence of Americans mentioned by witnesses.

The first possible explanation is that there were more Americans in the crowd. Even if this was the case, however, there are other reasons for a prevalence of Americans in the crowd beyond the not mentioned greater visibility attributed to Americans. One reason was the result of simple demographics and the residence patterns of the refugees in the camp. Neighborhoods in Phase I had more Americans than neighborhoods in Phase II (refer to residence pattern data). Another factor was the higher visibility of some of the Americans. Among a crowd of Asians, the Americans that had the physical features of

their American fathers, the larger stature and body builds and lighter or much darker complexions, stood out. A further factor was the reputation that had been acquired by the American population in general by the actions of a few, rather notorious, individuals and the expectation that they were all from the slums or gangs in Vietnam. As a result, the Americans were often blamed for everything.

Filipino I interviewed, both vendors in the market and regular camp employees, were quick to point out that the vendor who initiated the incident was Muslim. The exact nature of the tensions that may have existed between Christian and Muslim vendors in the market was not known to me. The market vendors I interviewed, however, also held the opinion that the Muslims were quicker to anger and more violent. Unfortunately, I was not able to interview any of the Muslim vendors from the market. When the market reopened after three days, the only stalls that remained closed by the camp administration were those of the Muslim vendors. Apparently, the view that the Muslim vendors were more responsible than the other vendors was shared by the PNH administration. It was also feared that since the Muslim vendors were the primary targets of the refugee wrath, it would better to keep their stalls closed to prevent further provocation. Some other vendors elected not to reopen immediately, adopting a wait and see attitude.

Filipinos who worked for the administration that I interviewed, including some that I know well, were convinced that the presence and actions of the American expatriate voting staff who were present and responded to the initial incidents caused the ensuing riot. Their reported perceptions ranged from accusing the Americans of misreading the situation to deliberately exacerbating it. The actions of the Americans who got on top of a vehicle in the middle of the riot with a megaphone and accompanied by a Vietnamese American to translate were especially irritating. The Filipinos I talked with were certain that the American and American were inciting the crowd to increased violence, not requesting them to go home. To say that the American's actions were misinterpreted is to miss the point. His actions were interpreted within the context of the PRPC and the Philippines in general. The perception was that the United States and its on-the-scene representatives could determine the outcome of such events. Consequently, if Americans were on the scene, whatever happened was considered to be their desired result [1]. A clear example of this was found in the statement of the PRPC administrator in response to the riot.

The rioting scene that times itself is one's imagination is the picture of juvenile Vietnamese, from mere children of twelve to teenagers twenty years old, jeering and taunting and running in packs after Filipinos.

There is clearly an ethnic basis for the behavior displayed by the juvenile Vietnamese refugees. It

is the responsibility of the agency in charge of holding the values of these youths, and in the self-interest of the resettlement country, that such discriminatory ethnic attitudes be changed. The failure, however, is apparent.

It may be perceived as an unfair statement, given the little time to prepare these youths. I do not think so, because it is the paramount responsibility of the educator, and because they have so much resources, talent, and even time if one doubts the very start of the process from the GEF or the first asylum countries.

Then, again, how much of a latent superiority complex is transmitted unconsciously to these young minds. And how is the poverty of the Filipinos around the camp explained to the refugees: as an object of sympathy and understanding as we are of the developing world in the verge of taking off, or as an example of the inferior world. (CRFO, 1988: 110-11)

Such clarification is necessary to establish the above statement as an "ideological" and not very factual statement. First, the agencies being referred to as being "in charge of holding the values of these youths" were IIRC and WRI (see Chapter 4 for a full description of their educational responsibilities). Second, the vast majority of the "talent" employed by these agencies was Filipino, though the upper management was expatriate. Third, the transmitters of any "latent superiority complex" transmitted to the refugees would have had to have been through the Filipino staff as almost the entire instructional staff, the teachers who actually taught the refugees, were Filipino. The expatriate management staff had almost no direct contact with the refugees. If any sort

of American superiority complex was transmitted to the refugees it would have had to have been transmitted indirectly as an inferior complex through the Filipino teaching staff. I do not believe this was the case. Fourth, the agencies involved in the instructional programs were not the same agencies responsible for programs in the first region camps. In fact, for those refugees coming from the Philippine First Army Camp (FMAC) in Palawan, the instructional programs were largely the responsibility of the Center for Assistance to Displaced Persons, a Philippine based and Filipino run Catholic NGO. As for GOF residents, they received an instruction before coming to the NRC. The point here is not to dispute what the Administrator said, but to place the statement in the context of an ideological or attitudinal response. The rift was partly an expression of anti-Filipino sentiment, but it was also the result of other factors, and much of the anti-Filipino sentiment was directed at very particular Filipinos. Furthermore, the majority of the relations between the Filipinos and the Vietnamese refugees in the camp was on a level about which the Administrator probably knew very little. Most of the interactions between the refugees and Filipinos took place in the two sectors in the camp, in the neighborhoods, and between the refugees and Filipino teachers in the classrooms. The camp administrative personnel with the most direct contact with refugees were the COMOs who worked with

The neighborhood councils and the security personnel who dealt with security problems between both refugees and other refugees and refugees and Filipinos. The importance of establishing an ideological context for this statement becomes more obvious in the Administrator's conclusion to his statement:

It is important for us to express my indignation over the attitude that even in the search for the culprits for this incident, the first suspect is made to be Filipinos. The market vendors, stone throwing from drunken, too many Filipinos ruining the neighborhoods, robberies, but these security community problems exist everywhere, but they do not have to serve as excuses for ethnically driven violence.

Filipinos do not in general, suffer from chauvinism being haindoscopic in the cultural development. The fault can not have been among the Filipinos. There are problems of individuals, of poverty, drunkenness, violence-- but not of ethnic discrimination.

This statement can have only one purpose, and it is to deliver the message that the PRPC Administration shall take steps to install respect for the Filipinos and Filipinos in the operations of the center, ensure all curricula to be in conformity with the values of international humanitarianism, and human brotherhood. (PRPC, 1980: 118-19)

The conclusion to the Administrator's statement is revealing not only as an ideological statement, but also for what ideology was being expressed. The Administrator asserted that the Filipinos were not to blame for the riot because of the ethnically based violence expressed by the refugees. The Administrator argued that Filipinos did not "suffer from

"chauvinism" because they were "kaleidoscopic" in their cultural development. The point being that the element of ethnic violence excluded the Filipinos from bias.

If the standard for "chauvinism" was the existence of ethnically based violence then Filipinos could be considered to be an observational as beyond what. The Philippines had been, and was experiencing, an ethnically based separatist insurgency in Mindanao between the indigenous Muslims and Christian migrants. Furthermore, in the central highlands of the Philippines the supposed communist insurgency led by the New People's Army (NPA) was largely the result of a conflict between the indigenous highlanders and the Tagalog dominated Philippine government over land rights. In fact one of the most controversial decisions of the Marcos era in the Philippines was the imposition of Tagalog, the language of the dominant ethnic group on Luzon, as the official language of the Philippines. There were Filipinos, especially among the instructional staff, who worked in the camp from various places in the Philippines, including Mindanao and Cebu whose first language was Cebuano or Ilocano, who could not speak Tagalog very well and used English, a language they acquired as part of their access to higher education, as the main medium of communication with their fellow Filipinos.

In essence, the standard used by the Administration for "chauvinism" was a Western, essentially American, standard.

In this case the chaos that resulted from the refugees and the nature of the chaos itself, the American managed instructional programs in the camp, were used to redirect responsibility for the riot. This argument was the result, and served to perpetuate, the myth that the United States had more say in the running of the camp than it did.

In fact, the events that led to the riot were more of a reflection of how little control the Americans actually had on the scene and the degree that events and attitudes were dominated by the interactions between the refugees and Filipinos, both formally and informally.

Frictional Factors in the Riot

One of the important, but essentially neglected, factors that contributed to the riot was a high level of frustration and uncertainty among the GRP refugee population. This frustration and uncertainty was the result of a bureaucratic mistake regarding the views of the GRPs.

Since 1988 the PRPC had been the site where flows of Southeast Asian refugees have mingled with the flow of American Orderly Departure Program (ODP) migrants. The refugees came from first region camps throughout Southeast Asia. They were first accepted for resettlement by the U.S. or Korea, the two countries that operate programs in the center, and came to the PRPC for six months of language and cultural orientation before departing to their final

destination. The American GDF migrants were accepted as migrants by the U.S. in Vietnam and given visas to the U.S. with a transit visa through the Philippines where they went to be processed through the same program that the refugees went through.

The GDFs were given their visas in Vietnam. Originally, the transit visas were for 7-8 months. The average stay in the PRG was 7-8 months. When the refugees first arrived they did not immediately begin their six months of class. They had to wait for the next cycle to begin. New cycles began every two weeks. In addition, when the refugee's cycle was completed they had to wait for their name to be listed for departure. Receiving the departure list was contingent on several factors. For the GDFs who were mainly "free cases", meaning they did not have sponsors in the U.S. when they came to the PRG and sponsors had to be found through the resettlement BIA in the U.S., the time required to establish sponsorships for them could delay their departure from the PRG. If for any reason the GDFs departure from Vietnam was delayed or their stay in the PRG extended, the visas expired. The visas had to be extended through Philippine immigration officials.

This was the situation during the time leading up to the riot. The U.S. refugee coordinator and the officials in Manila had been working hard to secure nationalities on the GDF transit visas but because the problem had not been foreseen

and the numbers of GDRs affected were large, many GDR refugees had to remain in the FRPC for several months past the time of their expected departure. Many of the refugees identified and/or charged as a result of the riot were from cycle 130 which had ended two months earlier in September.

Staying in the FRPC past the time that refugees had expected to leave had consequences beyond the basic uncertainty they felt about their resettlement status. The refugees would budget their money on the basis of their expected departure date. If that date was delayed, they would run out of money. Furthermore, the refugees could not cash checks or money orders past a certain point in their cycle. The GDR would not cash checks or money orders if the refugee had less than a month left in their cycle. This was to allow time for the check or money order to clear before the refugee left the camp. The existence of the illegal money changers in the camp was largely the result of this restriction. The illegal money changers would cash checks or money orders past the time that the GDR would but at a discount in the exchange of Marks for dollars. Consequently, many of those caught in the visa process and had their departures delayed were in economic straits as well.

Other factors also contributed to the buildup of tensions in Phase I during the time leading up to the riot. The factors mentioned in the Administrator's statement,

though discussed by the Administrator, did contribute to the tension.

Two nights before the riot, on November 18, the security office was notified by the leader of neighborhood three, the refugee neighborhood next to the Phase I market, that there were several Filipinos in the market drinking and throwing stones at the soldiers in neighborhood three. The investigating blueguards found the same refugee true neighborhood gathered together to observe the Filipinos and possibly try to catch the one throwing stones. They also found the Filipinos in the market similarly organized to respond to anything the refugees might do. The neighborhood three leader informed the blueguards that the stone throwing from the market had been going on for four nights. The neighborhood three leaders had already written a letter of complaint on November 8 and given it to the neighborhood three OSAO describing the stone throwing from the market and damage to building 149, where some of the roof tiles had been broken. No action had been taken, and none was taken on the night of November 18, beyond taking the names of all the Filipinos still in the market and suggesting that the office in charge of the markets on the camp determine who should be and should not be in the market at night and conduct inspections to verify that those not allowed to be in the market at night be removed (HRC 148, OIR 11-854-89).

The most inflammatory event from the refugees' point of view, and the event that might have defused the entire thing, took place on the morning of the riot. When the first refugees went back to the market they insisted that the refugee who had been assaulted by the Filipinos at the market go with them to identify who had beaten him. He was, reportedly, reluctant, but he did go and supposedly pointed out who had hit him. When the Minsangs first arrived at the market they took positions between the refugees and the Filipinos in the market and then took two refugees to the KSC who apprehended as Filipinos. The issue of a continuing conflict was set. The refugees thought they knew who had assaulted their fellow refugees. Furthermore they knew that those responsible were still in the market and, apparently, were not going to be punished. If the Minsangs had publicly taken the Filipino responsible from the market in the same way they took the two refugees the situation probably could have been resolved relatively peacefully. The appearance to the refugees, however, was that the Filipino responsible were not only going unpunished, but were being protected. Why were the Filipinos not also apprehended?

The fault lay not so much with the Minsangs but with the camp administration and the PC who were also present at the market. The Minsangs had no power of arrest over Filipinos. Their job was very specifically to provide

security, peace and order in the PRPC. The mandate under which they operated included only the refugees, not the local community, even if members of the local community were present in the PRPC. It was very clear, for example, in the incident related earlier (Chapter 8) where a newspaper shot and killed a local Filipino, that he was treated not as a law enforcement officer executing his duty but as an individual acting either criminally or in self-defense. The newspapers could have taken the Filipino out of the camp, ejecting them as they did illegal liquor vendors, under the guise of enforcing the PRPC rules and regulations, but they could not take any real action against them. The responsibility clearly lay with the PC whose job it was to maintain external security which included offenses committed by Filipinos whether inside or outside of the camp. The incident referred to earlier was, however, indicative of the kind of relationship between the camp security officer and the PC.

Why did the PRPC administration not request the PC to apprehend the Filipino? The PRPC administration was largely unresponsive during the course of the riot. The PRPC administrator in charge of the camp was in Manila at the time. A meeting held the evening of the riot to assess the event was convened by the assistant director of PROCOM, not the camp director nor the deputy director (Porter, 1997a). Considering the time taken by the PRPC

Administrative in the statement referred to above, it may have made no difference if he had been present. Clearly, he saw the event as an indication of "chaos" or attitudes of ethnic discrimination learned by the refugees from the Americans, and not as a result of any specific precipitating events or tensions. In long on the point of view remained that the responsibility lay elsewhere, no action was required.

While this may have been the point of view of the upper administration of the FORT it was not necessarily shared by those who had to deal directly with the problem and its aftermath. The chief of the security group, for example, came up with a plan for responding to future such events that included the participation of the village duty officers and about 100 village and HRF personnel outfitted with red vests as "peacekeepers". The plan called for the HRF security to respond first, and if the situation was unmanageable then to call in the assistance of the village and "peacekeepers". The plan did not include the PT, was entirely directed at managing an unruly refugee population, and had no provision for managing a similar Filipino group.

The plan reflected that he thought was the cause of the riot: he said he thought the riot was caused by the actions of the Filipino Filipino vendors and an uncoordinated and disorganized effort in handling the situation. He also thought that the situation resulting in the riot, and the

general situation in the camp, had become worse as a result of the expulsions.

He, unlike the camp administrator, did not feel that the Americans were to blame. He did feel that the expatriates did not coordinate with the camp authority. He mentioned that the original expatriates on the scene had told him that he did not see the blueguards and went to find expatriate help. When the expatriates began to show up in number he pulled the blueguards away to let the expatriates handle it. The lack of a prepared response to a riot was a precipitating cause. It was due to the lack of experience the security group had had with such events. The security group had only been in existence since March 1968 as a result of the change from the previous military administration to a civilian administration.

According to some of the people who had worked in the camp for a long time, including the time before the present administration, several riots or near riots had occurred when the camp had significant populations of Lao and Khmer as well as Vietnamese. The previous occurrences of collective action on the part of the refugees had been directed at each other along ethnic lines, primarily, it was said, between the Khmer and Vietnamese. These earlier events had been handled by personnel from the Philippine Army, who were responsible for internal security, and the

PC, and had incited threats and firing into the air with M-16 machine guns

I also discussed the riot with one of my bilibetates. Even though they were not involved in the riot I was interested in their opinions on several issues. One of the questions I asked was why the refugees would take such an action considering the possible consequences for their departure. He said that their honor as Vietnamese was threatened and that they were angry as they did not think about the consequences. If they did, he said, it would only mean going to the camp jail and "never mind about that."

I also asked my bilibetate what actions might have prevented the Vietnamese from attacking the market? He thought a priest or a monk might have had some influence in calming the people. He also thought that having a neighborhood leader there might have helped, and for the Vietnamese to see the police arrest the Filipinos who attacked the refugees. "Without action against the Filipinos," he said, "no one could prevent the Vietnamese from acting."

I also asked him what would happen in the same situation in Vietnam. He said that only the very close friends of the victim would help and other people would not feel an obligation. I was interested in knowing what he thought would have happened in the same situation in Vietnam, in a market in Vietnam with the police present. He said that

most people were very afraid of the police in Vietnam and that the likelihood of the same thing happening in Vietnam was very low; .

I also caught up the perspectives of other refugees. Among them was the neighborhood leader of neighborhood two. The refugee who was originally assisted by the Filipinos in the market was from neighborhood two. The neighborhood two leader said that the refugee had come to his house to report the incident and they went to the neighborhood office. He wrote out a complaint but the refugee was reluctant to pursue the complaint because it might delay his departure. He called the security office to report the matter and ask that the refugee be taken to the hospital. The blueguards came and took the refugee to the hospital. Two hours later, he said, the blueguards came back and asked him to go to the market and tell the residents of his neighborhood to go home. He saw only about 15 people from his neighborhood and told them to go home before his Assistant Peace and Order leader was hit in the rear by a stone (he said was thrown by a Filipino) and they went back to the neighborhood. I talked with him one week after the riot and he said that on the night of the riot, and for three nights after that, he did not sleep because they had ringed the neighborhood with the Peace and Order patrols in case of any problems with Filipinos.

his perspective on the situation regarding Amerasians was very different. He had four adopted children, all Amerasians, and he said that in neighborhood two there were 100 plus Amerasians 100 of the families in neighborhood two were 400s, and they did not have a lot of problems. He did say that there was considerable disagreement on the issue between the neighborhood leaders. The leader of neighborhood nine, for example, considered the Amerasians to be a big problem and seemed to advocate some kind of serious actions against them. He said that the neighborhood nine leaders could not keep keeping things quiet so few Amerasians in neighborhood nine.

I found a vendor who would talk to me about the riot. This was not easy. Most of the vendors did not want to talk about the riot with me. The man I talked with ran a drink shop on one side of the market and toward the middle. The man I spoke with said that he had not been at the market when the incident began but had heard about trouble at the market and had gone by tricycle to see. When he arrived at the market he asked the PT about his wife, who had been taking care of the stall that morning. He said he was told by the PT that his wife had already left so he decided to leave as well. When he tried to leave the market area, however, some refugees tried to stop him and threatened to hit him with a club. He pulled a knife and got to a nearby building that housed a clinic. He later left as a PRPC man

that had been brought to the market to evacuate the Filipino vendors. He also said that incidences of stealing had increased recently, and that the stalls in the Phase I market were known as "buy one, take one stores". He said that the vendors had complained but nothing was done, and that the refugees could never far each other as complaining to the neighborhood leaders was useless.

Nothing like what happened in the Phase I market ever happened in the Phase II market. One of the reasons was the way the markets were laid out. The dry goods stalls in the Phase I market were the traditional Southeast Asian market stalls, which are essentially large wooden boxes about four feet square and 1-2 feet deep, upon which the vendors display their products. At night they clear off the top of the stall and put everything inside the wooden compartment below. In the morning they open up and pull out their wares and display them on top again. The aisles through the market were narrow; there were items hanging down from above, and the items for sale were placed right to the edge of the stall. Thievery in such a place would not be difficult if not for the sharp eyes of the vendors.

The stalls in the Phase II market were very different. The dry goods stalls were like stalls, having counters on brick and shelves on three walls displaying the items for sale. The vendors either stood or sat on chairs inside the stall. In addition the aisles were wider. Pilferage was

such were difficult simply because the items were not easily accessible. Consequently, thievery was not reported to be a major problem for the vendors in the Phase II market.

Let us briefly review the various perspectives on the causes of the riot. First was the general state of uncertainty perceived by the refugees as a result of the visa problem and the delayed departures. Second, were the previous incidents of stone throwing at the Kilaba in neighborhood three by Filipinos at the Phase I market. Third was the ascribed ethnic discrimination by the refugees as a result of their contact with Americans and the instructional program by the camp administration. The ethnic prejudices would also include the perceptions of some that the Muslim Philippine vendors were at fault. Fourth was the lack of preparation and disorganization of the response to the initial threat. This point would also include the failure to apprehend the Filipinos responsible and the capture of two refugees and their being taken to the JRC. Fifth was the presence of large numbers of Americans in the camp. Sixth was the inactivity of the vendors in the Phase I market as a result of increased shoplifting by the refugees.

The Aftermath of the Riot

In most respects the riot changed nothing. There were meetings of the vendors and the camp administration and

plans were made to put a fence around the market. The administration also sought to have the vendors designated who would be in the market at night and limit the number of people in the market at night. None of these came to pass.

The vendors who initially attacked the refugees and two other men were charged but went unprosecuted. This was largely because they failed to show up at scheduled hearings in front of a judge. For them to actually go to trial for their acts they had to appear in front of a judge with the witnesses present to point them out as the perpetrators. They continued to fail to appear and the refugees did not wait his departure delayed any longer as the matter was dropped.

Refugees were charged as a result of the riot, and in the end six refugees went to jail for six months. Initially, many refugees were charged as a result of pictures taken by the Philippine photographer who was chased and rescued by an expatriate. The pictures were used to pull people out of the departure area on the day of their departure. The judge, however, did not allow pictures as witnesses. Without a witness to appear before the judge and identify the refugees as guilty of specific acts they could not be tried.

The refugees who were tried all had witnesses testify against them. The witnesses were either Filipinos or, in one case, a long-stayer refugee who worked with the camp security office. The trial process was a long one.

Hearings were held where the witnesses failed to appear, and thus had to be rescheduled. On one occasion the judge scolded the PRPC security and legal personnel present because of their failure to present the witness against the refugees. The PRPC lawyer had a heart attack at one point and the proceedings were delayed while a replacement was found.

The main impetus to pursue the case against the refugees came from the PRPC administration. Why the administration was so intent on pursuing the matter probably had more to do with appearances in the local Philippine community than the purported reason of teaching the refugees that such behavior would not be tolerated. The refugee population of the camp turned over too fast for the incarceration of six refugees, a year after the event took place, to have much effect.

The refugees were assisted by the Community Family Services International (CFSI), the mental health wing. The refugees's legal assistance was provided by a Philippine lawyer from the office of public legal assistance. The UNHCR, the United States Refugee Coordinator (USRCORD) and the Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA) had no part in the trials of the refugees. The initial recruitment of the public defender had been the result of the actions of a man working part time for UNHCR in the PRPC. He was removed from that position shortly after and there was no UNHCR representation

is the camp. CRIC was recruited by the administration to assist the refugees in the absence of any other willing and capable agency. CRIC also had expatriate Vietnamese employees who were fluent in English and could ensure that the translator provided by the PRPC for the refugees translated correctly.

Analysis and Conclusion

The riot revealed several characteristics of the PRPC environment and the refugee population that resided there. The most important single fact about the riot was that it occurred at all. The refugee population took collective, if somewhat disorganized, action as a result of an event deemed unjust and/or menacing. The actions of the refugees persisted in the face of threats by the camp security personnel, the PC, and the exhortations and pleas of expatriates. The riot was not the action of oppressed and passive refugees who were easily cowed by the camp authorities.

The characteristics of the PRPC revealed by the riot were more complex. The response to the riot revealed tensions between the Filipinos who worked for the administration and the expatriates. I was surprised by the response of one Filipino I knew who worked for the administration in the neighborhoods and thought that the Americans who came to the market, especially the ones who got

as top of a vehicle with a rifle and a megaphone, had exhorted the refugees to further violence.

The lack of response to the refugees' complaints about the Filipinos in the market throwing stones at the billets in neighborhood three in the days leading up to the riot was later revealed more as impotence than anything else. One night, a few weeks after the riot, I was walking home from Phase I after dark. The chief of the camp security group saw me and offered a ride. On the way to Phase II he gave me an abbreviated tour of what he saw as the current camp problems. One of the places we stopped was the Phase I market where we sat in the parking lot observing a large group of Filipinos hanging around in the market drinking and playing cards. The only people who were supposed to be in the market after 7:00 PM were a couple of vendors to provide extra security. There was nothing he could do about restricting the numbers of Filipinos in the market without a serious commitment by the camp administration and the assistance of the PC.

Nonetheless and the camp's relationship with the local community were becoming more important to the camp administration than the camp's security. It had originally been announced that the Phase I market would be closed for a week after the riot. The market was barely closed for three days before it was open for business again. One reason was undoubtedly the fact that the vendors were suffering more

from the closing than the refugees. The refugees could still go to the Phase II market, which just took business away from the vendors in Phase I. The transition to a greater emphasis on local community relations had been a gradual process during which access to the camp by locals was made easier. The squatter settlement just outside of Phase I had grown from a couple of houses to a small community with two video houses... The ad hoc beer relief distribution point next to the neighborhood wine food distribution center had become a permanent function in the neighborhood. Furthermore, the activities in the elite had expanded to include open gambling, which was against the MRC rules.

The only people affected in the long term to any real degree were the six refugees who were incarcerated for six months and thus had their departures delayed. Probably the most revealing aspect of the aftermath of the riot was that it changed nothing about the way the camp was operated. The basic relationships among the various groups participating in the life of the MRC did not change as a result of the riot. The essential structural arrangements among the MRC administration, the village, the local community and the refugees, though complex and multi-dimensional, remained fixed by factors that were not altered by a single event, no matter how dramatic.

In terms of the central argument concerning refugee dependency, the list, in conjunction with the cases presented in the preceding chapter and those to be presented in the next chapter, demonstrates that the refugees were capable of acting outside of any slightest dependency on the Institution to make their decisions. Furthermore, contrary to arguments to be presented in the next chapter by authors arguing refugee dependency in the FRG, the refugees in the FRG were certainly capable of protesting what they considered an injustice.

CHAPTER TEN
REFUGEE RESPONSE TO THE PRPC

In the preceding chapters two arguments have been put forward concerning the nature of the PRPC and the refugee population living there. One argument has been made that the refugees in the PRPC did not exhibit behavior characteristic of a "dependency syndrome" and that the PRPC itself was not a totalitarian, total institution. This is essentially an argument rejecting a commonly held misperception about refugees and refugee camps.

The second argument put forth is that the PRPC functioned as an institution as a result of the participation and cooperation of various groups of people including the PRPC administration, the village operating in the PRPC, the refugees and the local community. Achieving the level of participation and cooperation among these diverse groups required compromises that at times appeared to threaten the peace and order within the PRPC and led to ambiguities in determining who had, or was willing to exercise, authority within the camp. This argument essentially redefines the nature of the PRPC as an institution such as the first argument sought to redefine the nature of the refugees.

This still leaves the question of the nature of the proactive responses the refugees made to the PRPC. As non-dependant refugees in a non-mobilistic, nonritual institutional environment, the refugees had decisions to make about how they would live their lives while they were in the PRPC. This chapter presents the fundamental decisions the refugees had to make in choosing successful versus unsuccessful behaviors and how they were guided in the decision making process.

Individual Behaviors in an Institutional Environment

A successful adjustment to the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) is here defined as departing from the PRPC for third country resettlement after the six months required to complete the State Department mandated training program in English as a Second Language and Cultural Orientation. Defining successful responses this specifically requires us to review decisions people made that resulted in a successful transition through the PRPC, i.e. in their timely departure, as well as the decisions some refugees made that could be considered unsuccessful responses and resulted in a delay of their departure.

The goal of leaving the PRPC was commonly held by all groups involved: the refugees, the camp administration, and the voluntary agency (volag) personnel. The most frequent reason for delayed departures was missed class time in the

ESL and cultural orientation program mandated by the U.S. State Department as a result of detention in the camp jail.

The training program instituted in the camp and the rules and regulations designed to maintain order placed an emphasis on the proscribed and prescribed behavior of individuals. Refugees, as individuals, had to meet the expectations of the training program and avoid being sanctioned, as individuals, for violations of the rules and regulations¹.

The refugees, however, came to the camp as participants in pre-existing interdependent social relationships based on events intensely experienced in Vietnam, the last escapes from Hanoi, and in the first Syrian camps. In the PRPC the refugees continued to participate in social relationships by choice, with those people they knew before, and by necessity. Living with four to five other people in a billet that was separated on either side from another five to six people by nothing more than a half-inch of asbestos fiber board, as part of a building of 20 billets with 10-20 people, was an intensely social experience. Sharing such facilities as water, sanitation facilities, and food distribution reinforced the importance of social behavior and required a high level of cooperation and compromise.

Consequently there was a fundamental difference between the camp's institutionalized and individualistic behavioral expectations and the refugees' inherently socially

interdependent behavioral expectations. Every day refugees had to make decisions involving their social relationships that could be understood as successful or unsuccessful only after the fact, as a result of an unknown final outcome-- their timely or delayed departure from the PRG. How did the refugees resolve the apparent conflict between the formal expectations of the institution and the informed expectations imposed by the social and physical environment which that institution required them to live in?

They did this in two ways. First, they used what they knew about other people, specifically other vietnamese. As noted above, when people choose to migrate across national and cultural borders and become refugees they do not give up their learned expectations of what various individual, family, and social behaviors mean. They do not give up their expectations of what behaviors are indicative of friendship or enmity, understanding or incomprehension, caring or indifference, low or high status, deference or domination. Nor do they give up their learned expectations that the consequences of behaviors indicative of friendship or enmity, for example, can lead to cooperation or conflict.

Second, and again as noted above, they used their learning ability so as to predict the outcome of events, to act, to validate or invalidate their predictions and generate new ones. In this they were aided by two very visible aspects of camp life. One was the sight of their

felice refugees being detained in the camp jail. The other was the almost weekly departures of refugees to third countries.

The refugees' knowledge in the form of their expectations of the consequences of behavior coupled with their knowledge of the formal expectations of the camp and the consequences of violating or meeting these expectations, a knowledge negatively reinforced every time they passed the camp jail or the departure area, allowed them to make fairly accurate predictions of the outcomes of many of their daily decisions involving relationships with other people and thus determine how their decisions would affect their transition through the PRPC.

Case Studies

The case studies below illustrate the importance of the knowledge and decision making capability the refugees brought to the PRPC. These cases support the contention that the goals of the refugees, and the strategies they employed to attain them, shaped the PRPC environment and the life the refugees led there. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate the compromises made by both refugees and the PRPC administration that led to the refugees' participation and cooperation in keeping the PRPC a functional institution.

The maintenance of social relationships and residence patterns

Among first asylum camp refugees in the PRPC the primary adjustment to PRPC was the maintenance of previous affiliations. I discussed this with a lot of refugees and though they said that in many ways PRPC was a better camp, their experiences in the PAC and the friends they made there, the security in living with people you could trust, people you shared with, the intensity of the interdependence of people going through the shared trauma of separation from home and the uncertainty before the IIR interview, was extremely high. Refugees that successfully continued those relationships in the PRPC through coexistence increased their chances of a successful adjustment to the environment than those who either did not have, or could not maintain, such relationships.

Refugees had a considerable amount of control over where they resided, and with whom they resided. When refugees arrived at the PRPC, the first thing they were given was a billet assignment. They were directed to line up, but those with preferences were allowed to go first. This speeded up the processing since the processing staff accepted the newly arriving refugees' preferences and did not have to check the records and find billets with available space. When refugees from other first asylum camps were being processed, almost all of them had

preferences. These preferences were the result of maintaining contact with people who had gone ahead to the camp and had written letters back to the first asylum camps. Also, BRPC refugees would go to the administration office, where a schedule of arrivals was posted giving the day when new people would be arriving from Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, etc., and then go to the arrivals area to see if they had friends there. Table 18.1 shows the resulting residence patterns. For instance, 71 per cent of the new arrivals as of 1989-90 from Malaysia went to neighborhoods eight, nine, and ten. Those same neighborhoods also received 62 per cent of the new arrivals from Thailand. These patterns were the result of refugees having a choice in where to live, and choosing to live with friends or relatives they knew from the first asylum camps.

ODP and PAC Refugees. The maintenance of interpersonal ties by first asylum camp refugees is further supported by data collected through random forest interviews with refugees. Among the questions asked in the forest interviews was if the respondents knew anyone in the BRPC when they arrived and if they requested to live in a particular unit when they first came to the BRPC.

The data in Table 18.2 reveals some significant differences between respondents coming to the BRPC from first asylum camps (PACs) and those who came through the

ODP. Almost all of those who came from PACs knew someone in the PRPC when they arrived while only about a quarter of those coming through the ODP did. Fear of those coming through the ODP also had sponsors in the resettlement country than those coming from PACs.

Both of these factors had an impact on their perceptions of the difficulty of adapting to the PRPC and future resettlement. Knowing someone in the PRPC or having a sponsor in the third country gave people a contact, a source of information about what to expect in their new home. In addition, having a sponsor almost always meant that the individual or family had relatives in the third country and having relatives abroad also meant in most cases some financial support while in the PAC and PRPC. The lack of relatives abroad, the case for most of the ODP cases, meant no money while in the PRPC.

Table 10.2 presents data on the number of respondents who requested to live in the billet they were living in at the time of their arrival in the PRPC. The table also presents data on the number of respondents who requested, and were granted, a billet transfer during their stay in the PRPC. Refugees who came to the PRPC requested billets while those who came through the ODP did not. ODPs were, however, far more likely to change billets while in the PRPC than PAC refugees. The difference in the number of PAC refugees and ODPs requesting what billet they wanted to live in was

related to the differences in the number of PAC and GDF respondents who knew someone in the PRPC upon their arrival. PAC refugees chose to live with people they had known in the first refugee camps. GDFs, coming directly from Vietnam, were often those who did not have the same kind of links when they arrived in the PRPC.

Billiet transfers. Even with the option of selecting their own houses there were still approximately 1,194 Billiet transfers in 1978. One indication of the importance of co-residence with people you could live with was the percentage of transfers due to conflicts. Unfortunately information including the reasons for the Billiet transfer were only available for the first six months of 1978. During that time 87% of the Billiet transfers were due to Billiet conditions. Other reasons included family reunification, medical reasons, and overcrowding. Without the protection of Billiets the numbers of transfers would have been even higher.

Even when people could not arrange co-residence with previous affiliates from PACs they still maintained strong ties. When I sat down with PAC refugees at a party or the coffee shop, and inquired where the various people present had sat I found that previous PAC affiliations permeated run through the group.

The large percentage of GDF respondents transferring Billiets in the interview sample (see Table 19.1) was a

result of both their own desire to establish their own households and the flexibility of the camp administration in accommodating them.

In most cases GPF transfers resulted from a desire to live as a single household in a single billet. Most came from Vietnam as families. Americans were allowed to take with them their immediate family members or a primary caretaker. This ring of the GPF camps included the basketball's mother, sometimes a stepfather, as well as unmarried brothers and sisters. Consequently, they sought, if possible, to live as a household as they had done in Vietnam. Few of those who escaped from Vietnam by boat were able to do so as intact families. It was far more common to find siblings, or one parent and a child, or even more distantly related family members such as uncles and nephews, and a significant number escaped alone. The time in the first seaborne camp was spent in cramped overcrowded extremely difficult conditions with people the refugees may have met for the first time on the boat or in the camp. Consequently, it was also a time for expanding interdependent interpersonal networks beyond the immediate family.

The situation with GPFs was very different. I did not live with an GPF family in my billet. I did have several bills in my random sample of billet residents in Phase II. I also interviewed many GPF across of the EBC and I found that

the patterns were not as clear to us. Some Americans said that their only friends were other Americans. Other Americans who were idiosyncratic with Vietnamese friends because of a remote incident were obviously affiliating with more than just other Americans. They were however, making their primary affiliations in the PRPC not in a first system camp.

In an environment such as the PRPC where successful responses were almost totally determined by the refugee's social behavior and only minimally by the refugee's performance as measured by an objective standard, such as their attendance in class, harmonious social relationships were extremely important. This was even more important in the PRPC than it may have been in other similar environments since each of the problems the refugees were likely to encounter that could lead to unsuccessful responses, not departing on time, were the result of problems between refugees not between refugees and the institution. Living with people you already knew and treated as as a family unit minimized the possibility of conflict and the adverse consequences that could result. The case below illustrates the importance of harmonious social relationships in social activities for successfully transiting through the PRPC.

THE MAINTENANCE OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND DRINKING IN THE PRIC

When refugees went to the PRIC they expected to maintain the social relationships they had established in the first refugee camps or renew relationships with people they knew in Vietnam but had not seen in a long time without paying a price in a delayed departure.

Drinking together was an important ritual for Vietnamese men to connect, maintain or re-establish relationships, especially for ex-ARVN veterans. New arrivals would have "small parties" for their siblings and old friends they met in the camp but had not seen in a while, or would impatiently departing refugees as a farewell ritual. Drinking alcohol was against camp rules and the number one reason for refugee detention in the camp jail.

Refugees, however, were rarely detained simply for just drinking. Detention usually resulted from the refugee's post-drinking behavior such as wandering home drunk at night after the 8:30 PM curfew or getting drunk and fighting.

The refugees learned, however, to follow certain rules on these occasions to avoid the potentially disastrous consequences that could result because of the constraints of the camp environment. Being detained, for example, for a liquor box violation or for fighting just before your scheduled departure would mean delaying your own and your family's departure. One rule was always to serve food

before you drink. At a "small party" everyone might have a glass of beer with the meal but the serious drinking did not begin until people had eaten. The second rule was to keep the party small and confined to close friends, people you knew well, people who would not too readily take offense at some slight misunderstanding. In almost every case where I witnessed a drunken brawl or interviewed liquor law detainees in the jail one or both of these rules had been violated. When I would go around the camp on Sunday afternoons, when most of these events occurred, and find a group of people standing back watching one of these brawls and ask what happened they invariably said that the perpetrators had "made a mistake" and "drank wine" (the term for anything stronger than beer-usually whiskey) with someone they did not know, or they had "only drunk wine" and not had any food. The mistake they made was in drinking with someone they did not know and not eating. The fighting was simply the expected result.

Refugee Relationships

In addition to choosing where and with whom to live and maintaining pre-existing social relationships, even at some risk, refugees in the PRPC also sought to recreate some of their past life in Vietnam. One way of doing this was by engaging in occupations they had had before becoming refugees and setting up businesses in the camp. Another way

was in restaurant environments similar to what they had known in Vietnam.

Refugees in the PRG were allowed, even encouraged, to run businesses. The businesses ranged from bar air stands, portable stands where refugees sold sandwiches, to small stores where they sold a few dry goods such as: crackers, packages of soup mix, candy, and bottled sodas; to small coffee shops where they might have a table in front of their kiosk and sell sodas with ice in glasses and coffee as well as dry goods. The largest refugee businesses were the larger coffee shops. The larger coffee shops had several small tables with stools spread out in the common areas between the kiosks. These coffee shops often had music supplied by portable tape players run off of car batteries or illegally tapped electricity from the kiosks. These shops served coffee, hot and cold, and sodas.

The coffee shops resembled those that can still be found on the wide sidewalks in Ho Chi Minh City. The wooden tables were low, about 14 inches tall and the seats were small benches about 4 inches wide, a foot long and maybe 4 inches tall. The music played over the sound system was invariably Vietnamese or sometimes old 1940s American rock and roll.

The first afternoon I spent in Vietnam during July 1973, about a year after I had left the PRG, I went to a coffee shop around the corner from the hotel and sat on

again at times that seemed all too familiar to me. When an American got down and started talking about his problems it was almost as if I was back in the PRPC again.

The owners of the small stores usually got their supply from the market. The owners of the smaller and larger coffee shops got their supplies of coffee, and often the loan of a radio system, from a local Filipino business. Several stores in Morong had arrangements to supply the coffee shops in the camp and made regular deliveries. The business arrangements between the refugees and the local Filipino businessmen were the same as those between Filipinos. The Filipino businessmen provided the stock on consignment and the refugees were responsible only for what they sold or lost. The Filipino businessmen also often supplied the radio system for a fee. Part of the arrangement included lending out the car batteries and recharging them.

One of the most crucial items needed by the coffee shops was ice. The Filipino businessmen supplied some of the ice but more was needed than they could supply. Other sources of ice included the markets where the stalls owners had electricity and refrigerators and made ice for their own use and to sell directly to the refugees. Another source of ice was the PRPC and using staff dorms. The staff dorms also had electricity and refrigerators and made ice to sell to the refugees.

Within the PROCEMI, and later PROAM, group at the PRPC administration there was a livelihood section responsible for monitoring the refugee businesses. The livelihood officer supervised the work of a livelihood leader in each of the ten neighborhoods. Before a refugee could start a business they were supposed to get a permit from the livelihood section. The major reason for issuing permits was public health. Part of the permitting process was checking the refugee's health to make sure they did not have any infectious diseases, especially TB. The livelihood leaders in each of the neighborhoods were responsible for making sure that all businesses in the neighborhood had a permit, inspecting the businesses serving any kind of food or drink for cleanliness, and checking on the noise levels of the music in the coffee shops.

The total number and type of refugee businesses in the camp was unknown. The livelihood officer kept records but the accuracy of the records depended on how well the neighborhood livelihood leaders did their jobs and kept their own records updated. Businesses would spring up with every new batch of arrivals, and they could be quickly shut. Businesses were transferred from one owner to another when the current owners had their departure list. In some cases the refugees did not know they were supposed to get a permit or chose not to because of the time and trouble. The neighborhood livelihood leaders were supposed to make

inspections of their neighborhoods to ensure that all the businessmen had permits but they did not always do this.

The refugees also engaged in other types of businesses that were almost impossible to keep track of and regulate even if it was desired. Some refugees practiced the same trades they had pursued in Vietnam or first refugee camps such as teaching English, hairdressing, tailoring, sewing and selling special Vietnamese foods and fortune telling. All of these activities were carried out in the billets and performed as a special service to other refugees.

Refugees, as discussed in Chapter V, also sold a variety of items in the five markets in the camp. One of the most noticeable changes that took place in the TRPO from the time I first began living there until I left (September 1980-August 1984) was a significant increase in the number of businesses run by refugees. This was especially noticeable in the Phase I market, but it was true throughout the Phase II area where I lived.

I first began to notice the change when refugees began to sell produce in the Phase II market and to sell in the Phase I market everyday of the week and not just on Sunday. I also noticed an proliferation of "ban ai" stands. When I first began living in the billet if I wanted a complete ban ai, with pork, vegetables and sauce, I had to go to the Phase II market where one or two ban ai stands could be found in the morning selling to refugees on their way to

their morning meals when the *ban mi* for breakfast. After a couple of months *ban mi* stands began appearing in the neighborhoods ten, nine and eight food distribution centers. Then the hours in which you could find *ban mi* stands increased. You could see *ban mi* stands in the morning and then in the evening they appeared again. Finally, *ban mi* stands could be found that were open until the 5:00 curfew, and sometimes beyond.

The main reason for the increase in refugee businesses and trading appeared to be the increasing number of OCPs who came with either something to sell or the supplies needed to carry on occupations they had recently given up in Vietnam. The OCPs also came with a greater need to obtain money while in the PRPC. Most OCPs were free men, meaning they had no relatives in a third country who would send them money while they were in the PRPC.

One day I came home to my billet to discover that a family of OCPs had been assigned to my billet. There were six people in the family, one of them being an American. They were still feeling somewhat displaced and tired but we talked a while. They had already decided to try to move to another billet, an empty one, where they could live together without other billetees. During the conversation I could not resist exercising my anthropological curiosity and asked them what they had brought with them from Vietnam. I had always wanted to know and had found it difficult to get such

information from the interviews I had conducted. I wondered how much could be learned about their expectations of the RVFC and what life there would be like from what they had chosen to bring with them from Vietnam. Besides the clothes, previous amenities, and various important papers they had brought nearly a half of an ODF box worth of solids for making a coffee-grain-like type of desert. They were very reluctant to show me the solids at first and told me they were not for making deserts to sell. I do not know why they did not want to say they planned to make and sell the deserts in the camp. I did find out later after they had moved to another billet, however, that that was exactly what they did. I encountered one of the family members selling the deserts in the market. At least my curiosity in one case was satisfied. Others coming to the RVFC, apparently were told that bringing some way of making money with them to the RVFC would be a good idea.

For the refugees in the RVFC, having money increased their decision latitude (see below). For those who came to the RVFC with very little money and/or had no relatives who would send them money while they were in the RVFC the only way to achieve a greater independence and control was through running a business. In the RVFC, refugee businesses were encouraged both by the administration and the [new] Filipino community. The refugees took advantage of the

opportunities and pursued a wide range of income producing activities.

Exchanges and the Refugees' Disposable Income

Many refugees also had more resources at their command and more choices in what to eat, what to wear, and what to do for entertainment than that provided by the camp. Table 10.4 gives a breakdown of the amount of currency collected by the Center for Assistance to Displaced Persons (CADP), one of the villages in the camp. The data reveal that almost 2 million U.S. dollars were changed from January 1975 to April 1980. Since food and housing were supplied by the PRPC, that was 2 million dollars of disposable income for the refugees. There were also at least 15 to 20 illegal money changers in the camp, who the CADP workers thought may have changed almost as much as the CADP did.

There were two markets in the camp that sold everything from meat, fruit, and vegetables to custom made clothes, jewelry, cassette tape players, and music tapes in Vietnamese. In addition, refugees could go to Philippine quarter communities outside Phnom I and II where they could exchange fish or rice provided by PRPC, in addition to money, for oil, fish sauce, and a whole range of other goods. Refugees would trade up in this way by exchanging, for example, rice at 7 pesos a kilo for something not provided by the camp, and then buying better quality rice in the market for 9 pesos a kilo.

According to camp rules it was illegal for refugees to drink alcohol. The squatter population, however, also supplied door to door beer and liquor vendors. Since it was only a violation of camp rules, not a violation of Philippine law, to sell alcohol to refugees within the PRP, when liquor vendors were apprehended by camp security personnel their stocks were confiscated, but they were released. Food rationing was rare, and alcohol was freely available and consumed with few consequences, if the refugees drank at home and did not fight. Also in the squatter areas were video houses that showed Vietnamese-dubbed Chinese kung fu movies and pornography films, as well as serving as bars. All of this was technically prohibited: if you were not a refugee or a staff member, you had to have a special pass to get into the camp. The rules were simply not enforced, to the economic benefit of the local economy.

The existence of the markets, the video halls, the liquor vendors, etc. was the result of the refugees' having a great deal of money to spend. Furthermore, the provision of a basic subsistence food ration, housing and medical care meant that the refugees could spend money on things other than basic needs. The economic demand represented by the money the refugees had to spend led to the production and sale of items specifically for the refugees. One example was the local production of "ban ai", loaves of french-brand

that were introduced into Vietnam by the French and can not be commonly found elsewhere as the Philippines. Not long before I left the PRPC in the summer of 1969, a dress shop opened in the Phase II market that specialized in making "ao dai", the flowing, form fitting pant-suits favored by Vietnamese women as formal attire.

The Ex-ARVN Neighborhood Leaders

The refugees also recreated, although in a very modified form, the leadership structure of pre-1975 Vietnam. This was accomplished through the election of ex-Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) veterans to positions in the neighborhood councils.

The neighborhood councils were responsible for assisting the PRPC administration in managing the ten refugee residential areas, or neighborhoods, and in providing basic services such as food and mail distribution. Each council consisted of an elected leader, an assistant leader, and food, mail, and peace and order leaders. Leaders were also appointed for sanitation, women's affairs, information, socio-cultural affairs, livelihood, and training. The neighborhood council was supervised by a member of the PRPC staff, the Community Administration and Organization Officer (CAAO). The council's engagement role entailed approving or disapproving minor transfers, maintaining accurate records, and investigating and settling

disputes between refugees, either amicably or through resorting to sanctions.

The neighborhood councils were elected by the residents of the neighborhood. Because the neighborhood councils were selected by the refugees themselves the people they selected reflected the refugee's ideas of what characteristics would make a good leader.

In 1984 the Community Action and Social Services Development Group (CASSSDG), the precursor to PROSIS, initiated a study on refugee leadership in the FRC. The study was initiated to assess the refugee's perceptions of the effectiveness of the CSE refugee leaders, the perceived characteristics of good leaders, and the possible impact on the camp of the newly formed Vietnam Veterans Association.

According to the study 49% of the 121 Vietnamese respondents reported that the current CSE leaders possessed the "traditional" qualities of a good leader and 41% of the Vietnamese reported that the current CSE leaders possessed the "qualities and capabilities that the situation demands of a leader in the camp" (Tapscott, 1984:7). The specific personal qualities of a good leader identified by the Vietnamese included old age, good character and high educational attainment (Tapscott, 1984:8). In a side comment the study reported, without any statistical information, that "most people think a leader in the FRC must be a

former government official than it was traditionally" (Espino, 1984:35).

The study also included questions related to the refugees's perceptions of the Veterans Association. Of the 48 Vietnamese who responded to the question, 38 "indicated that the Veterans are helpful in the community" (Espino, 1984:37). The author of the study, however, inserted the caveat: "Of course, this is mainly because many of the association's leading members are also CDR leaders" (Espino, 1984:37). Unfortunately, the study did not give any statistical or biographical information on the current CDR leaders to support this conclusion.

While the study was limited in terms of actual data on the backgrounds of those actually selected as CDR leaders the study is revealing of the importance of ex-NVA and ex-NRF officials as neighborhood leaders that existed as far back as 1984.

I became interested in the role of ex-NVA and ex-NRF officials as neighborhood leaders as a result of both a general interest in how the NPPC worked and the role of the refugees and an announcement I heard over the camp public address system early in my stay in the Killeen. One morning while I was sitting in the coffee shop near my house I heard a meeting of the neighborhood council announced as "quan dan chieu", a meeting of military and government officials. I was surprised at this and pursued it further.

I discovered that the make-up of the current neighborhood area council consisted of almost entirely of ex-ARVN veterans. The neighborhood leader had been a major in the police, the assistant neighborhood leader had been a major in the infantry, the peace and order leader had been a lieutenant, and the information leader had been captain in the military police. The sailing leader of neighborhood area, who lived next door to me, was also an ex-ARVN veteran. The preference for veterans after area extended down to building leaders but the situation there was more complicated. The building leaders were also responsible for the daily food distribution which took place in the mornings. If there was a schedule conflict with the food distribution time and ARVN classes it was often not possible for them to be the building leader. At the time the building leaders of my building, 818, and the building next door, 814, were both ex-ARVN veterans and the assistant building leaders were not.

I sought information from PHOCODE on the backgrounds of the ORL leaders for the purpose of determining the number of ARVN veterans in ORL leadership positions. Unfortunately, PHOCODE did not have the information I required. They had forms which had been filled out by all those who sought to be elected to a ORL leadership position but they did not have them separated into who had been elected and who had not. As a result, I sought to do an informal survey of the

contact CNU leaders to give me an idea of the involvement of ARVN veterans in the CNU. I chose to interview the leaders in these 4 neighborhoods (1 through 4) because I did not live there and it would be less likely that I would be asked to assist in problems they had (a not uncommon event even when I was the one seeking information of even a forced nature). I also incorporated into the brief set of questions I asked, questions about the problems they encountered in performing their duties as leaders. Table 10.3 gives the data I collected by CNU position, military service if any, or other occupation before 1975 if not in the military. I was not able to interview all the leaders because of the difficulty of finding them either at home or in the neighborhood offices. Of the 19 CNU leaders I interviewed, 13 or 68% had prior military experience in Vietnam.

I also attended meetings of the Inter-Neighborhood Council (INC) to see how the CNU leaders from the various neighborhoods worked together and with the INC leaders. At one of the INC meetings where the issue of the next election was discussed and the date set, there was also a discussion of what the qualifications of a leader should be. They decided that the leaders should be men, veterans and of "good" character. They actually worked one of the qualifications for candidacy to be that the candidate had been either in the military or the government of South

Vietnam before 1975. PROCEED did not accept their recommendation. In rejecting a veterans only policy, they argued convincingly, that there might not be enough veterans willing to be leaders and thus not enough candidates running for office. The PROCEED was also worried that a veterans dominated CDR might be a divisive influence on the camp. They thought that some of the refugees might still blame the ARVN and the government of South Vietnam for losing the war. This was actually not a major problem. With the exception of some of the Americans who would use this against the CDR leaders on occasion, most Vietnamese blamed the loss of the war on the United States.

Nevertheless, the choice of ex-ARVN veterans as leaders was an essentially conservative approach to leadership by the refugees in the PEPC. The refugees did not select those with the highest education or those with the best English language skills as they might have if their primary concern was that the leaders could act as brokers with the PEPC administration and policy personnel with whom the medium of communication was English. Their primary concern while in the PEPC appeared to be that the CDR leaders were able to function as leaders among the refugee community. In choosing the veterans as leaders there was more involved than just choosing an individual for their military experience alone. There was an implicit recognition that a leader could not function as an individual leader merely

because they had an institutionally conferred title and supposedly, institutionally supported authority. Leaders could only function if they could count on the support of a network. The network they had to maintain had to operate at more than the formal level such as supporting decisions in the neighborhood council. The network the leaders needed, and the veterans provided each other, was there in an informal capacity as well. The veterans had such a network. In many cases it was a network that had begun in Vietnam and had been continued or reestablished in the first refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia.

The importance of a network can be illustrated by what happened to one leader who did not have such a network to depend on in a difficult situation. In neighborhood nine there were several coffee shops. One reason for the location of the coffee shops in neighborhood nine was the central location of neighborhood nine between neighborhoods ten and eight. Neighborhoods eight, nine and ten were predominantly occupied by first refugee camp host refugees who had relatives in third countries who sent them money while they were in the FPIC. Along with the money and the coffee shops came gambling run by local villagers, beer sellers hanging around between deliveries, and other locals and refugees just hanging out. One coffee shop became the focal point for a lot of this kind activity. The coffee shop was located just to the neighborhood nine food

distribution center where most of the adjacent bear villages would sit around with their things and had several bags full of bear waiting for orders. Unfortunately, the owners of this coffee shop had failed to show their permit, if they possessed one, to the either the neighborhood vice livelihood leader or the livelihood officer in Phatthai. Consequently, the neighborhood vice livelihood leader after a meeting of the neighborhood watchi where the issue was discussed stopped at the coffee shop to ask to see the owners permit. The owner of the coffee shop told him that he had a permit and that he would go and look for it. Later that night the owner of the coffee shop went to his house accompanied by another man and showed him the permit for the coffee shop. The owner then warned him that if he made any trouble for the coffee shop he, the livelihood leader, would have a problem. The day after this event was a Saturday and he was at home when another man, this time drunk, came to his house and warned him again this time telling him that he, the drunk, was friends with Col. Benson, one of the group directors in the PRC and that he had an American friend who was friends with the chief of the JVA. These were quite literally empty threats for neither Col. Benson nor any of the American expatriate staff would have gotten involved in this kind of business. However, threats like this were not uncommonly used by the refugees against each

other. The approach was based more on how things might be handled in Vietnam than in the PRPC.

The neighborhood wine livelihood leader had done nothing against the coffee shop nor had he made any threats against the coffee shop, nor did he have any reason to do so since the owner had a permit. The point here being, that the threats that ensued after the livelihood leader did nothing more than carry out his duty appeared to be driven by nothing more than suspicion. The problem, however, did not end with Wignate. On the following Monday, the first day of a week off, the livelihood leader was at home sitting in the hammock inside the billet when four men came to his house and beat him up so badly his family had to take him to the hospital. After he was released from the hospital later that same day he went back to the neighborhood wine office and talked with the CMAC and decided to transfer his billet to a new building adjacent to the SAC and next to the PC headquarters that was only rarely used for refugees who arrived on the beaches around Sotoun before they were moved to Polwan. Technically, he was in a sort of protective custody though he and his family could come and go as they pleased.

The livelihood leader had been asked by the neighborhood leader to take the job (livelihood leader was an appointed, not elected, position). He was not a veteran. He had an American son and had come to the PRPC as an ODP:

Before 1975 he had been a high school teacher and after 1975 he had taught English privately and fixed electrical appliances. Consequently, he had no network that he could depend on in the PRPC and thus no support or protection. He did make a report on the incident but pending an investigation by the neighborhood council the neighborhood committee (COMO), and he himself, felt that he and his family would not be safe staying in their billet in neighborhood nine.

Conclusion

Learning and being a refugee means learning new behaviors to attain the same ends that previously learned behaviors no longer produce. It also means learning that previously learned behaviors produce new, unintended, consequences. It does not necessarily mean giving up the learned goals, the learned desired consequences, the learned conceptions of how people expect to be treated and to treat other people, that liberally define who people are. Furthermore it does not mean learning that they can not act to produce desired outcomes.

The maintenance of previous social affiliations through choosing where, with whom to live and associate with, setting up and running businesses, creating a leadership structure along familiar, if not traditional, lines were all examples of how the refugees in the PRPC sought to ensure their successful transition through the

PRPC. Maintaining and/or recreating social relationships and social activities that were familiar and to some degree predictable allowed the refugees to feel some control over the decisions they made as a result of being better able to determine what the consequences of those decisions would be.

In addition, the strategies the refugees used in maintaining the validity of their own interpersonal goals while still responding to the institutional PRPC environment, shaped the very environment they lived in. The necessity of accommodating the refugees' social needs to maintain the viability of the PRPC's very reason for existence, processing refugees, led to an environment where it was possible for the refugees to live in an essentially Vietnamese world from the time they arrived in the PRPC until they departed.

Notes

1. There was one case where refugees were questioned as a group. A tape of two Vietnamese women took place by several young male Laotians. The Vietnamese women could not identify all of their assailants. As a result all Laotian families with young adult men were held by the Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA) and the Refugee Progress Coordinator (RPTCOG) until the Laotians themselves produced the perpetrators. The Laotians finally did produce the perpetrators who were subsequently tried in a Philippine court.

TABLE 10.1
NEW ARRIVALS (CIRCLES 129-134) BY ORIGIN** AND PLACE
NEIGHBORHOODS* (IN PERCENTAGES)

NEIGH.	SV	BN	BT	BR	BS	BT	BT	SEE	TE
1	8.8	11.0	6.4	11.5	1.4	7.4	1.4	6.1	0
2	12.8	9.1	6.8	0.0	0	2.8	41.8	1.7	0
3	8.8	3.7	3.1	7.7	0	3.3	3.4	28.8	0
4	5.2	8.1	7.9	0	0	0.4	0	1.8	0
5	18.4	3.4	3.8	1.3	0	3.8	0	8.1	40.0
6	13.8	5.1	5.7	0	0	28.8	13.7	5.3	0
7	8.1	3.4	3.8	8.4	0	3.1	8.1	6.8	0
8	18.8	11.0	24.4	8.0	7.0	1.0	0	5.8	0
9	4.3	42.8	33.4	17.7	31.3	6.8	7.3	4.4	40.0
10	8.8	11.1	22.0	40.4	40.3	41.8	1.3	21.8	20.0
TOTAL, %	100.1	108.0	108.0	100.0	100.0	89.8	89.8	100.0	100.0

TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF NEW ARRIVALS (CIRCLES 129-134) BY ORIGIN

SV	BN	BT	BR	BS	BT	BT	SEE	TE
24.8	13.3	18.3	8.4	8.7	8.8	0.3	3.3	6.1

*NEIGH. = Neighborhood of residence in the PRPC

**The codes used in the columns designate the first asylum country of the refugees prior to going to the PRPC. The codes are the same as used by JVA, DSE, IOM, the PRPC administration and the other volume.

SV = GDR BN = Malaysia BS = Thailand BR = Indonesia

BS = Singapore BT = Philippines BT = Japan SEE = Hong Kong

TE = Taiwan

SOURCE: International Catholic Migration Commission.

TABLE 12.3
Refugees Having a Settlement Sponsor or Knowing Someone in
the PRPC on Arrival by Origin

Origin	Total Number of Respondents	Had a Sponsor (Number)	(%)	Knew Someone in the PRPC on Arrival (Number)	(%)
BR	18	18	95	18	95
BY	10	11	68	8	18
BUR	1	1	100	1	100
FA	4	4	100	2	50
PT	2	1	50	n/a	
<hr/>					
P&C	24	14	61.5	21	81
ODP	21	12	68	8	33

Source: Interview Data

TABLE 10.1

Refugees requesting visas or Changing visas by Origin

origin	total number of respondents	Requested visas (Number)	(%)	Changed visas (Number)	(%)
BR	15	17	45.5	1	5.1
IN	20	0	0	15	45.2
SRB	1	1	100	0	0
PA	4	2	50	0	0
BT	2	2	50	0	0
<hr/>					
PAC	24	22	84.4	1	5.1
ODP	11	0	0	10	45.2

Source: Interview Data

TABLE 12-4

NUMBER OF REFUGEES CHARGING CURRENCY BY MONTH AND ETHNICITY

DATE	VIET.	KHMER	LAO	TOTAL	TOTAL CURRENCY CHARGED (P. THB.)
1/78	130	18	38	287	87,495
2/78	821	38	47	907	213,578
3/78	878	878	878	878	582,408
4/78	977	38	48	1063	387,888
5/78	1001	98	94	1293	88,888
6/78	1141	47	97	1285	327,778
7/78	828	38	48	918	321,888
8/78	888	108	71	1067	317,838
9/78	788	33	47	868	277,488
10/78	977	47	98	1022	317,888
11/78	887	88	274	1249	344,888
12/78	878	98	47	923	317,148
1/79	888	38	273	1199	318,318
2/79	831	18	48	927	88,488
3/79	783	18	31	732	78,378
4/79	878	4	11	893	74,378
5/79	813	34	18	865	71,488
6/79	827	8	11	846	82,377
7/79	882	5	18	905	84,518
8/79	888	8	34	931	73,788
9/79	878	878	878	878	387,888
10/79	724	3	11	738	78,118
11/79	471	3	0	474	81,888
12/79	1288	0	38	1327	382,888
1/80	1021	0	0	1029	388,787
2/80	1288	0	33	1328	384,888
3/80	1234	0	0	1234	371,888
4/80	1138	0	0	1138	381,788
TOTALS	22881	718	1213	25812	2,948,518

SOURCE: Center for Assistance to Displaced Persons,
PDP (Morang, Netang).

Table 18.3

Occupations or Military Position of Phase I CMB Leaders

Position in CMB	Military Service or Occupation Before 1975
Stnd. 1 Stnd. Ldr.	ARMY, 1st Lt.
Stnd. 1 Asst. Ldr.	Law Student
Stnd. 1 PO Ldr.	ARMY, Corporal
Stnd. 2 PO Ldr.	ARMY Sgt
Stnd. 2 Stnd. Ldr.	Military Intelligence, Captain
Stnd. 2 Asst. Ldr.	Air Force, 1st Sgt.
Stnd. 2 Training Ldr.	Chief of Police
Stnd. 2 Stnd. Ldr.	Chaplain Chief, Major
Stnd. 2 Asst. Ldr.	ARMY Major
Stnd. 2 Training Ldr.	Navy Sgt
Stnd. 4 Stnd. Ldr.	ARMY, Major
Stnd. 4 Asst. Ldr.	High School Teacher
Stnd. 4 PO Ldr.	Police, 1st Sgt.
Stnd. 4 Training Ldr.	Air Force 1st Sgt.
Stnd. 5 PO Ldr.	ARMY, 1st Lt. Military Police

Sources: Interview data

CHAPTER ELEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

In the last chapter of this dissertation I argued that there was a predisposition to become refugees among the Vietnamese resulting from the breakup of their lives as a result of the partition of the country in 1954 and the Vietnam war. I further argued that there was a predisposition among the refugees to recreate what was lost. I pointed out that the resettlement of the first 130,000 Vietnamese who left in 1975 with the U.S. represented the possibility of finding a place where they could live the kind of life they had known before. For those who followed, mostly by boat but also on foot and later on planes, carrying their experiences of life in post-April 30, 1975 Vietnam with them, escape represented the possibility of recreating the life they had known before 1975 for themselves and their children. I found Hitchcock's (1988) assessment of the motivations of the Vietnamese to be accurate.

Part of the motivation for escaping is to maintain the old way of life elsewhere under a government that provides that kind of freedom. For the Vietnamese who plan to settle, the priority is primarily not to adapt or be assimilated into

another society. But to reconstruct respected cultural values is a more balanced setting. . .
 (Bloch, 1994:15)

I then presented and criticized the arguments of authors and researchers who described refugees as dependent and refugee camps as institutions that foster a "dependency syndrome" among refugees. I also presented and discussed the views of those arguing for refugee dependency in the FRG and that the FRG was a dependency creating institution.

I then summed up the dependency argument analyzing the supporting arguments into the three categories of the psychological, sociological and the dehumanized. I also sought to describe the characteristics of refugee camps that distinguish between the refugee populations and the camp administration and assistance providers that led to the perception of dependency.

The history and structure of the FRG and the "upbeat of life" in transitioning through the FRG and living there day-to-day were then presented. In later chapters I sought to dispel the notion of the FRG as a "totalitarian" "totalizing" institution where strict hierarchies and status distinctions predominated, enforced by rigidly enforced rules and regulations. I then presented cases of conflict between the various groups of people participating, both formally and informally, in creating the environment in which the refugees lived. I illustrated the point that the FRG had a "loose" structure where there was a lot of room

for answer by describing the precipitating causes, and response, of a riot that took place in the PRPC.

I further described the response of the refugees to the PRPC in terms of the degree of autonomy and range of decisions, they experienced while living in the PRPC. The refugee preferences and choices determined to a great extent what the PRPC environment would be like, from basic decisions such as where and with whom to live, to securing preferred foods, to running businesses and largely governing themselves.

In chapter one and at the end of chapter five, I identified three specific questions to be addressed. They were:

1. What was the PRPC? What did it do, how did it work, and why?
2. What was the response of the Vietnamese Refugee population to the PRPC? What did they do, how did they do what they did, and why?
3. What do answers to the above two questions contribute to our understanding of people experiencing dramatic changes in how they live their lives?

In response to question one I described in chapter six the PRPC as a refugee processing center through which the refugees passed on their way to resettlement in third countries. Further, I identified the primary institutional task of the PRPC as moving refugees. In describing the structure and "cycles" (chapters six and seven) through which the refugees passed, both during their stay in the

PRPC and as they lived on a daily basis I sought to answer "how" the PRPC worked.

In determining why the PRPC worked as it did, it was necessary to discuss one other question. Who was the primary client of the PRPC, the refugees, the local Filipino community, or the Philippines itself? There was no single primary client. The PRPC attempted to provide services to the refugees at the same time it provided opportunities to the local community. Sometimes those goals were incompatible, as in the case of the adolescent liquor vendace, the squatter community, and the work-credit system. In these instances the policies, rules, and regulations served more as a threat, a potential measure to implement if things got out of control. They existed as a reminder of who had ultimate control and under whose balance, leniency, and good offices everybody lived.

The range of decisions the refugees could make in choosing where to live and with whom, the sanctioning system, the initiation of refugees in providing grievances, and the actions of the administration in acting on grievances - all supported, and to some degree encouraged, autonomy among the refugees. Refugees' initiatives and their decision making organizations were validated when decisions they made were supported or accepted by the administration.

In one way greater refugee autonomy was desirable, because it resulted from the change to a civilian administration, which advocated more openness and cooperation. Greater autonomy was also inevitable, resulting from the necessity of retaining the cooperation of refugee leaders in running the camp, even if this led to unintentional consequences (e.g. the case of the unfunctioned mill leader described above). The result of these adaptations for everyone, refugees and staff alike, was more give and take, more gray areas and less black and white, more interdependence and less dependence.

The third and final question I sought to address concerned the refugees' responses to the PRPC. Part of the task of addressing this question involved defining how the refugees sustained the link between their immediate social goals involving their relationships with other refugees and the larger goal of achieving resettlement. The task then became one of demonstrating how the refugees achieved both their immediate and long term goals.

In chapter ten I defined a "successful" response to the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) as departing from the port for third country resettlement after the six months required to complete the State Department mandated training program in English as a second language and Cultural Orientation. I further discussed the discrepancy between the institutional demands of the PRPC and inter-

personal and social environment in which the refugees had to live.

The training program instituted in the camp and the rules and regulations designed to maintain order placed an emphasis on the prescribed and proscribed behavior of individuals. The refugees, however, came to the camp as participants in pre-existing interdependent social relationships based on events intensely experienced in Vietnam, the boat escapes from Vietnam, and in the first Syrian camps.

I then discussed two ways in which the refugees resolved the apparent conflict between the forced expectations of the institution and the internal expectations imposed by the social and physical environment which that institution required them to live in.

First, they used what they knew about other people, specifically other Vietnamese. Second, they used their learning ability as we to predict the outcome of events, to act, to validate or invalidate their predictions and generate new ones.

I then argued that the refugees' knowledge in the form of their expectations of the consequences of behavior coupled with their knowledge of the formal expectations of the camp and the consequences of violating or meeting these expectations, a knowledge negatively reinforced every time they passed the camp jail or the departure area, allowed

them to make fairly accurate predictions of the outcome of any of their daily decisions involving relationships with other people and thus make decisions affecting their successful or unsuccessful transition through the PRPC.

Conclusion: The Refugee Transition

The data in this dissertation is based on my experience living with refugees for two years in a kibbutz in the PRPC while conducting research. The refugees I have known have experienced all of the hardships as collectively associated with refugees: war, hunger, fear, the death of family and loved ones, persecution by a hostile authority, loss of status and a familiar place in society, loss of a future, loss of livelihood and values. They have also experienced the uncertainty of flight, and the mixed relief, confusion, and ambivalence of survival in a foreign land among strangers. Before they became refugees, however, they had experienced lives in which there was peace, stability, enough food to eat today and tomorrow, a place in society and a future for themselves and their children.

Consequently, the refugees in the PRPC know what they had lost as a result of the events that led them to make the decision to leave their homes and become refugees. They also know what they hoped to gain by their departure. In their discussion of migrants, including refugees, Hansen and Oliver-Smith give their view of migrants as, "people in

social units who think, learn, persuade, decide and act" (1982:8). Choosing to become a refugee is an active decision, a decision to try, by migrating, to preserve something of what people have learned life can be.

Being a refugee continues the learning process as people discover what the actual consequences of their decision to become refugees are going to be. Being a refugee means learning that there are alternative ways of acting to preserve the validity of their expectations of themselves as effective thinking and deciding individuals. It means learning to choose alternative behaviors that allow them as individuals to act to maintain their place in the family and society, to maintain their basic conceptions of what life should be like. Becoming a refugee also means not giving up on themselves and their ability to validate their conceptions of what kind of life they want and their expectations of how things should come out in the end. The clearest expression of these ideas is found in the work of Peter Berio:

We reexamine our experiences by placing them in the context of a familiar, reliable construction of reality. This structure in turn rests not only on the regularity of events themselves, but on the possibility of their meaning. (Martin 1976a:7)

In this dissertation I have presented data collected from my research in the FRG, largely in the form of case studies, that describes how the refugees who lived there

sought to maintain a "reliable construction of reality" and the ambiguity of the meaning of the events they experienced as a result of choosing to become refugees.

The view of refugees and one refugee camp, the PRPC, presented here is in contrast to the view that refugees are dependent or suffer from a "dependency syndrome" where the meaning of their decision to become refugees is subsumed and altered by the refugee camp environment. The "dependency" view of refugees and refugee camps presents the dictates of oppressive administration and bureaucracy in the form of rules and regulations and the sanctions imposed for violating them, as defining what it means to be a refugee.

The transition experienced by people becoming refugees, being refugees, and finally ending their refugee experience by being resettled in third countries or repatriated is a process. It is a process initiated by the refugees themselves in making the decision to leave and seek asylum. The process of transition leads to learning new, adaptive, behaviors to obtain the new ends that previously required behaviors no longer produce. It also means learning that previously acquired behaviors produce new, unintended, and sometimes adverse, consequences.

The refugee camp experience is one part of the refugee transition. Refugee camps represent a new and unfamiliar environment that people must learn to live in as part of a successful refugee transition. Refugees often must go

through a period of adjustment as they learn the constraints and opportunities presented by the refugee camp environment. Refugee behavior during this period may appear to an outsider as evidence of dependency. As I hope to have demonstrated, however, learning about the refugee camp environment is part of a continuing process of transition and does not represent the abdication of the initial motivations, goals and desires that led to the refugees' initial decision to leave their homes. Furthermore, there are limits to the extent that refugees surrender themselves to the refugee camp environment and when those limits are reached they will initiate and take action.

The cases presented in previous chapters illustrate that refugees do not come to these new experiences, as is so often implied, as children with limited experiences, histories, or time depth. They arrive with a wealth of prior learning upon which they will rely as much possible and build upon when coping with new experiences. The experience of being a refugee often leads to people reaffirming their learned goals and the learned conceptions of how people expect to be treated and to treat other people, that liberally define the people apart. Furthermore, refugees also learn that they can continue to act and produce desired outcomes, contrary to what many proponents of a "refugee dependency syndrome" assert.

Equally important is the fact that little of this kind of autonomy was perceptible from a cursory examination of the HRC, or an acceptance of the written rules, regulations, and policies as accurately expressing the relationship between the refugees and the host administration. Refugees, like people everywhere, attempt to create and maintain control over their lives and their environment. As anthropologists we should begin our search to understand the people we study with the expectation that, within cultural or institutional parameters, they may be as autonomy-seeking as we are. Vietnamese "boat people" do not invest great amounts of time and money, risk jail in Vietnam, storms and pirates at sea, to become passive dependents in refugee camps. It can happen, but it is not a foregone conclusion that it does. In other refugee camps, or at other times in the HRC, this might not have been the case, but it was during the period of my research.

The final lesson to be addressed is: What does this mean for our understanding of people experiencing dramatic changes in how they live their lives? The refugee transition represents rapid sociocultural change. Rapid sociocultural change leads to a direct confrontation between the acquired expectations, and what those undergoing the change expect as a result of all that they have learned, and what are, to them, new outcomes of behavior. These acquired expectations form the guide of social interaction

that guide people in making decisions about how to act and evaluate the actions of others. The acquired goals of social interaction are a fundamental part of people's understanding of the world in which they live. Consequently, they are not easily given up even during a difficult and uncertain period such as refugee encounter in a new sociocultural environment.

One of the problems with the current state of refugee studies and their applicability to the larger area of environmental change theory is as even emphatic as the effects of the environments in which refugees are found, such as resettlement countries, areas of repatriation, and especially refugee camps. Discounting the refugees' expectations and the decision making capability inherent in the refugees' own desires and goals leads to a kind of environmental determinism that is very misleading. This is one reason that the field of refugee studies is often characterized by theoretical approaches that use analogies between refugees and mental patients, concentration camp inmates, prisoners and children (see for example Chan 1981 and Chan and Lowndes 1987).

Approaches that emphasize the maintenance, recreation, and rebuilding of a way of life for both individuals and groups who have experienced a period of profound uncertainty provide a better portrayal and will lead to a better understanding of the refugee experience. The process of

integrating the field of refugee studies into sociocultural change theory must include research focused on specific behaviors, what refugees do. In addition researchers must seek to elicit from refugees, as much as possible, what they predict or predicted as an outcome of their actions. The result of the kind of research advocated here would be an attempt to determine what the refugees learned or are learning from their own attempts to understand, to find order in, and to try to control, the changes they are living through.

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After graduating from Merritt Island High School in 1970 I attended Howard Community College until May 1974 when I received an Associate of Arts degree. In the fall of 1976 I began attending the University of Florida. In 1979 I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology. After a period of time in the real world which included service in the Peace Corps in Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, I returned to the University of Florida in 1984. I pursued a second interdisciplinary Bachelor's degree incorporating the dual majors of anthropology and agricultural economics. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in August 1988. I entered graduate school in the fall of 1988 in pursuit of a Master's degree. In August 1989 I received a Master of Arts degree in anthropology and in June 1990 was admitted to candidacy for a PhD in anthropology.

In August 1989 I went to the Philippines to begin research on refugees in the Philippine Refugee Processing Center where I was to remain for two years until the fall of 1990. In the fall of 1990 I again returned to the University of Florida where I began writing this dissertation.

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